version rule in Pennsylvania

2016Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1102 (internal citation and footnote omitted).

2016Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1102 (internal citation and footnote omitted). ____________________________________________ 3 Rule 600 was revised in 2012, and the current version of the rule became effective on July 1, 2013, prior to Appellant’s filing of his pretrial motion to dismiss. -7- J-S19002-16 Here, the Commonwealth filed an initial criminal complaint on June 20, 2013, which it later withdrew and refiled charges on July 19, 2013.

2016See Commonwealth v. Roles, 116 A.3d 122 , 124 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Brock, 61 A.3d 1015 , 1016 n.2 (Pa. 2013) (noting that former Rule 600 applies because the criminal complaint was filed prior to the effective date of the new version of the rule)).

2015See Roles, 116 A.3d at 124 n.4. -8- J.A25037/15 could not be apprehended because his whereabouts were unknown and could not be determined by due diligence; any period of time for which the defendant expressly waives Rule 600; and/or such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from: (a) the unavailability of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney; (b) any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.

2015We observe: While it is technically accurate that a complete failure to file, or failure to timely file, a Rule 1925(b) statement results in waiver of the issues, [Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 432-33 (Pa.Super.2009)], under the current version of the rule, a finding of waiver does not necessarily end the trial court’s analysis or require it to ignore the issues raised.

2012Our Court noted the bright-line waiver rule established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Lord and its progeny, but determined that, under the current version of the rule, “the remedy now for failure to file a 1925 concise statement is remand to allow nunc pro tunc filing of the statement.” Id. at 431 .

2006REM Coal Company Inc. v. Clark Equipment Company, 386 Pa. Super. 401, 413 , 563 A.2d 128, 134 (1989). (emphasis added) Therefore, the outcome here turns on what is considered to be the “product itself’?

2006REM Coal Company Inc. v. Clark Equipment Company, 386 Pa. Super. 401, 413 , 563 A.2d 128, 134 (1989). (emphasis added) Therefore, the outcome here turns on what is considered to be the “product itself’?

2024James Healthcare v. Cole, 178 P.3d 696, 705 (Mont. 2008) (citing Balboa and holding that “speech and conduct that is (continued…) [J-51-2023] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 16 The Majority’s embrace of this regrettable rule, at a time in which even the classic version of the rule has been widely questioned, 61 will rob equity courts of their power to award any measure of justice at all to tort victims who lack an adequate legal remedy.

2023“This rule mandates that the court resolve factual disputes by hearing evidence, rather than making a non-evidentiary judgment on the basis of the disputed factual allegations.” C.G. v. J.H., 172 A.3d 43, 54 (Pa. Super. 2017), affirmed, 193 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2018).

2023We quote from the current version of the rule. -5- J-A27045-22 shall consider evidence by depositions or otherwise.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(2); see also id., Note (“Preliminary objections raising an issue under subdivision (a)(1) [relating to, inter alia, objections to improper venue] cannot be determined from facts of record”).

2023Accordingly, the Court concluded that the expert’s testimony and the DNA report fell beyond the purview of the Confrontation Clause. [J-12-2023] - 25 In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas opined that the plurality had essentially created a new primary purpose test, which he viewed as chiefly focused upon whether a statement was intended to accuse a targeted individual engaged in criminal conduct; however, Justice Thomas submitted that this version of the test “lacks any grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in logic.” Williams, 567 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring in

2023In dissent, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that the expert’s testimony was “functionally identical to the ‘surrogate testimony’ that New Mexico proffered in Bullcoming.” Id. at 124 (Kagan, J., dissenting).22 Moreover, Justice Kagan, like Justice Thomas, derided the plurality’s newly declared focus of the primary purpose test, stressing that none of the Court’s prior cases “has ever suggested that,” to be testimonial in nature, “the statement must be meant to accuse a previously identified individual.” Id. at 135 (citation omitted).

2023If the sentence is to run concurrently, the sentence shall commence from the date of imposition unless otherwise ordered by the judge.” Furthermore, while the rule has slightly changed in more recent years, the Commonwealth Court has been clear that under the previous version of this rule, “a sentencing judge cannot direct that a sentence commence on a date prior to the date of sentencing when the defendant is serving time on an unrelated charge.” Doxsey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., 674 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Pa. [Cmwlth.] 1996).[1] Even if the [c]ourt had the discretion to provide credi

2021We therefore cite the old language of Rule 1925(b)(4)(ii), as that is the version of the rule that governed Frempong’s Rule 1925(b) statement. 8 1925(a) opinion”); Commonwealth v. McCree, 857 A.2d 188, 192 (Pa. Super. 2004), aff’d, 924 A.2d 621 (Pa. 2007) (stating that a Rule 1925(b) statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issue raised on appeal is “the functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all”).

2020Instead, he merely provided the version of the rule which was in effect in 2006, as cited in Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1176 (Pa. 2012). - 19 - J-A12037-20 and (4) corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

2020See Brown, 52 A.3d at 1176 .

2016See Commonwealth v. Roles, 116 A.3d 122 , 124 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Brock, 61 A.3d 1015 , 1016 n.2 (Pa. 2013) (noting that former Rule 600 applies because the criminal complaint was filed prior to the effective date of the new version of the rule)).

2014In Commonwealth v. Huggins, 68 A.3d 962, 966 (Pa.Super. 2013), we addressed a related, but dissimilar, argument concerning “whether the same witness may be proffered to testify regarding both lay and expert opinions without usurping the jury's fact-finding function.” After reviewing the relevant rules of evidence, we concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting both aspects of the opinion testimony therein because both the expert and the lay opinions offered by the witness satisfied the corresponding rules of evidence.

2012See Id.

2009See generally Zokaites Contracting Inc., v. Trant Corp., 968 A.2d 1282 (Pa.Super. 2009); Dental Care Associates Inc.; Varner. [8] Regardless, serious doubt exists as to whether under the old rule a certificate of merit would even be required for allegations against an unincorporated association.

2002See Laich, 566 Pa. at 32 , 777 A.2d at 1064-65 (Castille, J., dissenting).

2002See Laich, 566 Pa. at 32 , 777 A.2d at 1064-65 (Castille, J., dissenting).

2001Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equipment Co., 407 Pa. Super. 378, 385-86 , 595 A.2d 1198, 1201 (1991) (“purely economic losses cannot be recovered where the plaintiff’s action sounded solely in negligence or strict liability”).

2001Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equipment Co., 407 Pa. Super. 378, 385-86 , 595 A.2d 1198, 1201 (1991) (“purely economic losses cannot be recovered where the plaintiff’s action sounded solely in negligence or strict liability”).

2000Like the gist of the action doctrine, the purpose of the economic loss doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, is “maintaining the separate spheres of the law of contract and tort.” New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 387 Pa. Super. 537, 550 , 564 A.2d 919, 925 (1989). 11 The Commonwealth’s version of the doctrine precludes recovery for economic losses in a negligence action where the plaintiff has suffered no physical or property damage.

2000Like the gist of the action doctrine, the purpose of the economic loss doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, is “maintaining the separate spheres of the law of contract and tort.” New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 387 Pa. Super. 537, 550 , 564 A.2d 919, 925 (1989). 11 The Commonwealth’s version of the doctrine precludes recovery for economic losses in a negligence action where the plaintiff has suffered no physical or property damage.

2000Spivack v. Berks Ridge Corp. Inc., 402 Pa. Super. 73, 78 , 586 A.2d 402, 405 (1990) (“economic losses may not be recovered in tort (negligence) absent physical injury or property damage”); Aikens v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.

2000Spivack v. Berks Ridge Corp. Inc., 402 Pa. Super. 73, 78 , 586 A.2d 402, 405 (1990) (“economic losses may not be recovered in tort (negligence) absent physical injury or property damage”); Aikens v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.