starting point analysis in Oregon

2026In Campbell, we criticized the federal reasonable “expectation of privacy” test as a “formula for expressing a conclusion rather than a starting point for analysis.” Id.

2026In Campbell, we criticized the federal reasonable “expectation of privacy” test as a “formula for expressing a conclusion rather than a starting point for analysis.” Id.

2026That criticism drew upon our earlier observation in State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312 , 321 n 7, 745 P2d 757 (1987): “One difficulty with analyzing privacy interests in terms of ‘expectations’ is that the issue is one of right, not expecta- tion.

2026That criticism drew upon our earlier observation in State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312 , 321 n 7, 745 P2d 757 (1987): “One difficulty with analyzing privacy interests in terms of ‘expectations’ is that the issue is one of right, not expecta- tion.

2023A “search” occurs for purposes of Article I, section 9, when the government invades a “protected privacy interest.” Meredith, 337 Or at 303 .

2023A “search” occurs for purposes of Article I, section 9, when the government invades a “protected privacy interest.” Meredith, 337 Or at 303 .

2000Id.

1998AbuAdas, 325 Or at 485 .

2026Eastep, 361 Or at 751 (quoting Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2538 (unabridged ed 2002)).

2021Again, that statute provides that a public body is immune from claims that are “limited or barred by the provisions of any other statute, including but not limited to any statute of ultimate repose.” Plaintiff’s claims are for child abuse, and defendant accepts that, had plaintiff brought her claims against a private Cite as 368 Or 403 (2021) 415 entity, they would not be barred by the terms of any statute, including any statute of ultimate repose.

2021State v. Barnthouse, 360 Or 403, 413 , 380 P3d 952 (2016).

2021State v. Barnthouse, 360 Or 403, 413 , 380 P3d 952 (2016).

2015Blevins, 263 Or App at 607 ; see also State v. Murr, 254 Or App 456, 463 , 295 P3d 122 , rev den, 353 Or 788 (2013) (“[A] defendant is ‘charged with a crime’ for the purposes of [former] ORS 135.747 when an accusatory instrument is filed — either a complaint that is filed as part of the citation or a separately filed complaint or information.”).

2015In that case, Cite as 357 Or 524 (2015) 533 the defendant challenged a diagnosis of child sexual abuse from a KIDS Center physician that was based entirely on the child’s statements and history.

2014The text of the regulation itself is the best evidence of the enacting body’s intent and is the starting point for our inquiry.” George v. Myers, 169 Or App 472, 480 , 10 P3d 265 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 692 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; omission in original).

2014The text of the regulation itself is the best evidence of the enacting body’s intent and is the starting point for our inquiry.” George v. Myers, 169 Or App 472, 480 , 10 P3d 265 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 692 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; omission in original).

2013Looking first to text, the statute contemplates that the ultimate repose period applies to any action “arising from” certain construction-related activities, regardless of the legal theory that forms the basis for the action— that is the import of the phrase “whether in contract, tort or otherwise.” The question posed by this appeal, then, is what it means for an action to “arise from” the construction-related activities described in ORS 12.135(1). 11 The Supreme Court’s decision in Black v. Arizala, 337 Or 250, 95 P3d 1109 (2004), provides a starting point for our analysis, as it explains the

2013Looking first to text, the statute contemplates that the ultimate repose period applies to any action “arising from” certain construction-related activities, regardless of the legal theory that forms the basis for the action— that is the import of the phrase “whether in contract, tort or otherwise.” The question posed by this appeal, then, is what it means for an action to “arise from” the construction-related activities described in ORS 12.135(1). 11 The Supreme Court’s decision in Black v. Arizala, 337 Or 250, 95 P3d 1109 (2004), provides a starting point for our analysis, as it explains the

2012The cases on which defendant relies — Presley, Ray , and their predecessor, State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206 , 895 P2d 306 (1995) — concerned whether a police officer exceeded the statutory authority granted by an earlier version of ORS 810.410 — a version that has since been superseded— by seeking consent for a search during a traffic stop. 2 It is undisputed that there is no such statutory issue here: Defendant is asserting a violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.

2012The cases on which defendant relies — Presley, Ray , and their predecessor, State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206 , 895 P2d 306 (1995) — concerned whether a police officer exceeded the statutory authority granted by an earlier version of ORS 810.410 — a version that has since been superseded— by seeking consent for a search during a traffic stop. 2 It is undisputed that there is no such statutory issue here: Defendant is asserting a violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.

2010Indeed, Randolph relies on Payton — a seizure case — as the starting point for its analysis: “the Fourth Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a person’s house as unreasonable per se[.]” 547 US at 109 (quoting Payton, 445 US at 586 ).

2010Indeed, Randolph relies on Payton — a seizure case — as the starting point for its analysis: “the Fourth Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a person’s house as unreasonable per se[.]” 547 US at 109 (quoting Payton, 445 US at 586 ).

2005Oregon Health Care Assn. v. Health Div., 329 Or 480, 488 , 992 P2d 434 (1999) (so interpreting ORS 183.484 in light of other provisions of the APA); Tidewater Contractors, Inc. v. BOLI, 151 Or App 293, 298-99 , 948 P2d 750 (1997), rev den, 326 Or 507 (1998) (same).

2005Oregon Health Care Assn. v. Health Div., 329 Or 480, 488 , 992 P2d 434 (1999) (so interpreting ORS 183.484 in light of other provisions of the APA); Tidewater Contractors, Inc. v. BOLI, 151 Or App 293, 298-99 , 948 P2d 750 (1997), rev den, 326 Or 507 (1998) (same).

2005The starting point for the analysis is State ex rel Nilsen v. Johnston et ux, 233 Or 103 , 377 P2d 331 (1962), in which the Supreme Court established the meaning of the word “willful” that it and we have continued to follow up to this time.

2005The starting point for the analysis is State ex rel Nilsen v. Johnston et ux, 233 Or 103 , 377 P2d 331 (1962), in which the Supreme Court established the meaning of the word “willful” that it and we have continued to follow up to this time.

2005Oregon Health Care Assn. v. Health Div., 329 Or 480, 488 , 992 P2d 434 (1999) (so interpreting ORS 183.484 in light of other provisions of the APA); Tidewater Contractors, Inc. v. BOLI, 151 Or App 293, 298-99 , 948 P2d 750 (1997), rev den, 326 Or 507 (1998) (same).

2005Oregon Health Care Assn. v. Health Div., 329 Or 480, 488 , 992 P2d 434 (1999) (so interpreting ORS 183.484 in light of other provisions of the APA); Tidewater Contractors, Inc. v. BOLI, 151 Or App 293, 298-99 , 948 P2d 750 (1997), rev den, 326 Or 507 (1998) (same).

2000In that case, the defendant was charged with aggravated murder based on two separate aggravating factors, viz., the murder was committed in the course of a robbery, and the murder was committed to conceal the identity of the robbers. 308 Or at 374 .

1994Forney v. Western States Plywood, 297 Or. 628, 632 , 686 P.2d 1027 (1984); SAIF v. Curry, 297 Or. 504, 511 , 686 P.2d 363 (1984).

1994Forney v. Western States Plywood, 297 Or. 628, 632 , 686 P.2d 1027 (1984); SAIF v. Curry, 297 Or. 504, 511 , 686 P.2d 363 (1984).

1994Forney v. Western States Plywood, 297 Or. 628, 632 , 686 P.2d 1027 (1984); SAIF v. Curry, 297 Or. 504, 511 , 686 P.2d 363 (1984).

1994Forney v. Western States Plywood, 297 Or. 628, 632 , 686 P.2d 1027 (1984); SAIF v. Curry, 297 Or. 504, 511 , 686 P.2d 363 (1984).

1983State v. Leathers, 271 Or 236, 240 , 531 P2d 901 (1975); State v. Cannon, 11 Or 312 , 2 P 191 (1884); Ex parte Lange, 19 Wall 163, 21 LEd 872 (1874); Oxman v. US, 148 F2d 750 (8th Cir 1945); People v. Clinton, 243 Cal App 2d 284, 52 Cal Rptr 221 (1966).

1983State v. Leathers, 271 Or 236, 240 , 531 P2d 901 (1975); State v. Cannon, 11 Or 312 , 2 P 191 (1884); Ex parte Lange, 19 Wall 163, 21 LEd 872 (1874); Oxman v. US, 148 F2d 750 (8th Cir 1945); People v. Clinton, 243 Cal App 2d 284, 52 Cal Rptr 221 (1966).

1983State v. Leathers, 271 Or 236, 240 , 531 P2d 901 (1975); State v. Cannon, 11 Or 312 , 2 P 191 (1884); Ex parte Lange, 19 Wall 163, 21 LEd 872 (1874); Oxman v. US, 148 F2d 750 (8th Cir 1945); People v. Clinton, 243 Cal App 2d 284, 52 Cal Rptr 221 (1966).

1983State v. Leathers, 271 Or 236, 240 , 531 P2d 901 (1975); State v. Cannon, 11 Or 312 , 2 P 191 (1884); Ex parte Lange, 19 Wall 163, 21 LEd 872 (1874); Oxman v. US, 148 F2d 750 (8th Cir 1945); People v. Clinton, 243 Cal App 2d 284, 52 Cal Rptr 221 (1966).