17 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2023 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cutler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2023Generalized evidence does not exist in this case to prove or disprove the elements of unjust enrichment on a class-wide basis.” (quoting Cutler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 175 Md. 2023Generalized evidence does not exist in this case to prove or disprove the elements of unjust enrichment on a class-wide basis.” (quoting Cutler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 175 Md. | 3 | 3 |
Mulready v. University Research Corp.green2 sentences2019See, e.g. , McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek , 375 Md. 574 , 593, 826 A.2d 474 (2003) (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in introducing a comparative test for trucking and other transitory types of employment); see also Mulready , 360 Md. at 55 , 756 A.2d 575 (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in adopting the positional-risk test); Mackin v. Harris , 342 Md. 1 , 7-10, 672 A.2d 1110 (1996) (adopting a narrower version of a test enunciated in Larson's treatise for purposes of determining when a subsequent injury is compensable under the Act); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane , 3 2019See, e.g. , McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek , 375 Md. 574 , 593, 826 A.2d 474 (2003) (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in introducing a comparative test for trucking and other transitory types of employment); see also Mulready , 360 Md. at 55 , 756 A.2d 575 (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in adopting the positional-risk test); Mackin v. Harris , 342 Md. 1 , 7-10, 672 A.2d 1110 (1996) (adopting a narrower version of a test enunciated in Larson's treatise for purposes of determining when a subsequent injury is compensable under the Act); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane , 3 | 2 | 2 |
Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp.green2 sentences2019App. 736 , 744-45, 989 A.2d 1221 (2010) (finding Larson's discussion on standing instructive on this Court's interpretation of Maryland's rule on standing to appeal WCC decisions); Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp. , 97 Md. 2019App. 736, 744-45 (2010) (finding Larson’s discussion on standing instructive on this Court’s interpretation of Maryland’s rule on standing to appeal WCC decisions); Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp., 97 Md. | 1 | 2 |
Mackin & Associates v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g. , McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek , 375 Md. 574 , 593, 826 A.2d 474 (2003) (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in introducing a comparative test for trucking and other transitory types of employment); see also Mulready , 360 Md. at 55 , 756 A.2d 575 (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in adopting the positional-risk test); Mackin v. Harris , 342 Md. 1 , 7-10, 672 A.2d 1110 (1996) (adopting a narrower version of a test enunciated in Larson's treatise for purposes of determining when a subsequent injury is compensable under the Act); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane , 3 2019See, e.g. , McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek , 375 Md. 574 , 593, 826 A.2d 474 (2003) (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in introducing a comparative test for trucking and other transitory types of employment); see also Mulready , 360 Md. at 55 , 756 A.2d 575 (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in adopting the positional-risk test); Mackin v. Harris , 342 Md. 1 , 7-10, 672 A.2d 1110 (1996) (adopting a narrower version of a test enunciated in Larson's treatise for purposes of determining when a subsequent injury is compensable under the Act); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane , 3 | 1 | 2 |
Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane v. Tornillogreen2 sentences2019See, e.g. , McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek , 375 Md. 574 , 593, 826 A.2d 474 (2003) (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in introducing a comparative test for trucking and other transitory types of employment); see also Mulready , 360 Md. at 55 , 756 A.2d 575 (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in adopting the positional-risk test); Mackin v. Harris , 342 Md. 1 , 7-10, 672 A.2d 1110 (1996) (adopting a narrower version of a test enunciated in Larson's treatise for purposes of determining when a subsequent injury is compensable under the Act); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane , 3 2019See, e.g. , McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek , 375 Md. 574 , 593, 826 A.2d 474 (2003) (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in introducing a comparative test for trucking and other transitory types of employment); see also Mulready , 360 Md. at 55 , 756 A.2d 575 (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in adopting the positional-risk test); Mackin v. Harris , 342 Md. 1 , 7-10, 672 A.2d 1110 (1996) (adopting a narrower version of a test enunciated in Larson's treatise for purposes of determining when a subsequent injury is compensable under the Act); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane , 3 | 1 | 2 |
Darby v. Marley Cooling Tower Co.green2 sentences2019See, e.g. , McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek , 375 Md. 574 , 593, 826 A.2d 474 (2003) (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in introducing a comparative test for trucking and other transitory types of employment); see also Mulready , 360 Md. at 55 , 756 A.2d 575 (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in adopting the positional-risk test); Mackin v. Harris , 342 Md. 1 , 7-10, 672 A.2d 1110 (1996) (adopting a narrower version of a test enunciated in Larson's treatise for purposes of determining when a subsequent injury is compensable under the Act); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane , 3 2019See, e.g., McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek, 375 Md. 575 , 593 (2003) (quoting, with approval, Larson’s treatise in introducing a comparative test for trucking and other transitory types of employment); see also Mulready, 360 Md. at 55 (quoting, with approval, Larson’s treatise in adopting the positional-risk test); Mackin v. Harris, 342 Md. 1, 7-10 (1996) (adopting a narrower version of a test enunciated in Larson’s treatise for purposes of determining when a subsequent injury is compensable under the Act); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, 329 Md. at 46-47 (adopting Larson’s own conveyance | 1 | 2 |
Louis Carter v. Dutchess Community Collegegreen2 sentences2020The Court ultimately subscribed to the version of the test articulated by the Second Circuit in Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984). 2020Id. | 1 | 1 |
McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopekgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g. , McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek , 375 Md. 574 , 593, 826 A.2d 474 (2003) (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in introducing a comparative test for trucking and other transitory types of employment); see also Mulready , 360 Md. at 55 , 756 A.2d 575 (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in adopting the positional-risk test); Mackin v. Harris , 342 Md. 1 , 7-10, 672 A.2d 1110 (1996) (adopting a narrower version of a test enunciated in Larson's treatise for purposes of determining when a subsequent injury is compensable under the Act); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane , 3 2019See, e.g. , McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek , 375 Md. 574 , 593, 826 A.2d 474 (2003) (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in introducing a comparative test for trucking and other transitory types of employment); see also Mulready , 360 Md. at 55 , 756 A.2d 575 (quoting, with approval, Larson's treatise in adopting the positional-risk test); Mackin v. Harris , 342 Md. 1 , 7-10, 672 A.2d 1110 (1996) (adopting a narrower version of a test enunciated in Larson's treatise for purposes of determining when a subsequent injury is compensable under the Act); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane , 3 | 1 | 1 |
Claibourne v. Willisgreen2 sentences2014See 347 Md. at 690 n. 9, 702 A.2d 293 . 26 . 2014See 347 Md. at 690 n. 9, 702 A.2d 293 . 26 . | 1 | 1 |
Miles v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Under the traditional version of this doctrine, “evidence tainted by Fourth Amendment violations may not be used directly or indirectly against the accused.” Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 520 , 781 A.2d 787, 805 (2001) (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 , 60 S.Ct. 266, 268 , 84 L.Ed. 307, 312 (1939)). 2013Under the traditional version of this doctrine, “evidence tainted by Fourth Amendment violations may not be used directly or indirectly against the accused.” Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 520 , 781 A.2d 787, 805 (2001) (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 , 60 S.Ct. 266, 268 , 84 L.Ed. 307, 312 (1939)). | 1 | 1 |
Nardone v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013Under the traditional version of this doctrine, “evidence tainted by Fourth Amendment violations may not be used directly or indirectly against the accused.” Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 520 , 781 A.2d 787, 805 (2001) (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 , 60 S.Ct. 266, 268 , 84 L.Ed. 307, 312 (1939)). 2013Under the traditional version of this doctrine, “evidence tainted by Fourth Amendment violations may not be used directly or indirectly against the accused.” Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 520 , 781 A.2d 787, 805 (2001) (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 , 60 S.Ct. 266, 268 , 84 L.Ed. 307, 312 (1939)). | 1 | 1 |
Shifflett v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Shifflett, 315 Md. at 388 , 554 A.2d at 817 (footnote omitted)(“That rule requires that the court afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and present information in mitigation of punishment.”). 2010See Shifflett, 315 Md. at 388 , 554 A.2d at 817 (footnote omitted)(“That rule requires that the court afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and present information in mitigation of punishment.”). | 1 | 1 |
Countess v. Stategreen2 sentences1983See also Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444 , 408 A.2d 1302 (1979) (dealing with an earlier version of the rule) but that avails Dorsey naught unless he was indeed constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. 1983See also Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444 , 408 A.2d 1302 (1979) (dealing with an earlier version of the rule) but that avails Dorsey naught unless he was indeed constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hicks
green
2 sentences2023Rule 4-271(a). 5 27, § 591. 4 The Court viewed the statute as “a declaration of legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges” and as a manifestation of the “legislature’s recognition of the detrimental effects to our criminal justice system which result from excessive delay in scheduling criminal cases for trial and in postponing scheduled trials for inadequate reasons.” State v. Hicks, 285 Md. at 316 . 2023Rule 4-271(a). 5 27, § 591.4 The Court viewed the statute as “a declaration of legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges” and as a manifestation of the “legislature’s recognition of the detrimental effects to our criminal justice system which result from excessive delay in scheduling criminal cases for trial and in postponing scheduled trials for inadequate reasons.” State v. Hicks, 285 Md. at 316 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Rourke v. Amchem Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015Offensive Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel Garrity characterizes the Plumbing Board’s reliance upon the CPD decision as use of “offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel.” This is a version of the doctrine of collateral estoppel that arises when the plaintiff in the second case seeks to foreclose the defendant from re-litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully against other plaintiffs. 3 Rourke v. Amchem, 384 Md. 329, 341 , 863 A.2d 926 (2004). 2015Offensive Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel Garrity characterizes the Plumbing Board’s reliance upon the CPD decision as use of “offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel.” This is a version of the doctrine of collateral estoppel that arises when the plaintiff in the second case seeks to foreclose the defendant from re-litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully against other plaintiffs. 3 Rourke v. Amchem, 384 Md. 329, 341 , 863 A.2d 926 (2004). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Houghton v. County Comm'rs of Kent Co.
green
2 sentences2013We reach this conclusion based on Houghton v. County Commissioners of Kent County, 305 Md. 407 , 504 A.2d 1145 (1986), which was decided under a previous version of Maryland Rule 2-601, and Houghton’s progeny, which were decided under a later version of that rule. 2013We reach this conclusion based on Houghton v. County Commissioners of Kent County, 305 Md. 407 , 504 A.2d 1145 (1986), which was decided under a previous version of Maryland Rule 2-601, and Houghton’s progeny, which were decided under a later version of that rule. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Byrum v. Horning
green
2 sentences2013That amendment incorporated the “separate document” requirement, the effect of which was “to convert the official form of a judgment from a docket entry to a separate document.” Byrum v. Homing, 360 Md. 23, 33 , 756 A.2d 560 (2000). 2013That amendment incorporated the “separate document” requirement, the effect of which was “to convert the official form of a judgment from a docket entry to a separate document.” Byrum v. Homing, 360 Md. 23, 33 , 756 A.2d 560 (2000). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2007In 1995, the Department amended Rule 766 to restrict state funding of abortions to cases certified by a physician as necessary to save the life of the mother, to terminate an ectopic pregnancy, 40 or in cases of rape or incest, id. at 846 , whereas the previous version of the rule permitted state funding under a much broader definition of medical necessity that included any pregnancy having “a profound negative impact upon the physical or mental health of an individual.” Id. at 845 . 2007In 1995, the Department amended Rule 766 to restrict state funding of abortions to cases certified by a physician as necessary to save the life of the mother, to terminate an ectopic pregnancy, 40 or in cases of rape or incest, id. at 846 , whereas the previous version of the rule permitted state funding under a much broader definition of medical necessity that included any pregnancy having “a profound negative impact upon the physical or mental health of an individual.” Id. at 845 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker
green
2 sentences2006To this end, we begin by examining in detail American Pipe and its progeny, in particular Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 , 103 S.Ct. 2392 , 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). *243 In American Pipe, the State of Utah filed a civil antitrust action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah for treble damages against American Pipe and the other petitioners, alleging that they had fixed the price of concrete and steel pipe sold to the State. 2006To this end, we begin by examining in detail American Pipe and its progeny, in particular Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 , 103 S.Ct. 2392 , 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). *243 In American Pipe, the State of Utah filed a civil antitrust action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah for treble damages against American Pipe and the other petitioners, alleging that they had fixed the price of concrete and steel pipe sold to the State. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Lyles
green
2 sentences2002The requirement that the court inform the accused of this right *444 was eliminated, in the present version of the rule leaving only the requirement that an opportunity to make a statement be afforded. 308 Md. at 133 , 517 A.2d 761 (emphasis supplied). 2002The requirement that the court inform the accused of this right *444 was eliminated, in the present version of the rule leaving only the requirement that an opportunity to make a statement be afforded. 308 Md. at 133 , 517 A.2d 761 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Duncan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1983In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases was applicable to state prosecutions by virtue of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1983In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases was applicable to state prosecutions by virtue of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.