starting point analysis in California

2025Instead, section 290, subdivision (d)(4)(A) discusses the tier designation for registration based on an out-of-jurisdiction offense. 17 Assuming we can address Hamilton’s vagueness challenge,15 we conclude section 290, subdivision (d)(4)(A) clearly directs the Attorney General to assess an out-of-jurisdiction offense for its section 290 equivalent.16 “The starting point of our analysis is ‘the strong presumption that legislative enactments “must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.]” ’ ” (Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561

2020(In re Brian J. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 97, 124 .) “The starting point of our analysis is ‘the strong presumption that legislative enactments “must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’” (Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 568 .) Defendant only asserts the ordinances at issue are unconstitutionally vague on their face, not as applied to his own conduct.

2013A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” ’ [Citation.]” (Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567-568 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 , 853 P.2d 507 ].) “The starting point of our analysis is ‘the strong presumption that legislative enactments “must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohi

2013A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” ’ [Citation.]” (Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567-568 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 , 853 P.2d 507 ].) “The starting point of our analysis is ‘the strong presumption that legislative enactments “must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohi

2016Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 , 929 P.2d 596 ] [“ ‘[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.’ ”]; id. at p. 1116 [“[A] law that is ‘void for vagueness’ . . . ‘impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.’ ”].) “Th

2016Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 , 929 P.2d 596 ] [“ ‘[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.’ ”]; id. at p. 1116 [“[A] law that is ‘void for vagueness’ . . . ‘impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.’ ”].) “Th

2003(People v. Deskin (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1400 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 391 ].) In determining whether a criminal statute is sufficiently clear to fulfill fair notice requirements, we consider the language of the statute, its legislative history and California decisions construing the statutory language.

2003(People v. Deskin (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1400 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 391 ].) In determining whether a criminal statute is sufficiently clear to fulfill fair notice requirements, we consider the language of the statute, its legislative history and California decisions construing the statutory language.

1999A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id., at pp. 567-568.) “The starting point of our analysis is ‘the strong presumption that legislative enactments “must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohibited thereby and what may be done without violating its provisions,

1999A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id., at pp. 567-568.) “The starting point of our analysis is ‘the strong presumption that legislative enactments “must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohibited thereby and what may be done without violating its provisions,

1999(Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479 , 492 . . . .)” (People v. Camillo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 981, 996 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) “ ‘The requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Heilman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 391, 400 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 ] [“repeatedly” not unconstitutionally vague].) “A dictionary is a proper source to determine the usual and ordinary meaning of a word or phrase in a statute.” (E.

1999(Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479 , 492 . . . .)” (People v. Camillo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 981, 996 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) “ ‘The requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Heilman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 391, 400 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 ] [“repeatedly” not unconstitutionally vague].) “A dictionary is a proper source to determine the usual and ordinary meaning of a word or phrase in a statute.” (E.

1999(Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479 , 492 . . . .)” (People v. Camillo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 981, 996 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) “ ‘The requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Heilman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 391, 400 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 ] [“repeatedly” not unconstitutionally vague].) “A dictionary is a proper source to determine the usual and ordinary meaning of a word or phrase in a statute.” (E.

1999(Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479 , 492 . . . .)” (People v. Camillo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 981, 996 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) “ ‘The requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Heilman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 391, 400 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 ] [“repeatedly” not unconstitutionally vague].) “A dictionary is a proper source to determine the usual and ordinary meaning of a word or phrase in a statute.” (E.

1999A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id., at pp. 567-568.) “The starting point of our analysis is ‘the strong presumption that legislative enactments “must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohibited thereby and what may be done without violating its provisions,

1999A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id., at pp. 567-568.) “The starting point of our analysis is ‘the strong presumption that legislative enactments “must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohibited thereby and what may be done without violating its provisions,

1983He argues the sentencing procedure for forcible sex offenses under section 667.6 reflects an independent and distinct sentencing scheme free from the limitations of section 1170.1 and thus the sentencing rules simply do not apply to convictions for those offenses. [4] The starting point for our analysis must be the text of the statutes and the sentencing rules examined in light of the intent of the Legislature so our interpretation will effectuate the purpose of the law. ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 576 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 ].) (1) When we examine language in penal

1983He argues the sentencing procedure for forcible sex offenses under section 667.6 reflects an independent and distinct sentencing scheme free from the limitations of section 1170.1 and thus the sentencing rules simply do not apply to convictions for those offenses. [4] The starting point for our analysis must be the text of the statutes and the sentencing rules examined in light of the intent of the Legislature so our interpretation will effectuate the purpose of the law. ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 576 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 ].) (1) When we examine language in penal

1983He argues the sentencing procedure for forcible sex offenses under section 667.6 reflects an independent and distinct sentencing scheme free from the limitations of section 1170.1 and thus the sentencing rules simply do not apply to convictions for those offenses. [4] The starting point for our analysis must be the text of the statutes and the sentencing rules examined in light of the intent of the Legislature so our interpretation will effectuate the purpose of the law. ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 576 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 ].) (1) When we examine language in penal

1983He argues the sentencing procedure for forcible sex offenses under section 667.6 reflects an independent and distinct sentencing scheme free from the limitations of section 1170.1 and thus the sentencing rules simply do not apply to convictions for those offenses. [4] The starting point for our analysis must be the text of the statutes and the sentencing rules examined in light of the intent of the Legislature so our interpretation will effectuate the purpose of the law. ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 576 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 ].) (1) When we examine language in penal

1983He argues the sentencing procedure for forcible sex offenses under section 667.6 reflects an independent and distinct sentencing scheme free from the limitations of section 1170.1 and thus the sentencing rules simply do not apply to convictions for those offenses. [4] The starting point for our analysis must be the text of the statutes and the sentencing rules examined in light of the intent of the Legislature so our interpretation will effectuate the purpose of the law. ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 576 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 ].) (1) When we examine language in penal

1983He argues the sentencing procedure for forcible sex offenses under section 667.6 reflects an independent and distinct sentencing scheme free from the limitations of section 1170.1 and thus the sentencing rules simply do not apply to convictions for those offenses. [4] The starting point for our analysis must be the text of the statutes and the sentencing rules examined in light of the intent of the Legislature so our interpretation will effectuate the purpose of the law. ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 576 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 ].) (1) When we examine language in penal

2015“The starting point for our analysis is section 580, which states quite simply, ‘The relief granted to [a] plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which [is] demanded in [the] complaint . . . .’ ” (Parish v. Peters (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 202, 207 (Parish).) This “constitutes a statutory expression of the mandates of due process, which require ‘formal notice of potential liability.’ ” (Ibid., italics added, citing Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826 (Greenup).) This formal notice satisfies the right under due process to decide whether to defend an action or not.

1991A. The starting point for our analysis is section 580, which states quite simply, “The relief granted to [a] plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which [is] demanded in [the] complaint . . . .” As the Supreme Court held without qualification in Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 220 , 726 P.2d 1295 ], “in all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on recovery.” (Id. at p. 824.) In its overview of section 580, the high court stated the statute should be “strictly construed” so that any default judgment in excess of the amount specifically demanded is voi

2001It is beyond cavil that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." ( Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 ; accord, Freeman v. State Farm Mut.

2001It is beyond cavil that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." ( Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 ; accord, Freeman v. State Farm Mut.

2025(People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478 [“ ‘a hearing is required only where the court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would constitute “good cause” to doubt a juror’s ability to perform his duties and would justify his removal from the case’ ”].) Stanfield seeks to require the court to conduct an inquiry whenever it becomes aware of any indication of a possibility that there might be good cause to remove a juror.

2023(Ibid.) Private arbitration must not become “‘an instrument of injustice imposed on a “take it or leave it” basis.’” (Ibid.) “As a starting point for our analysis, we review general principles of unconscionability. ‘“One common formulation of unconscionability is that it refers to ‘“an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract 1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated. 9 terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”’ [Citation.] As that formulation implicitly recognizes, the doctri

2023“Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.” [Citations.] In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.’ [Citation.]” ( Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 1243-1244.) “‘[A] finding of procedural unconscionability does not mean that a contra

2022The court imposed, but stayed under Penal Code section 654, sentences for the two felon-in-possession counts. 3 A. Standard of Review “In determining a statute’s constitutionality, we start from the premise that it is valid, we resolve all doubts in favor of its constitutionality, and we uphold it unless it is in clear and unquestionable conflict with the state or federal Constitutions.” (People v. Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 311 (Yarbrough); see also Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 593 [the starting point of our analysis is a “‘strong pr