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29 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Vanornumgreen2 sentences2023See State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629 , 317 P3d 889 (2013) (stating requirements for “plain” error, including that the legal point is obvious and not reasonably in dispute). 2023See State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629 , 317 P3d 889 (2013) (stating requirements for “plain” error, including that the legal point is obvious and not reasonably in dispute). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Lazaridesgreen2 sentences2019The current version of our rule is based on the long-standing rationale that judgments are unenforceable “against a fleeing defendant.” Id. at 51 ; see also Lazarides, 358 Or at 736 (the 2015 version of ORAP 8.05(3) is based on the “narrow policy of dismissing a criminal appeal of a defendant who has absconded or escaped because the state *34 is not in a position to enforce a judgment”). 2016Thus, the history of the rule’s amend- ment establishes that the current version of the rule was intended to implement the “narrow” policy rationale for Cite as 358 Or 728 (2016) 739 the rule—“the inability of the appellate court to enforce a judgment against a fleeing defendant”—as opposed to the broader “waiver of appeal” policy behind the 2011 version of the rule. | 1 | 2 |
Lewis-Taylor v. Board of Parolegreen2 sentences2024OAR 255-085-0020(6) (Nov 25, 2020); see also Lewis-Taylor v. Board of Parole, 329 Or App 53, 55 , 540 P3d 34 (2023). 2024OAR 255-085-0020(6) (Nov 25, 2020); see also Lewis-Taylor v. Board of Parole, 329 Or App 53, 55 , 540 P3d 34 (2023). | 1 | 1 |
Sohappy v. Board of Parolegreen1 sentence2023The current version of the rule is materially different from the versions at issue in Sohappy and this case, see id. at 31, but those amendments are not at issue in this proceeding. | 1 | 1 |
Tupper v. Roangreen1 sentence2016Compare Tupper, 349 Or at 220 (“acquisition or retention” of property by defendant under circumstances where that would be “wrongful or * * * unconscientious” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Winters, 210 Or App at 421 (“ [U]nder the circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it.”). | 1 | 1 |
Winters v. County of Clatsopgreen1 sentence2016Compare Tupper, 349 Or at 220 (“acquisition or retention” of property by defendant under circumstances where that would be “wrongful or * * * unconscientious” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Winters, 210 Or App at 421 (“ [U]nder the circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it.”). | 1 | 1 |
Stelljes v. Maassgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Stelljes v. Maass, 306 Or 655, 657 , 761 P2d 925 (1988) (whether summary judgment could be construed as order disposing of case). 5 ORS 138.500(1) is the current version of a requirement that was included in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act when it originally was enacted. 2010See, e.g., Stelljes v. Maass, 306 Or 655, 657 , 761 P2d 925 (1988) (whether summary judgment could be construed as order disposing of case). 5 ORS 138.500(1) is the current version of a requirement that was included in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act when it originally was enacted. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Langdongreen2 sentences2002See generally ORS 137.667; see also State v. Langdon, 330 Or 72,74 , 999 P2d 1127 (2000). 6 In McCoy, we explained: “The court was confronted with apparently inconsistent sentencing mandates; it was required to impose a sentence of five years, ORS 161.610(4)(a), required to impose PPS, [OAR 213-005-0002(1)], and was directed that the total prison time and PPS not exceed the maximum indeterminate sentence for the crime of conviction, [OAR 213-005-0002(4)], which is five years. 2002See generally ORS 137.667; see also State v. Langdon, 330 Or 72,74 , 999 P2d 1127 (2000). 6 In McCoy, we explained: “The court was confronted with apparently inconsistent sentencing mandates; it was required to impose a sentence of five years, ORS 161.610(4)(a), required to impose PPS, [OAR 213-005-0002(1)], and was directed that the total prison time and PPS not exceed the maximum indeterminate sentence for the crime of conviction, [OAR 213-005-0002(4)], which is five years. | 1 | 1 |
Armatta v. Kitzhabergreen2 sentences1998See 327 Or. at 263-64 , 959 P.2d at 57 (setting out text of 1859 version of Article XVII). 1998See 327 Or. at 263-64 , 959 P.2d at 57 (setting out text of 1859 version of Article XVII). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of McKeegreen2 sentences1994See In re McKee, 316 Or 114, 129 , 849 P2d 509 (1993) (court analyzed whether the accused had violated an earlier version of DR 5-105(C) and stated that “[t]he new rules codified this court’s holding in In re Brandsness”); Kidney Association of Oregon v. Ferguson, 315 Or 135, 140, 145-47 , 843 P2d 442 (1992) (court tracked methodology used in discipline cases under DR 5-105; although applying the version of that rule in effect in 1981-83, court observed that DR 5-105 “since has been amended, but its effect essentially is the same,” id. at 140 n 7, and that “changes in DR 5-105 reflect an evolu 1994See In re McKee, 316 Or 114, 129 , 849 P2d 509 (1993) (court analyzed whether the accused had violated an earlier version of DR 5-105(C) and stated that “[t]he new rules codified this court’s holding in In re Brandsness”); Kidney Association of Oregon v. Ferguson, 315 Or 135, 140, 145-47 , 843 P2d 442 (1992) (court tracked methodology used in discipline cases under DR 5-105; although applying the version of that rule in effect in 1981-83, court observed that DR 5-105 “since has been amended, but its effect essentially is the same,” id. at 140 n 7, and that “changes in DR 5-105 reflect an evolu | 1 | 1 |
Kidney Association of Oregon v. Fergusongreen2 sentences1994See In re McKee, 316 Or 114, 129 , 849 P2d 509 (1993) (court analyzed whether the accused had violated an earlier version of DR 5-105(C) and stated that “[t]he new rules codified this court’s holding in In re Brandsness”); Kidney Association of Oregon v. Ferguson, 315 Or 135, 140, 145-47 , 843 P2d 442 (1992) (court tracked methodology used in discipline cases under DR 5-105; although applying the version of that rule in effect in 1981-83, court observed that DR 5-105 “since has been amended, but its effect essentially is the same,” id. at 140 n 7, and that “changes in DR 5-105 reflect an evolu 1994See In re McKee, 316 Or 114, 129 , 849 P2d 509 (1993) (court analyzed whether the accused had violated an earlier version of DR 5-105(C) and stated that “[t]he new rules codified this court’s holding in In re Brandsness”); Kidney Association of Oregon v. Ferguson, 315 Or 135, 140, 145-47 , 843 P2d 442 (1992) (court tracked methodology used in discipline cases under DR 5-105; although applying the version of that rule in effect in 1981-83, court observed that DR 5-105 “since has been amended, but its effect essentially is the same,” id. at 140 n 7, and that “changes in DR 5-105 reflect an evolu | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences2015OAR 213-012-0020(2)(a); State v. Miller, 317 Or 297, 306 , 855 P2d 1093 (1993) (interpreting an earlier version of that rule). 2015OAR 213-012-0020(2)(a); State v. Miller, 317 Or 297, 306 , 855 P2d 1093 (1993) (interpreting an earlier version of that rule). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Bucholz
green
2 sentences2015OAR 213-004-0006(2); State v. Bucholz, 317 Or 309, 314-15 , 855 P2d 1100 (1993) (interpreting an earlier version of that rule). 2015OAR 213-004-0006(2); State v. Bucholz, 317 Or 309, 314-15 , 855 P2d 1100 (1993) (interpreting an earlier version of that rule). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Miller v. Racing Commission
neutral
1 sentence2022We cite to the version of the rule in existence at the time the trial court issued its decision in this case. 4 Defendants contended that the complaint alleged the legal conclusion that plaintiff had a protected property interest but did not include any allegations of fact from which it could be found that plaintiff’s continuing employment in her position constituted a protected property interest: “Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges in a conclusory fashion that ‘Ms. Miller had a property interest in her employment.’ * * * The only ‘fact’ alleged in the Complaint with regard to such c | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State ex rel. Juvenile Department v. Black
neutral
2 sentences2022Dept. v. Black, 191 Or App 472 , 480 n 2, 83 P3d 338 (2004).1 Legislative history reinforces what the text and context provide: the corroboration requirement applies to criminal trials. 2022Dept. v. Black, 191 Or App 472 , 480 n 2, 83 P3d 338 (2004).1 Legislative history reinforces what the text and context provide: the corroboration requirement applies to criminal trials. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Moss
green
1 sentence2019The current version of our rule is based on the long-standing rationale that judgments are unenforceable “against a fleeing defendant.” Id. at 51 ; see also Lazarides, 358 Or at 736 (the 2015 version of ORAP 8.05(3) is based on the “narrow policy of dismissing a criminal appeal of a defendant who has absconded or escaped because the state *34 is not in a position to enforce a judgment”). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Delehant v. Board on Police Standards & Training
green
2 sentences2014Both parties point us to Delehant v. Board on Police Standards, 317 Or 273 , 855 P2d 1088 (1993). 2014Both parties point us to Delehant v. Board on Police Standards, 317 Or 273 , 855 P2d 1088 (1993). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2012Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s challenge to the length of his original sentence is moot. 2 All citations to OAR 213-008-0002 reference the version of the rule that became effective on March 8, 1996. 3 Additionally, in order to impose a departure sentence, a “court must explain why the circumstances are sufficiently exceptional — that is, it must show that imposing the presumptive sentence would fail to accomplish the purposes of the sentencing guidelines to ‘punish offenders appropriately and to ensure the security of the public.’ ” State v. Agee, 223 Or App 729, 744 , 196 P3d 1060 2012Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s challenge to the length of his original sentence is moot. 2 All citations to OAR 213-008-0002 reference the version of the rule that became effective on March 8, 1996. 3 Additionally, in order to impose a departure sentence, a “court must explain why the circumstances are sufficiently exceptional — that is, it must show that imposing the presumptive sentence would fail to accomplish the purposes of the sentencing guidelines to ‘punish offenders appropriately and to ensure the security of the public.’ ” State v. Agee, 223 Or App 729, 744 , 196 P3d 1060 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Agee
green
2 sentences2012Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s challenge to the length of his original sentence is moot. 2 All citations to OAR 213-008-0002 reference the version of the rule that became effective on March 8, 1996. 3 Additionally, in order to impose a departure sentence, a “court must explain why the circumstances are sufficiently exceptional — that is, it must show that imposing the presumptive sentence would fail to accomplish the purposes of the sentencing guidelines to ‘punish offenders appropriately and to ensure the security of the public.’ ” State v. Agee, 223 Or App 729, 744 , 196 P3d 1060 2012Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s challenge to the length of his original sentence is moot. 2 All citations to OAR 213-008-0002 reference the version of the rule that became effective on March 8, 1996. 3 Additionally, in order to impose a departure sentence, a “court must explain why the circumstances are sufficiently exceptional — that is, it must show that imposing the presumptive sentence would fail to accomplish the purposes of the sentencing guidelines to ‘punish offenders appropriately and to ensure the security of the public.’ ” State v. Agee, 223 Or App 729, 744 , 196 P3d 1060 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Burrows
green
2 sentences2010In re Burrows, 291 Or 135, 143-44 , 629 P2d 820 (1981). 2010In re Burrows, 291 Or 135, 143-44 , 629 P2d 820 (1981). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Jordan v. Rask
green
1 sentence2008Jordan, 66 Or App at 723-24 . 11 For example, in Dillard, the father moved to modify custody, and the trial court, after the presentation of the father’s evidence, granted the mother’s motion *339 to dismiss with prejudice pursuant to ORCP 54 B(2). 179 Or App at 28-29 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In re the Marriage of Dillard
green
1 sentence2008Jordan, 66 Or App at 723-24 . 11 For example, in Dillard, the father moved to modify custody, and the trial court, after the presentation of the father’s evidence, granted the mother’s motion *339 to dismiss with prejudice pursuant to ORCP 54 B(2). 179 Or App at 28-29 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
May Trucking Co. v. Department of Transportation
neutral
2 sentences2006May Trucking Co. v. Dept. of Transportation, 203 Or App 564, 573 , 126 P3d 695 (2006). 2006May Trucking Co. v. Dept. of Transportation, 203 Or App 564, 573 , 126 P3d 695 (2006). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Stull v. Hoke
green
2 sentences2005Cf. Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77 , 948 P2d 722 (1997) (holding that, in construing a statute, a court’s task is to identify the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by the parties). 3 We apply the version of the rule in effect when claimant was injured. 2005Cf. Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77 , 948 P2d 722 (1997) (holding that, in construing a statute, a court’s task is to identify the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by the parties). 3 We apply the version of the rule in effect when claimant was injured. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Carlson v. Myers
green
2 sentences2004For that proposition, SAIF relies on Carlson v. Myers, 327 Or 213 , 959 P2d 31 (1998). 2004For that proposition, SAIF relies on Carlson v. Myers, 327 Or 213 , 959 P2d 31 (1998). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Layton
green
2 sentences2002State v. Layton, 163 Or App 37,41 , 986 P2d 1121 (1999), rev den 330 Or 252 (2000) (Layton I). 3 The version of the rule in effect when Little was decided was numbered OAR 253-05-002(4). 2002State v. Layton, 163 Or App 37,41 , 986 P2d 1121 (1999), rev den 330 Or 252 (2000) (Layton I). 3 The version of the rule in effect when Little was decided was numbered OAR 253-05-002(4). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Peek v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2001In that respect, the 1987 rule bears little resemblance to the version of the rule interpreted in Peek v. Thompson, 160 Or App 260, 264-65 , 980 P2d 178 (1999), which this court interpreted to require that a psychiatrist’s or psychologist’s report make a “finding” of a “severe emotional disturbance” before the Board could defer parole release. 2001In that respect, the 1987 rule bears little resemblance to the version of the rule interpreted in Peek v. Thompson, 160 Or App 260, 264-65 , 980 P2d 178 (1999), which this court interpreted to require that a psychiatrist’s or psychologist’s report make a “finding” of a “severe emotional disturbance” before the Board could defer parole release. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Roseburg Forest Products v. Clemons
green
2 sentences2000Roseburg Forest Products v. Clemons, 169 Or App 231, 240 , 9 P3d 123 (2000) (interpreting former OAR 436-035-0007(27) (1996), renumbered as OAR 436-035-0007(28) (1998). 2 Under the amended rule, the Board potentially had to resolve two issues in this case. 2000Roseburg Forest Products v. Clemons, 169 Or App 231, 240 , 9 P3d 123 (2000) (interpreting former OAR 436-035-0007(27) (1996), renumbered as OAR 436-035-0007(28) (1998). 2 Under the amended rule, the Board potentially had to resolve two issues in this case. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. McVay
green
2 sentences1998In State v. McVay, 83 Or.App. 312 , 731 P.2d 466 (1987), we held, under an earlier version of this requirement, that the testing officer had not made certain that the defendant had not done any of those things. 1998In State v. McVay, 83 Or.App. 312 , 731 P.2d 466 (1987), we held, under an earlier version of this requirement, that the testing officer had not made certain that the defendant had not done any of those things. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Gage v. City of Portland
green
2 sentences1997We note, as we did in Gage v. City of Portland, 133 Or App 346, 350 , 891 P2d 1331 (1995), that the term “deference” as used there and here describes a standard of judicial review. 1997We note, as we did in Gage v. City of Portland, 133 Or App 346, 350 , 891 P2d 1331 (1995), that the term “deference” as used there and here describes a standard of judicial review. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. King green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Luce v. United States green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Howard v. State Board of Parole green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.