81 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Christakis v. Tivoli Terrace, LLCgreen2 sentences2023Dist. v. Venice HMA, LLC, 325 So. 3d 334 , 339 n.4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (“We, however, are constrained to view the County’s challenge through an 10 extraordinary writ because the version of rule 9.130(a)(3) in effect when the circuit court entered the subject order and the County filed its petition only authorized appeals of nonfinal orders that determined ‘as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to sovereign immunity.’”); Strauser v. State, 360 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (declining to apply the new Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure as the “petition was filed before the effective 2022Dist. v. Venice HMA, LLC, 325 So. 3d 334 , 339 n.4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (declining to apply the new version of rule 3 9.130(a)(3) because it was not in effect when the circuit court entered the order at issue or when the County filed its petition with the appellate court); Christakis v. Tivoli Terrace, LLC, 219 So. 3d 85, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding “that the January 1, 2015 amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(i)(3) does not have retroactive effect to undo the abandonment of a motion when the notice of appeal was filed before January 1, 2015.”); Thomas v. Cilbe, Inc., 104 | 2 | 2 |
Carbino v. Wardgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Aurora Bank v. Cimbler, 166 So. 3d 921, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (finding that award of $1250 monetary sanction for mortgagor's failure to appear was warranted); Carbino v. Ward, 801 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (finding, under a previous version of the rule, that party's failure to appear at mediation without good cause warranted the imposition of sanctions in the form of mediator costs and attorney's fees). 2016See, e.g., Aurora Bank v. Cim-bler, 166 So.3d 921, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (finding that award of $1250 monetary sanction for mortgagor’s failure to appear was warranted); Carbino v. Ward, 801 So.2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (finding, under a previous version of the rule, that party’s failure to appear at mediation without good cause warranted the imposition of sanctions in the form of mediator costs and attorney’s fees). | 2 | 2 |
Aurora Bank v. Cimbler & Fl Mediationgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Aurora Bank v. Cimbler, 166 So. 3d 921, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (finding that award of $1250 monetary sanction for mortgagor's failure to appear was warranted); Carbino v. Ward, 801 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (finding, under a previous version of the rule, that party's failure to appear at mediation without good cause warranted the imposition of sanctions in the form of mediator costs and attorney's fees). 2016See, e.g., Aurora Bank v. Cim-bler, 166 So.3d 921, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (finding that award of $1250 monetary sanction for mortgagor’s failure to appear was warranted); Carbino v. Ward, 801 So.2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (finding, under a previous version of the rule, that party’s failure to appear at mediation without good cause warranted the imposition of sanctions in the form of mediator costs and attorney’s fees). | 2 | 2 |
Fowler v. Stategreen2 sentences2014As we stated in Fowler when addressing the proper procedures to rule on the question of competency, albeit interpreting an earlier version of the rule referring to insanity, “[t]he framers of the rule ... obviously did not regard lightly the necessity for a hearing” by their use of the terms “shall” and “immediately.” Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla.1971). 2014P. 3.210(b); see Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513, 514-15 (Fla.1971) (construing a previous version of rule 3.210, and “attach[ing] prime significance to the words ‘shall’ and ‘immediately’. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Amendments to Fl. Rules of Civ. Proc.green2 sentences2011This version of rule 1.420(e) was adopted in 2005 and became effective January 1, 2006, see In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure (Two Year Cycle), 917 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla.2005), and has not since been amended. 2011This version of rule 1.420(e) was adopted in 2005 and became effective January 1, 2006, see In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure (Two Year Cycle), 917 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla.2005), and has not since been amended. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Montgomerygreen2 sentences2013No case had previously so held, although in State v. Montgomery, 39 So.3d 252, 259 (Fla.2010), the supreme court affirmed the First District’s finding that the prior version of the instruction improperly imposed an additional element of intent to kill on the offense of manslaughter by act and was therefore fundamentally erroneous. 2012In Montgomery , the Florida Supreme Court determined that a previous version of the standard jury instruction for manslaughter was erroneous because it “required the jury to find that the defendant intended to kill the victim in order to convict Montgomery of manslaughter.” Id. at 257 . | 1 | 5 |
Henry v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Henry v. State, 42 So.3d 328 , 329 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). 2011Id. | 1 | 2 |
Hanna v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Dollar Stores of Fla., Inc., 194 So. 3d 424, 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016))). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Proceduregreen1 sentence2023Proc., 52 So. 3d 579, 590 (Fla. 2010) (amending rule 1.525 to add the clarifying phrase “which judgment or notice concludes the action as to that party.”). | 1 | 1 |
Pearlstein v. Kinggreen1 sentence2023Petitioner cites us to Pearlstein v. King, 610 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. 1992), for the proposition that application of the amended rule in this case constitutes a prospective application. | 1 | 1 |
Landmark at Hillsboro Condominium Ass'n v. Candeloragreen2 sentences2023Landmark, 911 So. 2d at 1273 (interpreting the previous version of rule 1.525 which provided “[a]ny party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorney’s fees, or both shall serve a motion within 30 days after filing of the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal.” (alteration in original)). 2023Landmark, 911 So. 2d at 1273 (interpreting the previous version of rule 1.525 which provided “[a]ny party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorney’s fees, or both shall serve a motion within 30 days after filing of the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal.” (alteration in original)). | 1 | 1 |
All Certified Transmissions, Inc. v. State, Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2023Rules of Proc. 12.490 & 12.491, & Forms 12.920(A)-(C), 346 So. 3d 1053 , 1054 (Fla. 2022); see also Christ v. Christ, 103 So. 3d 1056, 1057 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (applying motion-to-vacate procedure in former Family Rule 12.491(f), appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to failure to timely file motion to vacate trial court’s entry of hearing officer’s recommended order). 2 The former version of the rule required a party seeking review to file “exceptions” to the magistrate’s recommendation within ten days after receipt of the recommendation, prior to the trial court’s entry of any or | 1 | 1 |
Strauser v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Dist. v. Venice HMA, LLC, 325 So. 3d 334 , 339 n.4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (“We, however, are constrained to view the County’s challenge through an 10 extraordinary writ because the version of rule 9.130(a)(3) in effect when the circuit court entered the subject order and the County filed its petition only authorized appeals of nonfinal orders that determined ‘as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to sovereign immunity.’”); Strauser v. State, 360 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (declining to apply the new Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure as the “petition was filed before the effective | 1 | 1 |
In Re AMENDMENTS TO the FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUREgreen1 sentence2022In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 199 So. 3d 867, 884 (Fla. 2016). 7 In furtherance of this policy in favor of deciding lawsuits on their merits, Florida courts construing rule 1.500(a) have defined the term “any document” broadly and liberally, “and [it] includes any written communication that informs the plaintiff of the defendant's intent to contest the claim.” Contreras, 306 So. 3d at 1145 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Cilbe, Inc.green1 sentence2022Dist. v. Venice HMA, LLC, 325 So. 3d 334 , 339 n.4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (declining to apply the new version of rule 3 9.130(a)(3) because it was not in effect when the circuit court entered the order at issue or when the County filed its petition with the appellate court); Christakis v. Tivoli Terrace, LLC, 219 So. 3d 85, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding “that the January 1, 2015 amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(i)(3) does not have retroactive effect to undo the abandonment of a motion when the notice of appeal was filed before January 1, 2015.”); Thomas v. Cilbe, Inc., 104 | 1 | 1 |
Topps v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. 2004) ("Since the nature of an extraordinary writ is not of absolute right, the granting of such writ lies within the discretion of the court.").8 8 The parties do not suggest we should apply the current version of rule 9.130 retroactively to obtain jurisdiction, and given the Florida Supreme Court’s direction in In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, 289 So. 3d at 867—that 27 In sum, we conclude the County is not entitled to a writ of prohibition. | 1 | 1 |
English v. McCrarygreen1 sentence2021We, however, are constrained to view the County’s challenge through an extraordinary writ because the version of rule 9.130(a)(3) in effect when the circuit court entered the subject order and the County filed its petition only authorized appeals of nonfinal orders that determined "as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to sovereign immunity." 10 within its jurisdiction." English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977). | 1 | 1 |
Citizens Property Ins. Corp. v. Calongegreen1 sentence2020App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(xi) (2019). 3 Corp. v. Calonge, 246 So. 3d 447, 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“[I]n making our jurisdictional determination, we look only to the face of the trial court’s order and we do not penetrate the record with a searchlight to divine whether the trial court’s undisclosed rationale warrants appellate review.”); see also Florida Highway Patrol v. Jackson, 288 So. 3d 1179 , 1182-83 (Fla. 2020) (concluding that, under the former version of the rule, when determining whether it has jurisdiction to review a non- final order denying entitlement to sovereign immunity, a distric | 1 | 1 |
Saenz v. Penagreen1 sentence2018Saenz, 754 So. 2d at 827 (finding violation of rule where certificate of service on motion to withdraw did not state that client was served). | 1 | 1 |
Neal v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See also Neal v. State, 60 So. 3d 1132, 1135 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (noting that “[a]lthough a prior version of the rule required the court to find on the record that the defendant had made a competent choice of self- representation based on his ‘mental condition, age, education, experience, the nature or complexity of the case, or other factors,’ that express requirement was eliminated in the current version of the rule”). | 1 | 1 |
| Stasio v. McManawaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ruiz v. Changgreen | 1 | 1 |
| POLO HOLDINGS v. Village of Wellingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pouncy v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Townsend v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1967 Revisiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Amendments to Florida Rules of Juvenile Proceduregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Solano v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bernard v. Rosegreen | 1 | 1 |
| C & S CHEMICALS, INC. v. McDougaldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Luis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Griffis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Larkins v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sireci v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vargas v. Vargasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Norris v. Treadwellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Swift v. Wilcoxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Byrne-Henry v. Hertz Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853 (D)green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allstate Indem. Co. v. Hingson
green
2 sentences2010First, in Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Hingson, 808 So.2d 197 (Fla.2002), we considered whether a former version of rule 1.442which did not use the specific language found in the current rule with regard to apportionment of terms to each partyrequired an offer of settlement made by a defendant to multiple plaintiffs to state the amount and terms attributable to each plaintiff. 2010First, in Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Hingson, 808 So.2d 197 (Fla.2002), we considered whether a former version of rule 1.442 — which did not use the specific language found in the current rule with regard to apportionment of terms to each party — required an offer of settlement made by a defendant to multiple plaintiffs to state the amount and terms attributable to each plaintiff. | 2 | 2005–2010 |
Miller v. Florida
green
2 sentences1989The incarcerative portion of the split sentence does not exceed the recommended range of nine to twelve years, and the total sanction does not exceed the statutory maximum term of life imprisonment for armed burglary under section 810.02(2), Florida Statutes. [1] Appellant also suggests that an ex post facto violation occurred due to his sentencing under the amended version of rule 3.701(d)(12), which authorizes a harsher sanction than the original 1983 version, citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 , 107 S.Ct. 2446 , 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). [2] However, Miller ex post facto concerns do not ar 1989The incarcerative portion of the split sentence does not exceed the recommended range of nine to twelve years, and the total sanction does not exceed the statutory maximum term of life imprisonment for armed burglary under section 810.02(2), Florida Statutes. [1] Appellant also suggests that an ex post facto violation occurred due to his sentencing under the amended version of rule 3.701(d)(12), which authorizes a harsher sanction than the original 1983 version, citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 , 107 S.Ct. 2446 , 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). [2] However, Miller ex post facto concerns do not ar | 2 | 1988–1989 |
Binger v. King Pest Control
green
2 sentences2026In this case, the majority opinion has respectfully considered the majority opinion in Binger v. 47 King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981), carefully distinguished between the holdings and dicta of Binger pursuant to Pedroza as is this court’s duty, decided the issues presented in this case from first principles in the absence of binding precedent—including whether Binger requires a trial court to find that the opposing party would be prejudiced by the introduction of testimony of an undisclosed or late- disclosed witness, or by the introduction of a late-disclosed expert opinion, befo 2026Binger, 401 So. 2d at 1313 . 20 Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981). 53 reality that admission and exclusion are two sides of the same coin. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Sims v. State
green
1 sentence2022The requirements for seeking belated discretionary review in rule 9.141(c)(4)(F) are largely derived from Sims v. State, 998 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2008), where we held that as part of a criminal defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, appellate counsel must timely notify the defendant of an appellate court decision and advise him or her of the right to seek discretionary review in a pro se capacity. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Appel v. FLA., DIV. OF LICENSING
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 1182 n. 2 (noting: “Rule 28–5.103 was repealed on June 30, 1998. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hernandez v. State
green
1 sentence2019Hernandez v. State, 137 So. 3d 542 , 543–45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Edenfield v. State
green
1 sentence2017As we did in Edenfield, we emphasize again that no “magic words” or specific questions are necessary to ensure an adequate Faretta inquiry. 45 So. 3d at 30 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Bowen
green
1 sentence2017This prior version stated a waiver was unacceptable unless the trial court found on the record that the defendant had made a competent choice based on his “mental condition, age, education, experience, the nature or complexity of the case, or other factors.” This language was removed from the Rule in 1998, following Bowen’s holding that the inquiry needs to ensure only that the defendant is proceeding “with eyes open.” 698 So. 2d at 251 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration
green
2 sentences2017The rule as amended applies to postconviction motions filed on or after January 1, 2015, and "[mjotions pending on that date are governed by the version of this rule in effect immediately prior to that date." Id. at 1180 . 2017The rule as amended applies to postconviction motions filed on or after January 1, 2015, and “[m]otions pending on that date are governed by the version of this rule in effect immediately prior to that date.” Id. at 1180 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
J.B., Etc. v. Florida Department of Children and Families
green
2 sentences2017Our narrowly tailored opinion in J.B. v. Department of Children and Families, 170 So.3d 780 (Fla. 2015), dealt only with the right of indigent parents to effective assistance of counsel. 2017Our narrowly tailored opinion in J.B. v. Department of - 13 - Children and Families, 170 So. 3d 780 (Fla. 2015), dealt only with the right of indigent parents to effective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Surrey Place of Ocala v. Goodwin neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| M.M., etc. v. Florida Department of Children and Families green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Ancel Pratt, Jr. v. Michael C. Weiss, D.O. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Valerie Audiffred v. Thomas B. Arnold green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| TS v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| In Re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2009-01 green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| In Re Amend. to Fla. Rules of Civ. Proc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Ferrell v. State green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Totura & Co., Inc. v. Williams green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Carter v. Lake County green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Pagan v. Facilicorp, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Huff v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Rodgers v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Frye v. United States red | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Spalding v. Dugger green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Ake v. Oklahoma green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Bolyea green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Davis v. State green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Moment v. State green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules—Criminal Procedure green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.