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28 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1977–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Lightfootgreen2 sentences2020"The starting point of our analysis is the language of the statute, 'the principal source of insight into Legislative purpose.'" Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 242 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718, 720 (1984). 2019"The starting point of our analysis is the language of the statute, 'the principal source of insight into Legislative purpose.' " Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians , 395 Mass. 238 , 242, 479 N.E.2d 649 (1985), quoting *740 Commonwealth v. Lightfoot , 391 Mass. 718 , 720, 463 N.E.2d 545 (1984). | 7 | 8 |
Simon v. State Examiners of Electriciansgreen2 sentences2020"The starting point of our analysis is the language of the statute, 'the principal source of insight into Legislative purpose.'" Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 242 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718, 720 (1984). 2019"The starting point of our analysis is the language of the statute, 'the principal source of insight into Legislative purpose.' " Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians , 395 Mass. 238 , 242, 479 N.E.2d 649 (1985), quoting *740 Commonwealth v. Lightfoot , 391 Mass. 718 , 720, 463 N.E.2d 545 (1984). | 7 | 8 |
Town of Hadley v. Town of Amherstgreen2 sentences2014“As a starting point for our analysis we assume, as we must, that the Legislature was aware of the existing statutes in enacting the above legislation, and that if possible a statute is to be interpreted in harmony with prior enactments to give rise to a consistent body of law.” Hadley v. Amherst, 372 Mass. 46, 51 (1977) (citation omitted). 1995Everett v. Revere, 344 Mass. 585, 589 (1962).” Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., All Mass. 580, 582-583 (1994), quoting Hadley v. Amherst, 372 Mass. 46, 51 (1977). | 3 | 3 |
Mathewson v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences1995“As a starting point for our analysis we assume, as we must, that the Legislature was aware of the existing statutes in enacting [c. 15IB], Mathewson v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 335 Mass. 610, 614 (1957), and that if possible a statute is to be interpreted in harmony with prior enactments to give rise to a consistent body of law. 1994“As a starting point for our analysis we assume, as we must, that the Legislature was aware of the existing statutes in enacting [the equal rights act], Mathewson v. Contribu *583 tory Retirement Appeal Bd., 335 Mass. 610, 614 (1957), and that if possible a statute is to be interpreted in harmony with prior enactments to give rise to a consistent body of law. | 3 | 3 |
City of Everett v. City of Reveregreen2 sentences1995Everett v. Revere, 344 Mass. 585, 589 (1962).” Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., All Mass. 580, 582-583 (1994), quoting Hadley v. Amherst, 372 Mass. 46, 51 (1977). 1994Everett v. Revere, 344 Mass. 585, 589 (1962).” Hadley v. Amherst, 372 Mass. 46, 51 (1977). | 3 | 3 |
Schulman v. Attorney Generalgreen1 sentence2023The proponents contend 10 that this more relaxed calendar would allow buffer time for judicial review of the Attorney General's certification decision, so that they would not have to collect signatures under a cloud of legal uncertainty.7 "In interpreting any statutory or constitutional provision, including [art. 48], the starting point of our analysis is its plain language . . . ." Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 189, 191 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Education v. Assessor of Worcestergreen1 sentence2014“Additionally, where two or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose.” Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Rabbgreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Rabb, 431 Mass. 123, 128 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Hanlon v. Rollinsgreen1 sentence2012We apply familiar principles of statutory construction, interpreting the Legislature’s intent “ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.” Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Beangreen1 sentence2012See Bean, supra at 713-714 ; Amirault, supra at 32 ; United States v. Frabizio, 459 F.3d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 2006) (Frabizio). | 1 | 1 |
Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Collegegreen1 sentence2012We apply familiar principles of statutory construction, interpreting the Legislature’s intent “ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.” Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Frabiziogreen1 sentence2012See Bean, supra at 713-714 ; Amirault, supra at 32 ; United States v. Frabizio, 459 F.3d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 2006) (Frabizio). | 1 | 1 |
Newspapers of New England, Inc. v. Clerk-Magistrate of Ware Division of District Court Departmentgreen1 sentence2010Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980); Newspapers of New England, Inc. v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Ware District Court, 403 Mass. 628, 634 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Berrygreen1 sentence2010The starting point for our analysis is that a jury verdict in a criminal case “must be unanimous.” Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 111 (1995), quoting from Commonwealth v. Hebert, 379 Mass. 752, 754 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Santosgreen1 sentence2010In some circumstances, a general unanimity instruction 2 and a general verdict slip will not be sufficient “to ensure the requisite unanimity.” Commonwealth v. Santos, 440 Mass. 281, 284 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hebertgreen1 sentence2010The starting point for our analysis is that a jury verdict in a criminal case “must be unanimous.” Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 111 (1995), quoting from Commonwealth v. Hebert, 379 Mass. 752, 754 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginiagreen1 sentence2010Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980); Newspapers of New England, Inc. v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Ware District Court, 403 Mass. 628, 634 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Mazzone v. Attorney Generalgreen1 sentence2006In interpreting any statutory or constitutional provision, including this exclusion, the starting point of our analysis is its plain language, “the principal source of insight into legislative purpose.” Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 242 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718, 720 (1984). “ ‘Its words are to be given their natural and obvious sense according to common and approved usage at the time of its adoption,’ although the historical context should not ‘controlO the plain meaning of the language.’ ” Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 515, 526 | 1 | 1 |
| Foss v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Hatchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Raygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nyquist v. Maucletgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gurley v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Northeast Energy Partners, LLC v. Mahar Regional School District Constellation NewEnergy, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Dist ., 462 Mass. 687 , 692, 971 N.E.2d 258 (2012) ("The starting point of our analysis is the language of the statute" [citation omitted] ). 2019Dist ., 462 Mass. 687 , 692, 971 N.E.2d 258 (2012) ("The starting point of our analysis is the language of the statute" [citation omitted] ). | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Patterson v. Paul
green
1 sentence2021In response, Ms. Smith claims that the 1997 Easement prevents anyone (apart from Ms. Smith, her heirs, successors-in-title or assigns) from using the Easement Area for any purpose, a position that she held consistently throughout this litigation until recently. [Note 4] When dealing with an express easement, the starting point of the analysis is the language of the grant. "'The basic principle governing the interpretation of deeds is that their meaning, derived from the presumed intent of the grantor, is to be ascertained from the words used in the written instrument, construed when necessary | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Sheftel v. Lebel
green
2 sentences2021In response, Ms. Smith claims that the 1997 Easement prevents anyone (apart from Ms. Smith, her heirs, successors-in-title or assigns) from using the Easement Area for any purpose, a position that she held consistently throughout this litigation until recently. [Note 4] When dealing with an express easement, the starting point of the analysis is the language of the grant. "'The basic principle governing the interpretation of deeds is that their meaning, derived from the presumed intent of the grantor, is to be ascertained from the words used in the written instrument, construed when necessary 2021"It follows that the same considerations govern [the] interpretation of an easement created by deed." Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bloom v. City of Worcester
green
1 sentence2021The starting point of the analysis is art. 89 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, "commonly referred to as the Home Rule Amendment." Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136 , 138 (1973). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Pyle v. School Committee
green
1 sentence2019"Where the language [of a statute] is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive of the Legislature's purpose." National Lumber II , 440 Mass. at 727 , 802 N.E.2d 82 , citing Pyle v. School Comm. of S. Hadley , 423 Mass. 283 , 285, 667 N.E.2d 869 (1996). i. Statutory language . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
National Lumber Co. v. United Casualty & Surety Insurance
green
2 sentences2019"Where the language [of a statute] is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive of the Legislature's purpose." National Lumber II , 440 Mass. at 727 , 802 N.E.2d 82 , citing Pyle v. School Comm. of S. Hadley , 423 Mass. 283 , 285, 667 N.E.2d 869 (1996). i. Statutory language . 2019"Where the language [of a statute] is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive of the Legislature's purpose." National Lumber II , 440 Mass. at 727 , 802 N.E.2d 82 , citing Pyle v. School Comm. of S. Hadley , 423 Mass. 283 , 285, 667 N.E.2d 869 (1996). i. Statutory language . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Rollins
green
1 sentence2018Rollins , supra at 70, 18 N.E.3d 670 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Amirault
green
1 sentence2012See Bean, supra at 713-714 ; Amirault, supra at 32 ; United States v. Frabizio, 459 F.3d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 2006) (Frabizio). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Boehm v. Trailer Train Co.
green
1 sentence2010Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980); Newspapers of New England, Inc. v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Ware District Court, 403 Mass. 628, 634 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009As the Court observed in Charland , “(a]s a starting point for our analysis we assume, as we must, that the Legislature was aware of the existing statutes . . . and that if possible a statute is to be interpreted in harmony with prior enactments to give a consistent body of law.” 417 Mass. at 582-83 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
McDonald v. Town Manager
green
1 sentence2007The decision in McDonald v. Town Manager of Southbridge, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 479 (1995), S.C., 423 Mass. 1018 (1996), provides a starting point for our analysis. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
McDonald v. Town Manager of Southbridge
green
1 sentence2007The decision in McDonald v. Town Manager of Southbridge, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 479 (1995), S.C., 423 Mass. 1018 (1996), provides a starting point for our analysis. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Bingham Land Co. v. Central Maine Power Co. neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Commonwealth v. Reid green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.