10 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Juneby v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Rev. 1 , 15-17 (2007) (explaining that the 2005 creation of presumptive ranges was not intended to increase active terms of imprisonment but was instead intended to restore flexibility to the sentencing court, particularly with regard to the imposition of suspended time). 29 Id. 30 Juneby, 665 P.2d at 37 (“The presumptive term should remain as the starting point of the analysis, and the Chaney criteria should be employed for the limited purpose of determining the extent to which the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors will justify deviation from the presumptive term.” (quoting J 2023Rev. 1 , 15-17 (2007) (explaining that the 2005 creation of presumptive ranges was not intended to increase active terms of imprisonment but was instead intended to restore flexibility to the sentencing court, particularly with regard to the imposition of suspended time). 29 Id. 30 Juneby, 665 P.2d at 37 (“The presumptive term should remain as the starting point of the analysis, and the Chaney criteria should be employed for the limited purpose of determining the extent to which the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors will justify deviation from the presumptive term.” (quoting J | 3 | 3 |
Pickard v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Rev. 1 , 15-17 (2007) (explaining that the 2005 creation of presumptive ranges was not intended to increase active terms of imprisonment but was instead intended to restore flexibility to the sentencing court, particularly with regard to the imposition of suspended time). 29 Id. 30 Juneby, 665 P.2d at 37 (“The presumptive term should remain as the starting point of the analysis, and the Chaney criteria should be employed for the limited purpose of determining the extent to which the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors will justify deviation from the presumptive term.” (quoting J | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Rev. 1 , 15-17 (2007) (explaining that the 2005 creation of presumptive ranges was not intended to increase active terms of imprisonment but was instead intended to restore flexibility to the sentencing court, particularly with regard to the imposition of suspended time). 29 Id. 30 Juneby, 665 P.2d at 37 (“The presumptive term should remain as the starting point of the analysis, and the Chaney criteria should be employed for the limited purpose of determining the extent to which the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors will justify deviation from the presumptive term.” (quoting J | 1 | 1 |
Pears v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Rev. 1 , 15-17 (2007) (explaining that the 2005 creation of presumptive ranges was not intended to increase active terms of imprisonment but was instead intended to restore flexibility to the sentencing court, particularly with regard to the imposition of suspended time). 29 Id. 30 Juneby, 665 P.2d at 37 (“The presumptive term should remain as the starting point of the analysis, and the Chaney criteria should be employed for the limited purpose of determining the extent to which the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors will justify deviation from the presumptive term.” (quoting J | 1 | 1 |
Mullin v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Rev. 1 , 15-17 (2007) (explaining that the 2005 creation of presumptive ranges was not intended to increase active terms of imprisonment but was instead intended to restore flexibility to the sentencing court, particularly with regard to the imposition of suspended time). 29 Id. 30 Juneby, 665 P.2d at 37 (“The presumptive term should remain as the starting point of the analysis, and the Chaney criteria should be employed for the limited purpose of determining the extent to which the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors will justify deviation from the presumptive term.” (quoting J | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pricegreen1 sentence2023Rev. 1 , 15-17 (2007) (explaining that the 2005 creation of presumptive ranges was not intended to increase active terms of imprisonment but was instead intended to restore flexibility to the sentencing court, particularly with regard to the imposition of suspended time). 29 Id. 30 Juneby, 665 P.2d at 37 (“The presumptive term should remain as the starting point of the analysis, and the Chaney criteria should be employed for the limited purpose of determining the extent to which the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors will justify deviation from the presumptive term.” (quoting J | 1 | 1 |
Erickson v. Stategreen1 sentence1982Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967); Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 514 (Alaska 1973). | 1 | 1 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967); Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 514 (Alaska 1973). 1982Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967); Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 514 (Alaska 1973). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1971Where the purpose of the new rule is primarily related to the integrity of the verdict, the application thereof has generally been extended to all cases. [20] This result was recently noted by Justice White writing for a plurality of the Court in Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 , 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 , 28 L.Ed.2d 388, 397 (1971): Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial which substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has b 1971Where the purpose of the new rule is primarily related to the integrity of the verdict, the application thereof has generally been extended to all cases. [20] This result was recently noted by Justice White writing for a plurality of the Court in Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 , 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 , 28 L.Ed.2d 388, 397 (1971): Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial which substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has b | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Juneby v. State
green
2 sentences2023Rev. 1 , 15-17 (2007) (explaining that the 2005 creation of presumptive ranges was not intended to increase active terms of imprisonment but was instead intended to restore flexibility to the sentencing court, particularly with regard to the imposition of suspended time). 29 Id. 30 Juneby, 665 P.2d at 37 (“The presumptive term should remain as the starting point of the analysis, and the Chaney criteria should be employed for the limited purpose of determining the extent to which the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors will justify deviation from the presumptive term.” (quoting J 1983The presumptive term should remain as the starting point of the analysis, and the Chaney criteria should be employed for the limited purpose of determining the extent to which the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors will justify deviation from the presumptive term. 641 P.2d at 835 n. 21. | 4 | 1983–2023 |
Hammond v. Hickel
green
1 sentence2021We conclude that AS 15.10.090 does not contain an implicit duty to timely confirm polling place locations and that the timing of the polling place change therefore does not support Pruitt’s claim of malconduct. 49 Id. at 258 . -20- 7565 The statutory text — the starting point for our analysis — does not mention anything about when a polling place must be confirmed.50 The legislature could have added language requiring the Division to verify the location of a polling place within a certain number of days before the election, but it did not do so. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz
green
1 sentence2021A presumption of constitutionality applies, 12 Id. 13 H.B. 309, ch. 9, §§ 1(a)-1(b), SLA 2020. -7 7567 and doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality.”14 The starting point for our analysis of a constitutional question not directly controlled by precedent is the plain text of the constitutional provision, as clarified by its drafting history.15 Applying these rules we conclude that the Constitution’s plain text, as supported by its drafting history, requires a joint session vote to either confirm or reject a governor’s appointees. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Huff v. State
green
1 sentence1985Huff v. State, 598 P.2d 928 (Alaska 1979), is the starting point for our analysis. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
United States v. Williams
green
2 sentences1982Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 , 68 S.Ct. 237 , 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948). 4 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, recently renamed “issue preclusion,” is defined as follows: When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a final and valid judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. 1982Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 , 68 S.Ct. 237 , 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948). 4 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, recently renamed “issue preclusion,” is defined as follows: When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a final and valid judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Sealfon v. United States
green
2 sentences1982Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 , 68 S.Ct. 237 , 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948). 4 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, recently renamed “issue preclusion,” is defined as follows: When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a final and valid judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. 1982Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 , 68 S.Ct. 237 , 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948). 4 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, recently renamed “issue preclusion,” is defined as follows: When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a final and valid judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ashe v. Swenson
green
2 sentences1982Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 , 68 S.Ct. 237 , 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948). 4 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, recently renamed “issue preclusion,” is defined as follows: When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a final and valid judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. 1982Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 , 68 S.Ct. 237 , 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948). 4 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, recently renamed “issue preclusion,” is defined as follows: When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a final and valid judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.