version instruction in California

2025Under the former version of the rule, “ ‘when the defendant or an accomplice kill[ed] someone during the commission, or attempted commission, of an inherently dangerous felony,’ the defendant could be found guilty of the crime of murder, without any showing of ‘an intent to kill, or even implied malice, but merely an intent to commit the underlying felony.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at 9 p. 704.) Although neither Senate Bill 1437 nor Senate Bill 775 mentioned the doctrine of provocative act murder, our Supreme Court has held that a defendant convicted under that doctrin

2024(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 704 .) The defendant then could be punished by death or life without parole per the felony-murder special circumstance involving the most serious felonies.

2015CALCRIM No. 3550 Gibbs and Reed, joined by Fuller, contend the trial court had a sua sponte duty to give the following instruction, which it omitted from CALCRIM No. 3550: “Do not reach a decision by the flip of a coin or by any similar act.” They make several arguments: (1) if there was no possibility a jury would arrive at a verdict by a flip of the coin, the Judicial Council would not have included the omitted sentence as an option; (2) although the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3550 make the omitted sentence optional, it was required in this case because the evidence was so close; (3) the omi

2015CALCRIM No. 3550 Gibbs and Reed, joined by Fuller, contend the trial court had a sua sponte duty to give the following instruction, which it omitted from CALCRIM No. 3550: “Do not reach a decision by the flip of a coin or by any similar act.” They make several arguments: (1) if there was no possibility a jury would arrive at a verdict by a flip of the coin, the Judicial Council would not have included the omitted sentence as an option; (2) although the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3550 make the omitted sentence optional, it was required in this case because the evidence was so close; (3) the omi

2015CALCRIM No. 3550 Gibbs and Reed, joined by Fuller, contend the trial court had a sua sponte duty to give the following instruction, which it omitted from CALCRIM No. 3550: “Do not reach a decision by the flip of a coin or by any similar act.” They make several arguments: (1) if there was no possibility a jury would arrive at a verdict by a flip of the coin, the Judicial Council would not have included the omitted sentence as an option; (2) although the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3550 make the omitted sentence optional, it was required in this case because the evidence was so close; (3) the omi

2015CALCRIM No. 3550 Gibbs and Reed, joined by Fuller, contend the trial court had a sua sponte duty to give the following instruction, which it omitted from CALCRIM No. 3550: “Do not reach a decision by the flip of a coin or by any similar act.” They make several arguments: (1) if there was no possibility a jury would arrive at a verdict by a flip of the coin, the Judicial Council would not have included the omitted sentence as an option; (2) although the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3550 make the omitted sentence optional, it was required in this case because the evidence was so close; (3) the omi

2026Gibbs alleged no contract between her and defendants, and the damages she seeks—compensation for having to delay retirement, for not being timely enrolled in CalPERS, and for not being able to mitigate her injury by purchasing credits through an SPM 10 Similarly, we need not address Gibbs’s other alternative argument that she should have been allowed to allege a “breach of [an] implied contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” 20 request—involve “a traditionally compensable form of harm” and do not “threaten[] indeterminate and disproportionate liability.” (Southern California

2024But as observed in Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905 , 922 (Sheen), a version of the doctrine may also apply in cases involving parties not in contractual privity, such as when a plaintiff seeks to impose “ ‘ “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 922, quoting Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 414 ; Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (1931) 255 N.Y. 170 [ 174 N.E. 441, 444 ].) But this case, like Sheen, falls into the more 10 RATTAGAN v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

2024Further, while defendant claims the record suggests his youth was “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense,” the court found no evidence the offense was connected to his childhood trauma (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E)).11 11 The same trial judge was presiding over defendant’s upcoming hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 , 283–284, and 21 More importantly, even assuming the trial court followed the former version of rule 4.423, we can “ ‘say with confidence’ ” the court would have reimposed the full enhancement even if it had considered defendant was under age

2024Further, while defendant claims the record suggests his youth was “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense,” the court found no evidence the offense was connected to his childhood trauma (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E)).11 11 The same trial judge was presiding over defendant’s upcoming hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 , 283–284, and 21 More importantly, even assuming the trial court followed the former version of rule 4.423, we can “ ‘say with confidence’ ” the court would have reimposed the full enhancement even if it had considered defendant was under age

2023The Supreme Court approved an earlier version of this instruction. ( Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 954, fn. 14, 956, 957.) Odell does not claim later revisions of CALCRIM No. 570 departed from the law.

2023The Supreme Court approved an earlier version of this instruction. ( Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 954, fn. 14, 956, 957.) Odell does not claim later revisions of CALCRIM No. 570 departed from the law.

2022The trial court must give a flight instruction whenever the prosecution relies on evidence of flight to show a consciousness of guilt. (§ 1127c.) “[A] flight instruction is correctly given ‘where there is substantial evidence of flight by the defendant apart from his identification as the perpetrator, from which the jury could reasonably infer a consciousness of guilt.’ ” (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1245 .) “If there is 2 The full version of the instruction states: “If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately after the crime was committed or after he was accused of commi

2016(People v. Hernández Ríos (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154 , 10 A permissive inference allows, but does not require, the trier of fact “to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and . . . places no burden of any kind on the defendant. [Citation.]” (Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 .) Instruction on such an inference “is invalid as a matter of due process only if there is no rational way the jury could draw the permitted inference. [Citations.]” (People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1243-1244.) 13. 1159.) To the extent defendant is arguing

2021(See Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 669 .) The court noted the “general agreement [among researchers and the courts of several other jurisdictions] that witness certainty is not a good indicator of accuracy under most circumstances,” and acknowledged that “the current version of the instruction might confuse jurors about the relationship between confidence and accuracy.” (Lemcke, that jurors should consider the witness’s level of certainty when assessing the credibility and accuracy of the identification testimony.” (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 656, fn. 6 .) 40 supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 666

2021(See Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 669 .) The court noted the “general agreement [among researchers and the courts of several other jurisdictions] that witness certainty is not a good indicator of accuracy under most circumstances,” and acknowledged that “the current version of the instruction might confuse jurors about the relationship between confidence and accuracy.” (Lemcke, that jurors should consider the witness’s level of certainty when assessing the credibility and accuracy of the identification testimony.” (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 656, fn. 6 .) 40 supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 666

2018They argued that "the trial court had no jurisdiction to award appellate attorney fees to respondents because [the court of appeal] did not award appellate costs to respondents in the prior appeal." ( Ibid. ) Like Beck, they contended that a prior version of current rule 8.278(d)(2) did not apply because no "award" of costs was made. ( Id. at p. 925, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 .) That prior rule, California Rule of Court, rule 27(c)(2), was very similar to the current version of rule 8.278(d)(2), stating, " 'Unless the court orders otherwise, an award of costs neither includes attorney's fees on appea

2018They argued that "the trial court had no jurisdiction to award appellate attorney fees to respondents because [the court of appeal] did not award appellate costs to respondents in the prior appeal." ( Ibid. ) Like Beck, they contended that a prior version of current rule 8.278(d)(2) did not apply because no "award" of costs was made. ( Id. at p. 925, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 .) That prior rule, California Rule of Court, rule 27(c)(2), was very similar to the current version of rule 8.278(d)(2), stating, " 'Unless the court orders otherwise, an award of costs neither includes attorney's fees on appea

2017"Misdescription of an element of a charged offense is subject to harmless error analysis and does not require reversal if the misdescription was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652 , 670, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 967 P.2d 563 ; accord, People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 424, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 .) Notwithstanding *70 defendant's arguments to the contrary, we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the instructional error "did not contribute to the verdict obtained." ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 .) The co

2017"Misdescription of an element of a charged offense is subject to harmless error analysis and does not require reversal if the misdescription was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652 , 670, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 967 P.2d 563 ; accord, People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 424, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 .) Notwithstanding *70 defendant's arguments to the contrary, we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the instructional error "did not contribute to the verdict obtained." ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 .) The co

2016(Caldwell, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 1035 .) Third, workers’ compensation cases awarding coverage do not necessarily provide reliable precedent for tort cases because the version of the rule applied in tort cases is more restrictive.

2016(Caldwell, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 1035 .) Third, workers’ compensation cases awarding coverage do not necessarily provide reliable precedent for tort cases because the version of the rule applied in tort cases is more restrictive.

2016(Fields v. State of California, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398 .) For example, the court in Caldwell, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 1028 stated: “While in certain circumstances payment of travel expenses may be an exception [to the going and coming rule] under workers’ compensation laws [citation], the same conclusion has not been reached under respondeat superior doctrine. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1040.) Workers’ compensation cases take a more expansive view of the test for course of employment than tort cases because the policies underlying the workers’ compensation statute favor granting employee

2016(Fields v. State of California, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398 .) For example, the court in Caldwell, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 1028 stated: “While in certain circumstances payment of travel expenses may be an exception [to the going and coming rule] under workers’ compensation laws [citation], the same conclusion has not been reached under respondeat superior doctrine. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1040.) Workers’ compensation cases take a more expansive view of the test for course of employment than tort cases because the policies underlying the workers’ compensation statute favor granting employee

2010However after Thompson this jury *1392 instruction was revised, as explained in People v. Maurer 7 (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1131 , footnote 2 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335 ]: “The former version of the section 647.6 instruction (CALJIC No. 16.441) stated: ‘Motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest with respect to children.’ (Italics added.) The current version of the instruction (CALJIC No. 16.440 (1990 rev.)) states: ‘[M]otivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in [the specific child victim].’ [ 8 ] This revision is apparently based upon language in People v. Thompson, supra

1995Supp. 901.) 2 The former version of the section 647.6 instruction (CALJIC No. 16.441) stated: “[M]otivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest with respect to children.” (Italics added.) The current version of the instruction (CALJIC No. 16.440 (1990 rev.)) states: “[Motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in [the specific child victim].” This revision is apparently based upon language in People v. Thompson, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at page 465 .

2010The In re David H. panel noted that the rule of court relied upon by the In re Shelley J. and In re James C. courts, former rule 39 of the California Rules of Court, has been repealed and the current version of the rule does not contain the language the two courts cited. ( In re David H., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1638 .) In addition, the court departed from the view stated in In re Shelley J. *83 that, "`Unless otherwise specified, the requirements of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply [to dependency proceedings]. [Citations.]'" ( In re Shelley J., supra, 68 Cal.Ap

2010(In re David H., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1638 .) In addition, the court departed from the view stated in In re Shelley J. that, “ ‘Unless otherwise specified, the requirements of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply [to dependency proceedings]. [Citations.]’ ” (In re Shelley supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 328 , quoting In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 711 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 759 ].) The In re David H. court gave two reasons for concluding that the provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.80 that allows a challenge to the facial sufficiency of a petitio

2010The In re David H. panel noted that the rule of court relied upon by the In re Shelley J. and In re James C. courts, former rule 39 of the California Rules of Court, has been repealed and the current version of the rule does not contain the language the two courts cited. ( In re David H., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1638 .) In addition, the court departed from the view stated in In re Shelley J. *83 that, "`Unless otherwise specified, the requirements of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply [to dependency proceedings]. [Citations.]'" ( In re Shelley J., supra, 68 Cal.Ap

2010(In re David H., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1638 .) In addition, the court departed from the view stated in In re Shelley J. that, “ ‘Unless otherwise specified, the requirements of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply [to dependency proceedings]. [Citations.]’ ” (In re Shelley supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 328 , quoting In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 711 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 759 ].) The In re David H. court gave two reasons for concluding that the provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.80 that allows a challenge to the facial sufficiency of a petitio

2026In People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91 , 110–111 (Nieto Benitez), the defendant challenged a revised version of CALJIC No. 8.31 for omitting the requirement that the relevant act must involve a high probability of resulting in death, which had been included in an earlier version of the instruction.

2025(Judicial Council of Cal., Advisory Com. on Criminal Jury Instructions Rep., Jury Instructions: Criminal Jury Instructions (Sept. 20, 2022) p. 4.) The double negative was removed and replaced with the “consistent with” phrasing that is in the current version, and the second paragraph stating that CSAAS evidence “is offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child abuse” was added “to clarify the distinction between the proper and improper use of the evidence.” (Id. at pp. 4, 86; see Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 503 [quoting prior version of CALCRIM No. 1193].) In

2025While giving the old version of CALCRIM No. 1802 may not be prejudicial error if provided as the only version of that instruction, it became prejudicial error when considered with the court’s otherwise problematic answer to the jury’s question.10 The jury heard even from the prosecution 9 “An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction accurately states the law.” (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 .) Given our holding in this matter we need not resolve whether the older CALCRIM language given to the jury adequately captured