version rule in Indiana

2024Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-886 | September 4, 2024 Page 6 of 9 date.” Battering, 150 N.E.3d at 601 (quotation omitted). “[A] defendant generally waives rights under Rule 4(C) by failing to offer a timely objection to trial dates set outside the one-year limitation, unless the setting of that date occurs after the one-year period has expired.” Id.; see also State v. Larkin, 100 N.E.3d 700, 704 (Ind. 2018) (“A defendant waives his right to be brought to trial within the period by failing to raise a timely objection if, during the period, the trial court schedules trial beyond t

2014BSU argues that we have jurisdiction over this appeal under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(3), which governs interlocutory appeals as of right and allows such an appeal from any order “[t]o compel the delivery or assignment of any securities, evidence of debt, documents or things in action.” 2 Our supreme court has held that this rule applies to “trial court orders which carry financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in final judgments: payment of money, issuance of a debt, delivery of securities, and so on.” State v. Hogan, 582 N.E.2d 824, 825 (Ind.1991) (discussing a

2014BSU argues that we have jurisdiction over this appeal under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(3), which governs interlocutory appeals as of right and allows such an appeal from any order “[t]o compel the delivery or assignment of any securities, evidence of debt, documents or things in action.”2 Our supreme court has held that this rule applies to “trial court orders which carry financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in final judgments: payment of money, issuance of a debt, delivery of securities, and so on.” State v. Hogan, 582 N.E.2d 824, 825 (Ind. 1991) (discussing a

2014See In re J.T.D., No. 45S03-1406-AD-387, 2014 WL 6843629 (Ind. Dec. 4, 2014).

2012See Bates v. State, 495 N.E.2d 176, 178 (Ind. 1986); Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied; Moore v. State, 827 N.E.2d 631, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. 6 Sentence Hicks also contends that his aggregate ninety-five year sentence is inappropriate, and therefore requests that we revise his sentence.

2012See Bates v. State, 495 N.E.2d 176, 178 (Ind. 1986); Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied; Moore v. State, 827 N.E.2d 631, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. 6 Sentence Hicks also contends that his aggregate ninety-five year sentence is inappropriate, and therefore requests that we revise his sentence.

2012See Bates v. State, 495 N.E.2d 176, 178 (Ind. 1986); Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied; Moore v. State, 827 N.E.2d 631, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. 6 Sentence Hicks also contends that his aggregate ninety-five year sentence is inappropriate, and therefore requests that we revise his sentence.

2012See id. 21 Id. at 410-11 (citations omitted).

2012See id. 21 Id. at 410-11 (citations omitted).

2012Id.; see also Farris v. State, 787 N.E.2d 979 , 981 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

2008With regard to the entrustor’s knowledge of the entrustee’s incapacitation, “Indiana follows a strict version of this rule, requiring that the actor have actual knowledge that the driver is intoxicated at the time he entrusts the car to him.” Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert, 431 N.E.2d 534, 537 (Ind.Ct.App.1982). “[E]videnee which reveals that the owner could have known or should have known of the driver’s unfitness to drive is not sufficient under present law to impose liability.” Stocker v. Cataldi 489 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (opinion on reh’g), trans. denied.

2008With regard to the entrustor’s knowledge of the entrustee’s incapacitation, “Indiana follows a strict version of this rule, requiring that the actor have actual knowledge that the driver is intoxicated at the time he entrusts the car to him.” Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert, 431 N.E.2d 534, 537 (Ind.Ct.App.1982). “[E]videnee which reveals that the owner could have known or should have known of the driver’s unfitness to drive is not sufficient under present law to impose liability.” Stocker v. Cataldi 489 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (opinion on reh’g), trans. denied.

2004Donnelley & Sons Co. v. North Texas Steel, 752 N.E.2d 112, 128 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied.

2004As the State acknowledges, in State v. Albright, 632 N.E.2d 725, 725 (Ind.1994), our supreme court, in addressing a former version of the rule, stated: 260 IAC 1.1-4-8(1) requires a twenty[-Iminute waiting period prior to the administration of the Intoxilyzer test, during which time the subject may not have had any foreign substance in his mouth.

2004As the State acknowledges, in State v. Albright, 632 N.E.2d 725, 725 (Ind.1994), our supreme court, in addressing a former version of the rule, stated: 260 IAC 1.1-4-8(1) requires a twenty[-]minute waiting period prior to the administration of the Intoxilyzer test, during which time the subject may not have had any foreign substance in his mouth.

2004Bridges points out that the former version of this rule, ADR Rule 2.12, included an additional sentence which provided as follows: "This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of the mediation process." See Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind.2000); RR.