version rule in Utah

2017P. 22(e) (2015) 15 (“The court may correct an illegal sentence . . . at any time.”); State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 20 , 353 P.3d 55 (“Rule 22(e) operates as [a] limited exception to the preservation doctrine.” (citation omitted)), as amended (Mar. 13, 2015), reh’g denied (June 30, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2005 (2016); State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982) (allowing appellate courts to entertain issues sua sponte “in rare cases” based on the old version of rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence). ¶53 The foregoing standards for exercising appellate review of issues waived on app

2017P. 22(e) (2015) 15 (“The court may correct an illegal sentence . . . at any time.”); State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 20 , 353 P.3d 55 (“Rule 22(e) operates as [a] limited exception to the preservation doctrine.” (citation omitted)), as amended (Mar. 13, 2015), reh’g denied (June 30, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2005 (2016); State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982) (allowing appellate courts to entertain issues sua sponte “in rare cases” based on the old version of rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence). ¶53 The foregoing standards for exercising appellate review of issues waived on app

2022The earlier version of rule 103 stated, (continued…) 20191079-CA 18 2022 UT App 23 Kelly v. Timber Lakes Criminal Procedure (rule 19), see Labrum, 2000 Utah L.

2022The earlier version of rule 103 stated, (continued…) 20191079-CA 18 2022 UT App 23 Kelly v. Timber Lakes Criminal Procedure (rule 19), see Labrum, 2000 Utah L.

2016Because the pertinent amendments are organizational and stylistic, we cite to the current version of the rule. 2 Cite as: 2016 UT 53 Opinion of the Court the Second District Court‘s 1975 order (1975 Order) approving the sale of Mr. McBroom‘s stock in R.C.

2016Because the pertinent amendments are organizational and stylistic, we cite to the current version of the rule. 2 Cite as: 2016 UT 53 Opinion of the Court the Second District Court’s 1975 order (1975 Order) approving the sale of Mr. McBroom’s stock in R.C.

2026We therefore cite the current version of the rule for convenience. 20230024-CA 23 2026 UT App 54 Cook Martin Poulson PC v. Smith reversal of the district court’s dismissal of his claims against the Other Shareholders. ¶42 Although the Other Shareholders have presented no arguments on this point, CMP has.

2025In Boyer, we affirmed the admission of testimony from a psychiatrist about “the behaviors and symptoms consistent with child sexual abuse victims,” where that testimony was based on the expert’s “thirty years of experience working with child abuse victims.” 2020 UT App 23, ¶ 42 .

2025The rule generally does not vest the district court with discretion to deny such a stay, and so some have referred to a stay to enforce a money judgment as a matter of right.8 See, e.g., Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 , 1027 __________________________________________________________ 8 We say “generally” because rule 62(b) includes a subpart— 62(b)(2)—which vests the court with discretion to stay certain (continued . . .) 6 Cite as: 2025 UT 20 Opinion of the Court (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam) (stating “a money judgment will be stayed as a matter of right upon posting a supersedeas bo

2025The rule generally does not vest the district court with discretion to deny such a stay, and so some have referred to a stay to enforce a money judgment as a matter of right.8 See, e.g., Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 , 1027 __________________________________________________________ 8 We say “generally” because rule 62(b) includes a subpart— 62(b)(2)—which vests the court with discretion to stay certain (continued . . .) 6 Cite as: 2025 UT 20 Opinion of the Court (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam) (stating “a money judgment will be stayed as a matter of right upon posting a supersedeas bo

2025However, the version of the rule interpreted in Reisbeck is substantively similar, for our purposes, to the current rule. 20240530-CA 11 2025 UT App 113 Sankey v. Sawyer and not her—to prepare an affidavit of costs, and she maintains that, under such circumstances, her appellate-finality clock has, even now, not started ticking because the Sawyers never filed any such affidavit.

2025In State v. Loose, for example, our supreme court held (albeit while addressing a case decided under a previous version of the rule) that “the trial court did not err” in allowing a social worker to offer expert testimony that “he had seen some of the behaviors he saw in [the victim] in other children who had been sexually abused.” 2000 UT 11, ¶ 11 , 994 P.2d 1237 .

2025In State v. Loose, for example, our supreme court held (albeit while addressing a case decided under a previous version of the rule) that “the trial court did not err” in allowing a social worker to offer expert testimony that “he had seen some of the behaviors he saw in [the victim] in other children who had been sexually abused.” 2000 UT 11, ¶ 11 , 994 P.2d 1237 .

2024And I do not believe we should presume that the Shelledy court made a mistake worthy __________________________________________________________ 80 See supra ¶ 72 (describing the Singleton plurality); supra ¶ 58 n.9 (noting that a majority of the Court had since adopted the Singleton plurality’s position). 81 499 U.S. 400 , 410–11 (1991) (recognizing third-party standing upon satisfaction of the requirements that “the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests” (cleaned up)). 82 See

2024But the advisory committee’s note to the current version of rule 35— which applies in labor commission cases, to the extent that labor commission rules do not contradict it, see Barker v. Labor Comm’n, 2023 UT App 31, ¶ 11 , 528 P.3d 1260 , cert. denied, 534 P.3d 751 (Utah 2023)—makes clear that such examinations should no longer be referred to as IMEs.

2024But the advisory committee’s note to the current version of rule 35— which applies in labor commission cases, to the extent that labor commission rules do not contradict it, see Barker v. Labor Comm’n, 2023 UT App 31, ¶ 11 , 528 P.3d 1260 , cert. denied, 534 P.3d 751 (Utah 2023)—makes clear that such examinations should no longer be referred to as IMEs.

2024The __________________________________________________________ be made available to the prosecutor . . . .”), with id.

2024And I do not believe we should presume that the Shelledy court made a mistake worthy __________________________________________________________ 80 See supra ¶ 72 (describing the Singleton plurality); supra ¶ 58 n.9 (noting that a majority of the Court had since adopted the Singleton plurality’s position). 81 499 U.S. 400 , 410–11 (1991) (recognizing third-party standing upon satisfaction of the requirements that “the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests” (cleaned up)). 82 See

2023But to the extent that Clayton asks us to apply the new rule as a “clarifying amendment”—something he alludes to in his reply brief—we decline that invitation, because our supreme court has “expressly repudiate[d] the notion of” a “‘clarification’ exception to the general rule against retroactivity.” See State v. Steinly, 2015 UT 15, ¶ 11 , 345 P.3d 1182 . 20210890-CA 7 2023 UT App 84 State v. Clayton & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 30 , 299 P.3d 1058 (quotation simplified).

2023But to the extent that Clayton asks us to apply the new rule as a “clarifying amendment”—something he alludes to in his reply brief—we decline that invitation, because our supreme court has “expressly repudiate[d] the notion of” a “‘clarification’ exception to the general rule against retroactivity.” See State v. Steinly, 2015 UT 15, ¶ 11 , 345 P.3d 1182 . 20210890-CA 7 2023 UT App 84 State v. Clayton & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 30 , 299 P.3d 1058 (quotation simplified).

2023But to the extent that Clayton asks us to apply the new rule as a “clarifying amendment”—something he alludes to in his reply brief—we decline that invitation, because our supreme court has “expressly repudiate[d] the notion of” a “‘clarification’ exception to the general rule against retroactivity.” See State v. Steinly, 2015 UT 15, ¶ 11 , 345 P.3d 1182 . 20210890-CA 7 2023 UT App 84 State v. Clayton & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 30 , 299 P.3d 1058 (quotation simplified).

2023But Kell’s constitutional arguments suffer from the same infirmity as his ineffective assistance of post-conviction _____________________________________________________________ procedure is to raise his argument in a rule 60(b) motion in his original case and not in a subsequent petition.” We do not reach this question and instead reject Kell’s argument on the alternative basis that he has not tied the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to his current delay in seeking relief. 39 See infra ¶¶ 37–38. 40 Patterson v. State, 2021 UT 52, ¶ 194 , 504 P.3d 92 . 11 KELL v. STAT

2023But Kell’s constitutional arguments suffer from the same infirmity as his ineffective assistance of post-conviction _____________________________________________________________ procedure is to raise his argument in a rule 60(b) motion in his original case and not in a subsequent petition.” We do not reach this question and instead reject Kell’s argument on the alternative basis that he has not tied the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to his current delay in seeking relief. 39 See infra ¶¶ 37–38. 40 Patterson v. State, 2021 UT 52, ¶ 194 , 504 P.3d 92 . 11 KELL v. STAT

2023Invoking the final clause of the adopted definition, we concluded that an unconstitutional sentence is one “not authorized by the judgment of conviction,” and thus a substantive due process challenge to a sentence fit __________________________________________________________ 2 The version of rule 22(e) in effect at the time Yazzie was decided was “based on an antecedent in the federal rules—rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which until 1987 authorized federal courts to correct illegal sentences.” State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 22 , 274 P.3d 919 (cleaned up). 6 Cite as: 202

2023Invoking the final clause of the adopted definition, we concluded that an unconstitutional sentence is one “not authorized by the judgment of conviction,” and thus a substantive due process challenge to a sentence fit __________________________________________________________ 2 The version of rule 22(e) in effect at the time Yazzie was decided was “based on an antecedent in the federal rules—rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which until 1987 authorized federal courts to correct illegal sentences.” State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 22 , 274 P.3d 919 (cleaned up). 6 Cite as: 202

2023But to the extent that Clayton asks us to apply the new rule as a “clarifying amendment”—something he alludes to in his reply brief—we decline that invitation, because our supreme court has “expressly repudiate[d] the notion of” a “‘clarification’ exception to the general rule against retroactivity.” See State v. Steinly, 2015 UT 15, ¶ 11 , 345 P.3d 1182 . 20210890-CA 7 2023 UT App 84 State v. Clayton & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 30 , 299 P.3d 1058 (quotation simplified).

2023But to the extent that Clayton asks us to apply the new rule as a “clarifying amendment”—something he alludes to in his reply brief—we decline that invitation, because our supreme court has “expressly repudiate[d] the notion of” a “‘clarification’ exception to the general rule against retroactivity.” See State v. Steinly, 2015 UT 15, ¶ 11 , 345 P.3d 1182 . 20210890-CA 7 2023 UT App 84 State v. Clayton & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 30 , 299 P.3d 1058 (quotation simplified).