starting point analysis in Texas

2015Trinity’s breach The starting point for our analysis of Trinity’s evidentiary-sufficiency challenges to the jury’s findings regarding Trinity’s failure to comply with the Lease is the jury charge.6 See Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000) (legal sufficiency); Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. 2003) (“Before a court can properly conduct a factual sufficiency review, it must first have a clear understanding of the evidence that is pertinent to its inquiry.

2015Rev. 361 , 362–63 (1960)). 8 finding is supported by legally sufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, “crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.”21 We indulge every reasonable inference that would support the finding.22 In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider and weigh all the evidence presented at trial, including any evidence contrary to the judgment.23 We set aside a finding for factual insufficiency if it is “so contrary to the overwhe

2015Trinity’s breach The starting point for our analysis of Trinity’s evidentiary-sufficiency challenges to the jury’s findings regarding Trinity’s failure to comply with the Lease is the jury charge.6 See Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000) (legal sufficiency); Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. 2003) (“Before a court can properly conduct a factual sufficiency review, it must first have a clear understanding of the evidence that is pertinent to its inquiry.

2015Rev. 361 , 362–63 (1960)). 8 finding is supported by legally sufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, “crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.”21 We indulge every reasonable inference that would support the finding.22 In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider and weigh all the evidence presented at trial, including any evidence contrary to the judgment.23 We set aside a finding for factual insufficiency if it is “so contrary to the overwhe

2015The starting point generally is the charge and instructions to the jury.”); Ancira Enters., Inc. v. Fischer, 178 S.W.3d 82, 93 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.).

2014The starting point generally is the charge and instructions to the jury.”); Ancira Enters., Inc. v. Fischer, 178 S.W.3d 82, 93 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.).

2022“The Blockburger test is the starting point in the analysis of a multiple-punishments double-jeopardy claim.” Ex parte Denton, 399 S.W.3d at 546 (citing Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 370 (Tex. Crim.

2010The Blockburger test is the starting point in the analysis of a multiple-punishments double-jeopardy claim: Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 370 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).

2009See Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393 (“If the written instrument is so worded that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and the court will construe the contract as a matter of law.”).

2009See Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983) (“If the written instrument is so worded that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and the court will construe the contract as a matter of law.”).

2022TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011).

2021After looking to both traditional and medical dictionary definitions of the relevant terms to discern their “common, ordinary meanings . . . within their statutory context”, 82 we concluded that TMA was “mak[ing] too much of the rule’s use of the word ‘diagnostic.’” 83 78 459 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2015) (citing TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011) (“Undefined terms in a statute are typically given their ordinary meaning, but if a different or more precise definition is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the statute, we apply that meaning.”)).

2009Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

2009Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

2009See id.

2009See id.

2007See State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. Crim.

1998State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

2006See Fairrow , 112 S.W.3d 288 (holding that the State's oral admonishment on the day of trial did not afford the *145 defendant proper notice of intent to enhance punishment); Hudson v. State, 145 S.W.3d 323 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd) (holding that notice was unreasonable when given during the guilt phase of trial six days before the punishment phase began); Cf. Fugate v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 2-04-548-CR, 2006 WL 601698 , 2006 Tex.App.

2006See Fairrow, 112 S.W.3d 288 (holding that the State’s oral admonishment on the day of trial did not afford the defendant proper notice of intent to enhance punishment); Hudson v. State, 145 S.W.3d 323 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref d) (holding that notice was unreasonable when given during the guilt phase of trial six days before the punishment phase began); Cf. Fugate v. State, — S.W.3d —, No. 2-04-548-CR, 2006 WL 601698 , 2006 Tex.App.

2024See id.

2021Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 750 (Tex. 1995)). 76 Id. 77 Id. at 34. 17 Arlington v. Williams, where we had reiterated that “context is fundamental to understanding the use of language” and cautioned against drawing “meaning . . . from isolated words or phrases”. 78 If a definition that is “different, more limited, or [more] precise” than the dictionary definition “is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the statute, [then] we apply that meaning.” 79 The starting point of our analysis in Marriage and Family Therapists was the language of the Licensed Marriage and Family Therapists A

2021Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 750 (Tex. 1995)). 76 Id. 77 Id. at 34. 17 Arlington v. Williams, where we had reiterated that “context is fundamental to understanding the use of language” and cautioned against drawing “meaning . . . from isolated words or phrases”. 78 If a definition that is “different, more limited, or [more] precise” than the dictionary definition “is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the statute, [then] we apply that meaning.” 79 The starting point of our analysis in Marriage and Family Therapists was the language of the Licensed Marriage and Family Therapists A

2021After looking to both traditional and medical dictionary definitions of the relevant terms to discern their “common, ordinary meanings . . . within their statutory context”, 82 we concluded that TMA was “mak[ing] too much of the rule’s use of the word ‘diagnostic.’” 83 78 459 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2015) (citing TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011) (“Undefined terms in a statute are typically given their ordinary meaning, but if a different or more precise definition is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the statute, we apply that meaning.”)).

2015See Ex Parte Ervin, 991 SW 2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App; 1999)(€EI]he Blockburger test cannot authorize two punishments where the legislature clearly intended only one"); accord, Gonzales v. State, 304 SW 3d 838, 845-46 (Tex.CrimrApp. 2010). jeopardy purposes, the Court will focus on the elements alleged in the chargingfinstrument.

2015Rev. 361 , 362–63 (1960)). 8 finding is supported by legally sufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, “crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.”21 We indulge every reasonable inference that would support the finding.22 In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider and weigh all the evidence presented at trial, including any evidence contrary to the judgment.23 We set aside a finding for factual insufficiency if it is “so contrary to the overwhe

2015See Ex Parte Ervin, 991 SW 2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App; 1999)(€EI]he Blockburger test cannot authorize two punishments where the legislature clearly intended only one"); accord, Gonzales v. State, 304 SW 3d 838, 845-46 (Tex.CrimrApp. 2010). jeopardy purposes, the Court will focus on the elements alleged in the chargingfinstrument.

2015Rev. 361 , 362–63 (1960)). 8 finding is supported by legally sufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, “crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.”21 We indulge every reasonable inference that would support the finding.22 In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider and weigh all the evidence presented at trial, including any evidence contrary to the judgment.23 We set aside a finding for factual insufficiency if it is “so contrary to the overwhe

2015Rev. 361 , 362–63 (1960)). 8 finding is supported by legally sufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, “crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.”21 We indulge every reasonable inference that would support the finding.22 In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider and weigh all the evidence presented at trial, including any evidence contrary to the judgment.23 We set aside a finding for factual insufficiency if it is “so contrary to the overwhe

2014See Garfias, 424 S.W.3d at 59 .

2006Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656 ; see also In re Skiles, 102 S.W.3d 323, 326 (TexApp.-Beaumont 2003, orig. proceeding)(rules do not determine whether counsel should be disqualified but rather are the starting point for an analysis).

2006See Parkway v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex.1995).

2006See Parkway v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex.1995).

1996The starting point for our analysis is the language from the Moriel opinion that we must detail the relevant evidence “when conducting a factual sufficiency review of a punitive damages award.” Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 31 (emphasis added).