13 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committeegreen1 sentence2025See Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 339 Conn. 503 , 515 n.12, 261 A.3d 722 (2021) (‘‘[b]ecause the commentary to the Rules of Professional Conduct is formally adopted by the judges of the Superior Court, we have no occasion to examine a question we have not closely examined before: whether, in general, § 1-2z applies to the rules of practice or to the Rules of Professional Conduct’’). | 1 | 1 |
Delbert Heard v. Michael F. Sheahangreen1 sentence2021In reality, that statement is a quotation attributable to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 2001), which, in turn, was citing the Eleventh Circuit decision of Knight v. Columbus, [supra, 19 F.3d 581–82], discussing whether the ‘continuing violation theory’ was applicable to a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. [ 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.] Importantly, the ‘continuing violation theory’ is not the same as the ‘continuing course of conduct doctrine.’ ’’ (Citation omitted.) The plaintiff is correct that these two cases discuss ‘‘continuing violat | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pinagreen2 sentences2010See State v. Pina, 185 Conn. 473 , 481 n.6, 440 A.2d 962 (1981); see also State v. Lawrence, supra, 91 Conn. App. 774 n.10 (“Connecticut law can be understood to follow either the version of rule 35 as it existed between 1966 and 1984 or the position of the dissent in Hill”). 2010See State v. Pina, 185 Conn. 473 , 481 n.6, 440 A.2d 962 (1981); see also State v. Lawrence, supra, 91 Conn. App. 774 n.10 (“Connecticut law can be understood to follow either the version of rule 35 as it existed between 1966 and 1984 or the position of the dissent in Hill”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Edwards Adamsgreen1 sentence1992That prohibition serves to strengthen the prophylactic scheme established by [rjule 11 and enforced by McCarthy , that is, it helps to insure that involuntary, unknowing and unfounded guilty pleas will not be entered.” United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Uretek, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Believing itself to be bound by cases such as State v. Uretek, Inc., 207 Conn. 706 , 543 A.2d 709 (1988) (Ure- tek), a majority of the Appellate Court held that the corpus delicti rule is merely an evidentiary rule that bars the use of a defendant’s own uncorroborated extra- judicial confessions or admissions6 to prove the corpus delicti of a crime. 2019Believing itself to be bound by cases such as State v. Uretek, Inc., 207 Conn. 706 , 543 A.2d 709 (1988) (Ure- tek), a majority of the Appellate Court held that the corpus delicti rule is merely an evidentiary rule that bars the use of a defendant’s own uncorroborated extra- judicial confessions or admissions6 to prove the corpus delicti of a crime. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Phillips
green
2 sentences2019I believe that this concern is overstated, particularly given the narrow version of the doctrine that I understand the majority to adopt, which, consistent with the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Phillips , supra, 139 P.3d at 647 , and the Virginia Supreme Court in C.F. 2019I believe that this concern is overstated, particularly given the narrow version of the doctrine that I understand the majority to adopt, which, consistent with the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Phillips , supra, 139 P.3d at 647 , and the Virginia Supreme Court in C.F. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. Partnership
green
2 sentences2019Trust, Inc. v. First Flight, L.P. , 266 Va. 3 , 12-13, 580 S.E.2d 806 (2003), requires consideration of the impact of reverse piercing on innocent shareholders, investors, and creditors. 3 With recognition of outside reverse piercing representing the distinct majority view; see, e.g., 1 C. 2019Trust, Inc. v. First Flight, L.P. , 266 Va. 3 , 12-13, 580 S.E.2d 806 (2003), requires consideration of the impact of reverse piercing on innocent shareholders, investors, and creditors. 3 With recognition of outside reverse piercing representing the distinct majority view; see, e.g., 1 C. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences2016The current version of the rule, set forth in Opper v. United States , 348 U.S. 84 , 93, 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), and followed by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris , 215 Conn. 189 , 192-97, 575 A.2d 223 (1990), and State v. Hafford , 252 Conn. 274 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S.Ct. 136 , 148 L.Ed.2d 89 (2000), states that "the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. 2016The current version of the rule, set forth in Opper v. United States , 348 U.S. 84 , 93, 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), and followed by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris , 215 Conn. 189 , 192-97, 575 A.2d 223 (1990), and State v. Hafford , 252 Conn. 274 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S.Ct. 136 , 148 L.Ed.2d 89 (2000), states that "the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Hafford
green
2 sentences2016The current version of the rule, set forth in Opper v. United States , 348 U.S. 84 , 93, 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), and followed by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris , 215 Conn. 189 , 192-97, 575 A.2d 223 (1990), and State v. Hafford , 252 Conn. 274 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S.Ct. 136 , 148 L.Ed.2d 89 (2000), states that "the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. 2016The current version of the rule, set forth in Opper v. United States , 348 U.S. 84 , 93, 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), and followed by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris , 215 Conn. 189 , 192-97, 575 A.2d 223 (1990), and State v. Hafford , 252 Conn. 274 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S.Ct. 136 , 148 L.Ed.2d 89 (2000), states that "the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Opper v. United States
green
2 sentences2016The current version of the rule, set forth in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 , 75 S. Ct. 158 , 99 L. 2016The current version of the rule, set forth in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 , 75 S. Ct. 158 , 99 L. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Johnson v. McCaughtry
green
2 sentences2016The current version of the rule, set forth in Opper v. United States , 348 U.S. 84 , 93, 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), and followed by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris , 215 Conn. 189 , 192-97, 575 A.2d 223 (1990), and State v. Hafford , 252 Conn. 274 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S.Ct. 136 , 148 L.Ed.2d 89 (2000), states that "the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. 2016Ed. 101 (1954), and followed by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris, 215 Conn. 189 , 192–97, 575 A.2d 223 (1990), and State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Gonzales-Lemus v. California
green
2 sentences2016The current version of the rule, set forth in Opper v. United States , 348 U.S. 84 , 93, 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), and followed by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris , 215 Conn. 189 , 192-97, 575 A.2d 223 (1990), and State v. Hafford , 252 Conn. 274 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S.Ct. 136 , 148 L.Ed.2d 89 (2000), states that "the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. 2016Ed. 101 (1954), and followed by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris, 215 Conn. 189 , 192–97, 575 A.2d 223 (1990), and State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Escarino-Carrillo v. United States
green
2 sentences2016The current version of the rule, set forth in Opper v. United States , 348 U.S. 84 , 93, 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), and followed by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris , 215 Conn. 189 , 192-97, 575 A.2d 223 (1990), and State v. Hafford , 252 Conn. 274 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S.Ct. 136 , 148 L.Ed.2d 89 (2000), states that "the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. 2016Ed. 101 (1954), and followed by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris, 215 Conn. 189 , 192–97, 575 A.2d 223 (1990), and State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Grovenburg v. Rustle Meadow Associates, LLC
green
2 sentences2022We are not persuaded by that argument. 10 The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he emotional abuse was actually being caused by the [children’s mother] falsely accusing and coercing the children, shaming the [plaintiff] to the children, brainwashing the children and used sheer manipulation tactics.’’ In support of this argument, the plaintiff devotes a significant portion of his brief to discussing ‘‘malicious parent syndrome.’’ Neither the hearing officer nor the court made any findings as to ‘‘malicious parent syndrome,’’ and it is ‘‘axiomatic that this appellate body does not engage in fact-findin 2022We are not persuaded by that argument. 10 The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he emotional abuse was actually being caused by the [children’s mother] falsely accusing and coercing the children, shaming the [plaintiff] to the children, brainwashing the children and used sheer manipulation tactics.’’ In support of this argument, the plaintiff devotes a significant portion of his brief to discussing ‘‘malicious parent syndrome.’’ Neither the hearing officer nor the court made any findings as to ‘‘malicious parent syndrome,’’ and it is ‘‘axiomatic that this appellate body does not engage in fact-findin | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Stevens
green
2 sentences2020In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current version of that rule. 2 ‘‘A Garvin agreement is a conditional plea agreement that has two possi- ble binding outcomes, one that results from the defendant’s compliance with the conditions of the plea agreement and one that is triggered by his violation of a condition of the agreement.’’ State v. Stevens, 278 Conn. 1, 7 , 895 A.2d 771 (2006). 3 Practice Book § 43-22 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any oth 2020In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current version of that rule. 2 ‘‘A Garvin agreement is a conditional plea agreement that has two possi- ble binding outcomes, one that results from the defendant’s compliance with the conditions of the plea agreement and one that is triggered by his violation of a condition of the agreement.’’ State v. Stevens, 278 Conn. 1, 7 , 895 A.2d 771 (2006). 3 Practice Book § 43-22 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any oth | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Veits v. City of Hartford
green
2 sentences2019It is only when the causes of action, that is, the groups of facts [on] which the plaintiff bases his claims for relief, are separate and distinct that separate counts are necessary or indeed ordinarily desirable." (Footnote omitted.) Veits v. Hartford , 134 Conn. 428 , 438-39, 58 A.2d 389 (1948). 2019It is only when the causes of action, that is, the groups of facts [on] which the plaintiff bases his claims for relief, are separate and distinct that separate counts are necessary or indeed ordinarily desirable." (Footnote omitted.) Veits v. Hartford , 134 Conn. 428 , 438-39, 58 A.2d 389 (1948). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.