modification rule in Kansas

2011K.S.A.2009 Supp. 21-4611(c)(8) K.S.A.2009 Supp. 21-4611(c)(8) states in pertinent part: "The court may modify or extend the offender's period of supervision, pursuant to a modification hearing and a judicial finding of necessity." See State v. Freeman, 32 Kan.App.2d 1027, 1028 , 93 P.3d 1223 , rev. denied 278 Kan. 849 (2004) (citing Gordon, 275 Kan. at 405-06 , 66 P.3d 903 ) ("extension of the duration of probation may only be accomplished under subsection [c][8] pursuant to a modification hearing and a finding of judicial necessity").

2011K.S.A.2009 Supp. 21-4611(c)(8) K.S.A.2009 Supp. 21-4611(c)(8) states in pertinent part: "The court may modify or extend the offender's period of supervision, pursuant to a modification hearing and a judicial finding of necessity." See State v. Freeman, 32 Kan.App.2d 1027, 1028 , 93 P.3d 1223 , rev. denied 278 Kan. 849 (2004) (citing Gordon, 275 Kan. at 405-06 , 66 P.3d 903 ) ("extension of the duration of probation may only be accomplished under subsection [c][8] pursuant to a modification hearing and a finding of judicial necessity").

2011K.S.A.2009 Supp. 21-4611(c)(8) K.S.A.2009 Supp. 21-4611(c)(8) states in pertinent part: "The court may modify or extend the offender's period of supervision, pursuant to a modification hearing and a judicial finding of necessity." See State v. Freeman, 32 Kan.App.2d 1027, 1028 , 93 P.3d 1223 , rev. denied 278 Kan. 849 (2004) (citing Gordon, 275 Kan. at 405-06 , 66 P.3d 903 ) ("extension of the duration of probation may only be accomplished under subsection [c][8] pursuant to a modification hearing and a finding of judicial necessity").

2011K.S.A.2009 Supp. 21-4611(c)(8) K.S.A.2009 Supp. 21-4611(c)(8) states in pertinent part: "The court may modify or extend the offender's period of supervision, pursuant to a modification hearing and a judicial finding of necessity." See State v. Freeman, 32 Kan.App.2d 1027, 1028 , 93 P.3d 1223 , rev. denied 278 Kan. 849 (2004) (citing Gordon, 275 Kan. at 405-06 , 66 P.3d 903 ) ("extension of the duration of probation may only be accomplished under subsection [c][8] pursuant to a modification hearing and a finding of judicial necessity").

2003“When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment. [Citation omitted.]” Kaul v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 266 Kan. 464 , 471, 970 P.2d 60 (1998), cert. denied 528 U.S. 812 (1999).

2003“When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment. [Citation omitted.]” Kaul v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 266 Kan. 464 , 471, 970 P.2d 60 (1998), cert. denied 528 U.S. 812 (1999).

2003“When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment. [Citation omitted.]” Kaul v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 266 Kan. 464 , 471, 970 P.2d 60 (1998), cert. denied 528 U.S. 812 (1999).

2001His citation to State v. Duke, 10 Kan.

1997Where the defendant appears pro se, as did Buckland, he should be permitted to appear on his own behalf at the modification hearing.” Buckland, 245 Kan. at 142 .

1991“A person may stand his ground and use deadly force if this reasonably seems necessary to save himself.” Wiggins requested the following modification of the instruction: “Such justification requires both the belief on the part of a defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person, in the position of the defendant, to that belief.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court determined that State v. Simon, 231 Kan. 572 , 646 P.2d 1119 (1982), required the use of an objective standard to determine reasonableness and denied the use of a modified instruction.

1991“A person may stand his ground and use deadly force if this reasonably seems necessary to save himself.” Wiggins requested the following modification of the instruction: “Such justification requires both the belief on the part of a defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person, in the position of the defendant, to that belief.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court determined that State v. Simon, 231 Kan. 572 , 646 P.2d 1119 (1982), required the use of an objective standard to determine reasonableness and denied the use of a modified instruction.

1966In a murder case, State v. Post, 139 Kan. 345 , 30 P. 2d 1089 , the instruction was approved where the jury’s consideration was limited to the purpose of determining intention.

1966In a murder case, State v. Post, 139 Kan. 345 , 30 P. 2d 1089 , the instruction was approved where the jury’s consideration was limited to the purpose of determining intention.

1955Perhaps, of all our decisions, the case closest in point is Cretcher v. Machine Works Co., 116 Kan. 54 , 225 Pac. 1041 .

1955Perhaps, of all our decisions, the case closest in point is Cretcher v. Machine Works Co., 116 Kan. 54 , 225 Pac. 1041 .

1955Encycl. of L. 829.)” A more recent expression of the court, dealing with the modification and waiver of written agreements by parol, wherein the rule announced in the case last above cited is recognized, adhered to, discussed and applied is Alexander v. Flick, 154 Kan. 446 , 119 P. 2d 464 .

1955Encycl. of L. 829.)” A more recent expression of the court, dealing with the modification and waiver of written agreements by parol, wherein the rule announced in the case last above cited is recognized, adhered to, discussed and applied is Alexander v. Flick, 154 Kan. 446 , 119 P. 2d 464 .

1935(Fraker v. Cullum, 21 Kan. 555 ; National Bank v. Hoover, 114 Kan. 394, 400 , 218 Pac. 1003 ; Holloway v. Gano, 120 Kan. 256 , 243 Pac. 317 ; id., 125 Kan. 3, 6, 7 , 262 Pac. 573 ; Baron v. Lyman, 136 Kan. 842, 852, 853 , 18 P. 2d 137 .) In Hocknell v. Sheley, 66 Kan. 357 , 71 Pac. 839 , it was said: “The fraudulent alteration of a promissory note in a material respect destroys the note as a cause of action and will defeat a recovery on the original consideration, and if the note is secured by a mortgage such alteration operates io discharge the mortgage.” (Syl.) The only modification of the r

1935(Fraker v. Cullum, 21 Kan. 555 ; National Bank v. Hoover, 114 Kan. 394, 400 , 218 Pac. 1003 ; Holloway v. Gano, 120 Kan. 256 , 243 Pac. 317 ; id., 125 Kan. 3, 6, 7 , 262 Pac. 573 ; Baron v. Lyman, 136 Kan. 842, 852, 853 , 18 P. 2d 137 .) In Hocknell v. Sheley, 66 Kan. 357 , 71 Pac. 839 , it was said: “The fraudulent alteration of a promissory note in a material respect destroys the note as a cause of action and will defeat a recovery on the original consideration, and if the note is secured by a mortgage such alteration operates io discharge the mortgage.” (Syl.) The only modification of the r

1935(Fraker v. Cullum, 21 Kan. 555 ; National Bank v. Hoover, 114 Kan. 394, 400 , 218 Pac. 1003 ; Holloway v. Gano, 120 Kan. 256 , 243 Pac. 317 ; id., 125 Kan. 3, 6, 7 , 262 Pac. 573 ; Baron v. Lyman, 136 Kan. 842, 852, 853 , 18 P. 2d 137 .) In Hocknell v. Sheley, 66 Kan. 357 , 71 Pac. 839 , it was said: “The fraudulent alteration of a promissory note in a material respect destroys the note as a cause of action and will defeat a recovery on the original consideration, and if the note is secured by a mortgage such alteration operates io discharge the mortgage.” (Syl.) The only modification of the r

1935(Fraker v. Cullum, 21 Kan. 555 ; National Bank v. Hoover, 114 Kan. 394, 400 , 218 Pac. 1003 ; Holloway v. Gano, 120 Kan. 256 , 243 Pac. 317 ; id., 125 Kan. 3, 6, 7 , 262 Pac. 573 ; Baron v. Lyman, 136 Kan. 842, 852, 853 , 18 P. 2d 137 .) In Hocknell v. Sheley, 66 Kan. 357 , 71 Pac. 839 , it was said: “The fraudulent alteration of a promissory note in a material respect destroys the note as a cause of action and will defeat a recovery on the original consideration, and if the note is secured by a mortgage such alteration operates io discharge the mortgage.” (Syl.) The only modification of the r

1935(Fraker v. Cullum, 21 Kan. 555 ; National Bank v. Hoover, 114 Kan. 394, 400 , 218 Pac. 1003 ; Holloway v. Gano, 120 Kan. 256 , 243 Pac. 317 ; id., 125 Kan. 3, 6, 7 , 262 Pac. 573 ; Baron v. Lyman, 136 Kan. 842, 852, 853 , 18 P. 2d 137 .) In Hocknell v. Sheley, 66 Kan. 357 , 71 Pac. 839 , it was said: “The fraudulent alteration of a promissory note in a material respect destroys the note as a cause of action and will defeat a recovery on the original consideration, and if the note is secured by a mortgage such alteration operates io discharge the mortgage.” (Syl.) The only modification of the r

1935(Fraker v. Cullum, 21 Kan. 555 ; National Bank v. Hoover, 114 Kan. 394, 400 , 218 Pac. 1003 ; Holloway v. Gano, 120 Kan. 256 , 243 Pac. 317 ; id., 125 Kan. 3, 6, 7 , 262 Pac. 573 ; Baron v. Lyman, 136 Kan. 842, 852, 853 , 18 P. 2d 137 .) In Hocknell v. Sheley, 66 Kan. 357 , 71 Pac. 839 , it was said: “The fraudulent alteration of a promissory note in a material respect destroys the note as a cause of action and will defeat a recovery on the original consideration, and if the note is secured by a mortgage such alteration operates io discharge the mortgage.” (Syl.) The only modification of the r

1935(Fraker v. Cullum, 21 Kan. 555 ; National Bank v. Hoover, 114 Kan. 394, 400 , 218 Pac. 1003 ; Holloway v. Gano, 120 Kan. 256 , 243 Pac. 317 ; id., 125 Kan. 3, 6, 7 , 262 Pac. 573 ; Baron v. Lyman, 136 Kan. 842, 852, 853 , 18 P. 2d 137 .) In Hocknell v. Sheley, 66 Kan. 357 , 71 Pac. 839 , it was said: “The fraudulent alteration of a promissory note in a material respect destroys the note as a cause of action and will defeat a recovery on the original consideration, and if the note is secured by a mortgage such alteration operates io discharge the mortgage.” (Syl.) The only modification of the r

1931Appellant in conclusion cites Herriman v. Shomon, 24 Kan. 387 ; Jones v. Inness, 32 Kan. 177 , 4 Pac. 95 ; and Haverty v. Haverty, 35 Kan. 438 , 11 Pac. 364 , showing the right of one situated as plaintiff was to relief as sought in these actions and by a motion to set aside the judgment.

1931Appellant in conclusion cites Herriman v. Shomon, 24 Kan. 387 ; Jones v. Inness, 32 Kan. 177 , 4 Pac. 95 ; and Haverty v. Haverty, 35 Kan. 438 , 11 Pac. 364 , showing the right of one situated as plaintiff was to relief as sought in these actions and by a motion to set aside the judgment.

1931Appellant in conclusion cites Herriman v. Shomon, 24 Kan. 387 ; Jones v. Inness, 32 Kan. 177 , 4 Pac. 95 ; and Haverty v. Haverty, 35 Kan. 438 , 11 Pac. 364 , showing the right of one situated as plaintiff was to relief as sought in these actions and by a motion to set aside the judgment.

1931Appellant in conclusion cites Herriman v. Shomon, 24 Kan. 387 ; Jones v. Inness, 32 Kan. 177 , 4 Pac. 95 ; and Haverty v. Haverty, 35 Kan. 438 , 11 Pac. 364 , showing the right of one situated as plaintiff was to relief as sought in these actions and by a motion to set aside the judgment.

1907It is also urged that as the supreme court has held inferentially in the case of Cook v. The People, 125 Ill. 278 , 17 N. E. 849 , that quinine is not a domestic remedy, it was error to submit to the jury, as the instructions did, the determination of whether that drug is a domestic remedy.

1907It is also urged that as the supreme court has held inferentially in the case of Cook v. The People, 125 Ill. 278 , 17 N. E. 849 , that quinine is not a domestic remedy, it was error to submit to the jury, as the instructions did, the determination of whether that drug is a domestic remedy.

1906The modification of the instruction is readily distinguishable (Campbell v. Fuller, 25 Kan. 723 ), and the plaintiff has lost nothing by reason of the court’s conduct respecting it.

1878P. Railway Co. v. Cutter, 19 Kas. 83 .) This instruction so given was simply a modification of instruction asked by the plaintiffs.