7 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1896–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mitchell v. Hardwickgreen2 sentences2004If it had, and the South Carolina Supreme Court retroactively invalidated the probate statute, a "disruption of the orderly probate process" would occur. 374 S.E.2d at 682 ; see also id. at 683 (discussing of the facts on hand, the Mitchell court stated that "the estate has never been formally probated and, therefore, the disruption of the probate process would not occur in this situation"). [16] The Mitchell rule was a modification of the test set forth in Williamson . 2004If it had, and the South Carolina Supreme Court retroactively invalidated the probate statute, a "disruption of the orderly probate process" would occur. 374 S.E.2d at 682 ; see also id. at 683 (discussing of the facts on hand, the Mitchell court stated that "the estate has never been formally probated and, therefore, the disruption of the probate process would not occur in this situation"). [16] The Mitchell rule was a modification of the test set forth in Williamson . | 1 | 1 |
Sawada v. Endogreen2 sentences1981Sawada v. Endo, 57 Haw. 608, 612-13 , 561 P.2d 1291, 1295 (1977); jee HRS Chapter 509. 7 But in Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Haw. 455 (1958), we acknowledged that the rule and its underlying notions were borrowed from the common law when we said the statute “preserves the common law prohibition based upon the concept of legal identity of husband and wife.” Id. at 458 . 8 The Massachusetts statute, G.L., ch. 209, § 6, as amended by St. 1963, c. 765, § 2, read as follows: A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if she were sole; but this section shall not authorize suits between husb 1981Sawada v. Endo, 57 Haw. 608, 612-13 , 561 P.2d 1291, 1295 (1977); jee HRS Chapter 509. 7 But in Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Haw. 455 (1958), we acknowledged that the rule and its underlying notions were borrowed from the common law when we said the statute “preserves the common law prohibition based upon the concept of legal identity of husband and wife.” Id. at 458 . 8 The Massachusetts statute, G.L., ch. 209, § 6, as amended by St. 1963, c. 765, § 2, read as follows: A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if she were sole; but this section shall not authorize suits between husb | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vorfeld v. Vorfeld
green
2 sentences2019Father had to show that the "relevant circumstances that are proven to exist at the time of the modification hearing are materially different from [his] relevant circumstances that were proven to exist when the family court entered its spousal support order." Vorfeld v. Vorfeld, 8 Haw. 2019App. 391 , 402, 804 P.2d 891 , 897 (1991). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Cassiday v. Cassiday
green
1 sentence1991As outlined in Cassiday v. Cassiday, 6 Haw. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Peters v. Peters
green
2 sentences1986It did. however, state: We do not foreclose the possibility of a modification of the rule in other contexts where there may be overriding policy or constitutional concerns, for the considerations supporting immunity are not the same in every adversary situation that may develop between husband and wife. 63 Haw. at 659 n. 9, 634 P.2d at 590 n. 9. 1986It did. however, state: We do not foreclose the possibility of a modification of the rule in other contexts where there may be overriding policy or constitutional concerns, for the considerations supporting immunity are not the same in every adversary situation that may develop between husband and wife. 63 Haw. at 659 n. 9, 634 P.2d at 590 n. 9. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Petersen Ex Rel. Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu
green
2 sentences1981In Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51 Haw. 74 , 450 P.2d 998 (1969), and Petersen v. City & County, 51 Haw. 484 , 462 P.2d 1007 (1969), it was urged upon us that policy considerations similar to those supporting interspousal tort immunity also compelled an approval of parent-child immunity. 1981In Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51 Haw. 74 , 450 P.2d 998 (1969), and Petersen v. City & County, 51 Haw. 484 , 462 P.2d 1007 (1969), it was urged upon us that policy considerations similar to those supporting interspousal tort immunity also compelled an approval of parent-child immunity. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Tugaeff ex rel. Tugaeff v. Tugaeff
green
2 sentences1981Sawada v. Endo, 57 Haw. 608, 612-13 , 561 P.2d 1291, 1295 (1977); jee HRS Chapter 509. 7 But in Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Haw. 455 (1958), we acknowledged that the rule and its underlying notions were borrowed from the common law when we said the statute “preserves the common law prohibition based upon the concept of legal identity of husband and wife.” Id. at 458 . 8 The Massachusetts statute, G.L., ch. 209, § 6, as amended by St. 1963, c. 765, § 2, read as follows: A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if she were sole; but this section shall not authorize suits between husb 1981Sawada v. Endo, 57 Haw. 608, 612-13 , 561 P.2d 1291, 1295 (1977); jee HRS Chapter 509. 7 But in Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Haw. 455 (1958), we acknowledged that the rule and its underlying notions were borrowed from the common law when we said the statute “preserves the common law prohibition based upon the concept of legal identity of husband and wife.” Id. at 458 . 8 The Massachusetts statute, G.L., ch. 209, § 6, as amended by St. 1963, c. 765, § 2, read as follows: A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if she were sole; but this section shall not authorize suits between husb | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Tamashiro v. De Gama
green
2 sentences1981In Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51 Haw. 74 , 450 P.2d 998 (1969), and Petersen v. City & County, 51 Haw. 484 , 462 P.2d 1007 (1969), it was urged upon us that policy considerations similar to those supporting interspousal tort immunity also compelled an approval of parent-child immunity. 1981In Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51 Haw. 74 , 450 P.2d 998 (1969), and Petersen v. City & County, 51 Haw. 484 , 462 P.2d 1007 (1969), it was urged upon us that policy considerations similar to those supporting interspousal tort immunity also compelled an approval of parent-child immunity. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Frank v. Stratford-Handcock
green
1 sentence1919This seems to be a concrete statement of the better rule, for, as said in Frank v. Stratford-Handcock, 77 Pac. 134 , the doctrine seems still to be maintained but in modern equity practice it has become very much narrowed in its application by the recognition of a number of so-called exceptions, though the exceptions are so thoroughly established that it would seem more accurate to consider them a part of or a modification of the doctrine itself. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Railway Co. v. Roberts
neutral
1 sentence1896Railway Co. v. Roberts, 56 Ark. 387 . | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.