version rule in Iowa

2015Id.; see also id. at 255 (Cady, J., dissenting) (explaining the “held to answer” language from the previous version of the rule related to the initial court appearance).

2015Id.; see also id. at 255 (Cady, J., dissenting) (explaining the “held to answer” language from the previous version of the rule related to the initial court appearance).

2021Ethics & Conduct v. Jones, 606 N.W.2d 5, 6, 9 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding the former version of rule 32:8.4(c) was violated in part because Jones failed to disclose that the transaction was very risky, and in part because he had failed to reveal he had taken a contingent interest in the transaction).

2013Jones, 606 N.W.2d at 6, 9 .

2016Under our existing precedents interpreting the language in rule 51:2.11(A), it is clear that a judge who fails to disqualify himself or herself from a proceeding in which an attorney who recently represented the judge in a personal matter represents a party violates rule 51:2.11(A) unless the judge complies with rule 51:2.11(0 by disclosing the relevant facts to and obtaining a disqualification waiver from both parties in advance. 4 See Bride v. Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1996) (relying on a prior interpretation of the language in the prior version of rule 51:2.11(A)); Forsmark v. Stat

2016Under our existing precedents interpreting the language in rule 51:2.11(A), it is clear that a judge who fails to disqualify himself or herself from a proceeding in which an attorney who recently represented the judge in a personal matter represents a party violates rule 51:2.11(A) unless the judge complies with rule 51:2.11(C) by disclosing the relevant facts to and obtaining a disqualification waiver from both parties in advance. 4 See Bride v. Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1996) (relying on a prior interpretation of the language in the prior version of rule 51:2.11(A)); Forsmark v. Sta

2016State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 [Iowa 1994) (addressing nearly identical language in the prior version of rule 51:2.11).

2016State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994) (addressing nearly identical language in the prior version of rule 51:2.11).

2016Under our existing precedents interpreting the language in rule 51:2.11(A), it is clear that a judge who fails to disqualify himself or herself from a proceeding in which an attorney who recently represented the judge in a personal matter represents a party violates rule 51:2.11(A) unless the judge complies with rule 51:2.11(0 by disclosing the relevant facts to and obtaining a disqualification waiver from both parties in advance. 4 See Bride v. Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1996) (relying on a prior interpretation of the language in the prior version of rule 51:2.11(A)); Forsmark v. Stat

2016Under our existing precedents interpreting the language in rule 51:2.11(A), it is clear that a judge who fails to disqualify himself or herself from a proceeding in which an attorney who recently represented the judge in a personal matter represents a party violates rule 51:2.11(A) unless the judge complies with rule 51:2.11(C) by disclosing the relevant facts to and obtaining a disqualification waiver from both parties in advance. 4 See Bride v. Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1996) (relying on a prior interpretation of the language in the prior version of rule 51:2.11(A)); Forsmark v. Sta

2025Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598; see also Brown v. First Nat’l Bank, 193 N.W.2d 547 , 552–53 (Iowa 1972) (discussing a former version of this rule but 7 See, e.g., Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 600 (Ind. 2007); Kennedy v. Sheriff of E.

2025Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598; see also Brown v. First Nat’l Bank, 193 N.W.2d 547 , 552–53 (Iowa 1972) (discussing a former version of this rule but 7 See, e.g., Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 600 (Ind. 2007); Kennedy v. Sheriff of E.

2024See State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679 , 686–87 (Iowa 2000) (approving this procedure and rejecting the defendant’s argument that the substituted trial information without the habitual-offender enhancement replaced the one previously filed); see also State v Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862 , 869–70 (Iowa 2009) (concluding a “supplemental information” was simply designed to comply with rule 2.6(5)).

2024See State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679 , 686–87 (Iowa 2000) (approving this procedure and rejecting the defendant’s argument that the substituted trial information without the habitual-offender enhancement replaced the one previously filed); see also State v Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862 , 869–70 (Iowa 2009) (concluding a “supplemental information” was simply designed to comply with rule 2.6(5)).

2024See, e.g., State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 2016) (requiring district courts to give reasons for imposing consecutive sentences under an earlier version of rule 2.23).

2023See State v. LeFlore, 308 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Iowa 1981) (stating “the statutory right to a speedy trial under [the former version of rule 2.33(2)(b)] is not a personal right that can be waived only by the defendant” and “[d]efense counsel acting within the scope of his or her authority may waive this right on the defendant's behalf without the defendant’s express consent”).

2023See Top of Iowa Coop v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000) (“[O]ne purpose of our error preservation rules is to ensure that the opposing 1 Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 601 (1985), “a child [was] presumed to be competent.” But if the child’s competency was questioned, then the court was required to determine: (1) the child is mentally capable of understanding the questions being asked; (2) the child is able to formulate intelligent answers and communicate impressions and recollections regarding the incident about which the child is to testify; and (3) the child can understand the

2023More recently, our supreme court approved of a very similar version of instruction 5 in State v. Williams, 929 N.W.2d 621, 633 (Iowa 2019).

2023He did not make any objection to duplicative reasonable care specifications in Instruction 15, as he does on appeal. 5 Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.924, “[w]e may only consider on appeal those objections to instructions previously raised with the trial court.” Grefe & Sidney, 525 N.W.2d at 824 (citing a former version of rule 1.924); accord Boham v. City of Sioux City, 567 N.W.2d 431, 438 (Iowa 1997) (“A party may not amplify or change an objection on appeal.”).

2018See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002) (declining to consider issue for the first time on appeal, even if it is the only ground available to uphold a district court ruling).

2016We have said that “the professional relationship renders it impossible for the vulnerable layperson to be considered ‘consenting’ ” to the sexual relationship, Jowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marzen, 779 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Furlong, 625 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 2001)); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morrison, 727 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 2007) (discussing the prior version of the rule in the Code of Professional Responsibility and delineating four separate reasons for it).

2016We have said that “the professional relationship renders it impossible for the vulnerable layperson to be considered ‘consenting’ ” to the sexual relationship, Jowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marzen, 779 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Furlong, 625 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 2001)); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morrison, 727 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 2007) (discussing the prior version of the rule in the Code of Professional Responsibility and delineating four separate reasons for it).

2016We have said that “the professional relationship renders it impossible for the vulnerable layperson to be considered ‘consenting’ ” to the sexual relationship, Jowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marzen, 779 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Furlong, 625 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 2001)); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morrison, 727 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 2007) (discussing the prior version of the rule in the Code of Professional Responsibility and delineating four separate reasons for it).

2015“The court is not required to use any particular language to satisfy rule 22(3)(d).” State v. Glenn, 431 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (discussing a former version of rule 2.23(3)(d)).

2015“Substantial compliance is sufficient.” Id.

2015Id. (“An arrest is the triggering event to commence the forty-five-day time period to file an indictment under the rule, supplanting the previous version of the rule’s use of the date of prosecution as the trigger.”); see also Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 255 (Cady, J. dissenting).

2012Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. D.J.I., 545 N.W.2d 866, 871 (Iowa 1996) (observing under the former version of rule 35.7(3), rule 118.7, that issue preclusion “may be used by either party in a lawyer discipline case”).

2000In re A.G., 558 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Iowa 1997).

1992See City of Webster City v. Draheim, 292 N.W.2d 406, 409 (Iowa 1980).