21 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohrgreen2 sentences1999Even when a federal statute contains an express preemption provision, the starting point of our analysis is the presumption that "`the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 188 Ill.2d 415, 417 , 242 Ill.Dec. 618 , 721 N.E.2d 1149 (1999), quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2250 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700, 715 (1996). 1999Even when a federal statute contains an express preemption provision, the starting point of our analysis is the presumption that "`the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 188 Ill.2d 415, 417 , 242 Ill.Dec. 618 , 721 N.E.2d 1149 (1999), quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2250 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700, 715 (1996). | 4 | 4 |
Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences1999Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 475 , 702 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1998). 1999Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 475 , 702 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1998). | 2 | 2 |
Murphy v. Ursogreen2 sentences1997Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 452 , 430 N.E.2d at 1083 ("The starting point of analysis under either the general rule of estoppel or the exception is the same — the allegations of the complaint”); Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d at 193 , 355 N.E.2d at 28 ("In determining whether the insurer owes a duty to defend[,] *** it is the general rule that the allegations of the complaint determine the duty”); Federal Insurance Co. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 189 Ill. 1997Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 452 , 430 N.E.2d at 1083 ("The starting point of analysis under either the general rule of estoppel or the exception is the same — the allegations of the complaint”); Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d at 193 , 355 N.E.2d at 28 ("In determining whether the insurer owes a duty to defend[,] *** it is the general rule that the allegations of the complaint determine the duty”); Federal Insurance Co. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 189 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppersgreen2 sentences1997Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 452 , 430 N.E.2d at 1083 ("The starting point of analysis under either the general rule of estoppel or the exception is the same — the allegations of the complaint”); Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d at 193 , 355 N.E.2d at 28 ("In determining whether the insurer owes a duty to defend[,] *** it is the general rule that the allegations of the complaint determine the duty”); Federal Insurance Co. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 189 Ill. 1997Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 452 , 430 N.E.2d at 1083 ("The starting point of analysis under either the general rule of estoppel or the exception is the same — the allegations of the complaint”); Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d at 193 , 355 N.E.2d at 28 ("In determining whether the insurer owes a duty to defend[,] *** it is the general rule that the allegations of the complaint determine the duty”); Federal Insurance Co. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 189 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Graham v. Floridagreen2 sentences2011Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 ; Graham, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2023. 2011Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ; Graham, 560 U.S. at ___ , 130 S.Ct. at 2023 . | 1 | 2 |
Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing System, Inc.green2 sentences1999Even when a federal statute contains an express preemption provision, the starting point of our analysis is the presumption that "`the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 188 Ill.2d 415, 417 , 242 Ill.Dec. 618 , 721 N.E.2d 1149 (1999), quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2250 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700, 715 (1996). 1999Even when a federal statute contains an express preemption provision, the starting point of our analysis is the presumption that "`the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 188 Ill.2d 415, 417 , 242 Ill.Dec. 618 , 721 N.E.2d 1149 (1999), quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2250 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700, 715 (1996). | 1 | 2 |
Federal Insurance v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.green2 sentences1997Murphy , 88 Ill. 2d 444, 452 , 430 N.E.2d 1079, 1083 ("The starting point of analysis under either the general rule of estoppel or the exception is the same-the allegations of the complaint"); Peppers , 64 Ill. 2d 187, 193 , 355 N.E.2d 24, 28 ("In determining whether the insurer owes a duty to defend *** it is the general rule that the allegations of the complaint determine the duty"); Federal Insurance Co. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. , 189 Ill. 1997Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 452 , 430 N.E.2d at 1083 ("The starting point of analysis under either the general rule of estoppel or the exception is the same — the allegations of the complaint”); Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d at 193 , 355 N.E.2d at 28 ("In determining whether the insurer owes a duty to defend[,] *** it is the general rule that the allegations of the complaint determine the duty”); Federal Insurance Co. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 189 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roper v. Simmons
green
2 sentences2011Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ; Graham, 560 U.S. at ___ , 130 S.Ct. at 2023 . 2011Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ; Graham, 560 U.S. at ___ , 130 S.Ct. at 2023 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Healey
green
2 sentences2011At a minimum, this would require actual introduction of a proposal to the appropriate zoning authorities which, if enacted into law, would change the property's existing zoning to a classification that would not allow construction of the property owner's building project." (Emphasis added.) Healey, 223 Ill.2d at 622 , 308 Ill.Dec. 379 , 861 N.E.2d 944 . 2011At a minimum, this would require actual introduction of a proposal to the appropriate zoning authorities which, if enacted into law, would change the property's existing zoning to a classification that would not allow construction of the property owner's building project." (Emphasis added.) Healey, 223 Ill.2d at 622 , 308 Ill.Dec. 379 , 861 N.E.2d 944 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
green
2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 700, 715 , 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 , 91 L. 1999Ed. 2d 700, 715 , 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 , 91 L. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Bishop
green
1 sentence2024While not solely dispositive, the starting point of this analysis is the expert testimony.” ¶ 43 The trial court then robustly discussed each of the three testifying experts, finding each credible and ultimately concluding that the expert testimony resulted in “an evidentiary tie” and - 17 - 2024 IL App (2d) 230106 that defendant’s experts alone did not meet the burden of proof. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill.App.3d 581 , 102 Ill.Dec. 172 , 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986), is the starting point for analysis of ex parte prohibitions. 2002App. 3d 581 , 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986), is the starting point for analysis of ex parte prohibitions. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. O'DONNELL
green
2 sentences1987(People v. O’Donnell (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 517 , 508 N.E.2d 1066 .) The language of the statute is the starting point of the analysis. 1987(People v. O’Donnell (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 517 , 508 N.E.2d 1066 .) The language of the statute is the starting point of the analysis. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Washburn
green
2 sentences1987(Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Washburn (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 486 , 493 N.E.2d 1071 .) The court should also consider the reason and necessity for the act. 1987(Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Washburn (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 486 , 493 N.E.2d 1071 .) The court should also consider the reason and necessity for the act. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood
green
2 sentences1987(Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood (1979), 441 U.S. 91, 107 , 60 L. 1987(Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood (1979), 441 U.S. 91, 107 , 60 L. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Boykin
green
2 sentences1984Statutory language is the starting point of the analysis. ( People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill.2d 138 , 445 N.E.2d 1174 .) The language of section 5-2-4 does not refer to probation revocation. 1984Statutory language is the starting point of the analysis. ( People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill.2d 138 , 445 N.E.2d 1174 .) The language of section 5-2-4 does not refer to probation revocation. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Goodfriend v. Board of Appeals
green
1 sentence1984“It is the law in this State that circuit courts have the power to issue common law writs of certiorari addressed to all inferior tribunals whenever it is shown either that they have exceeded their jurisdiction or have proceeded illegally, and no direct appeal or other mode of direct review of their proceedings is provided.” (Goodfriend v. Board of Appeals (1973), 18 Ill. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
St. Joseph's Clinton County Hospital, Inc. v. Kampwerth
neutral
1 sentence1983Under this rule, taxes, debts and expenses of administration attributable to probate assets are borne by the residuary estate in the absence of a contrary indication in the will. ( In re Estate of Maddux (1981), 93 Ill. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern Railroad
green
2 sentences1979Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504 ): A motion for a directed verdict in a jury trial should be allowed only where the evidence, viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opposite party, so overwhelmingly favors the moving party that no contrary verdict could ever stand. 1979Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504 ): A motion for a directed verdict in a jury trial should be allowed only where the evidence, viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opposite party, so overwhelmingly favors the moving party that no contrary verdict could ever stand. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon
green
2 sentences1975The parties agree that the starting point in the analysis of any labor law preemption question is the rule established in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon (1959), 359 U.S. 236 , 3 L. 1975The parties agree that the starting point in the analysis of any labor law preemption question is the rule established in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon (1959), 359 U.S. 236 , 3 L. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.