starting point analysis in New York

2016The starting point of this analysis must be our decision in Thoma v Ronai ( 189 AD2d 635 [1st Dept 1993], affd 82 NY2d 736 [1993]).

2016The starting point of the analysis must be "the basic premises that courts will generally enforce choice-of-law clauses and that contracts should be interpreted so as to effectuate the parties' intent" ( Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v Snow , 26 NY3d 466 , 470 [2015]).

2016The starting point of this analysis must be our decision in Thoma v Ronai ( 189 AD2d 635 [1st Dept 1993], affd 82 NY2d 736 [1993]).

2010As a starting point for the analysis, the court notes that the City deposited the money with the Department of Finance in accordance with the decision of the Appellate Division, wherein that court directed that “[i]n order to prevent any potential windfall to either side, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, with instructions to hold in escrow any award that may be rendered in the condemnation proceeding until the conclusion of the Navigation Law proceeding, and that the proceeds of the condemnation award shall first be utilized to satisfy whatever judgment is recovered in t

2004The court's role, however, is not merely a negative one, looking only backward to judge and sanction wrongful conduct or misguided decision-making by police or prosecutor, but it is also forward-looking to furnish guidance for the future actions and decisions of law enforcement. [FN4] The starting point for this analysis is the three-pronged test set forth by the Court of Appeals in Mitchell for the emergency exception to apply: (1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or prop

2002The starting point for our analysis is the principle that “[a]n arbitration award may not be vacated unless it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator’s power” (Matter of Board of Educ. v Arlington Teachers Assn., 78 NY2d 33, 37 , citing CPLR 7511 [b] [1]).

1997However, the youthful offender may be questioned about the illegal or immoral acts underlying the adjudication (see, e.g., People v Gray, 84 NY2d 709 ; People v Greer, 42 NY2d 170 ).

1997However, the youthful offender may be questioned about the illegal or immoral acts underlying the adjudication (see, e.g., People v Gray, 84 NY2d 709 ; People v Greer, 42 NY2d 170 ).

1993Although there is language in People v Mitchell ( 80 NY2d 519 , supra) which indicates that People v Sloan (supra) implicates something more than a “statutory violation” (People v Mitchell, supra, at 527 ), that language is perfectly consistent with a reference to our State Constitution, rather than to any Federal constitutional principles. 3 Since the Sloan rule is based on State law, this State’s rule on retroactivity as set forth in People v Pepper ( 53 NY2d 213 , supra) must be the starting point for our analysis.

1993Although there is language in People v Mitchell ( 80 NY2d 519 , supra) which indicates that People v Sloan (supra) implicates something more than a “statutory violation” (People v Mitchell, supra, at 527 ), that language is perfectly consistent with a reference to our State Constitution, rather than to any Federal constitutional principles. 3 Since the Sloan rule is based on State law, this State’s rule on retroactivity as set forth in People v Pepper ( 53 NY2d 213 , supra) must be the starting point for our analysis.

1993Although there is language in People v Mitchell ( 80 NY2d 519 , supra) which indicates that People v Sloan (supra) implicates something more than a “statutory violation” (People v Mitchell, supra, at 527 ), that language is perfectly consistent with a reference to our State Constitution, rather than to any Federal constitutional principles. 3 Since the Sloan rule is based on State law, this State’s rule on retroactivity as set forth in People v Pepper ( 53 NY2d 213 , supra) must be the starting point for our analysis.

1993Ill Applying the factors set forth in People v Pepper (supra) we note that the Sloan rule “relates to the fact-finding process only indirectly and therefore retroactivity is not mandated” (People v Mitchell, supra, at 528 ; see also, People v Pepper, supra, at 221; People v Morales, 37 NY2d 262, 269 , supra).

1990Nevertheless, because " 'legislative intent is the great and controlling principle’ ” (Ferres v City of New Rochelle, 68 NY2d 446, 451 , quoting People v Ryan, 274 NY 149, 152 [emphasis in original]), we have accorded deference to the Commissioner’s interpretation only as a starting point for our analysis and not as a substitute for our consideration of the spirit and purpose of the statute and the objective to be accomplished.

1987The Court of Appeals recently held that a civil contempt penalty is imposed "to compensate the injured private party for the loss of or interference with that right (State of New York v Unique Ideas, 44 NY2d 345 ).” (Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, supra, at 583.) Thus, notwithstanding the willfulness of the acts, a civil contempt fine is limited to damages "sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party”.

1987While clear expression of such purpose is unquestionably necessary (see, e.g., Gleason v Gleason, 26 NY2d 28, 36 ), that requirement is satisfied both by the literal words of the 1983 amendment and by its history.

1987Against this background, the starting point of our analysis must be the seminal New York case in this area of Matter of Storar ( 52 NY2d 363 , supra), and its companion case Matter of Eichner v Dillon ( 52 NY2d 363 , supra).

1987Against this background, the starting point of our analysis must be the seminal New York case in this area of Matter of Storar ( 52 NY2d 363 , supra), and its companion case Matter of Eichner v Dillon ( 52 NY2d 363 , supra).