starting point analysis in Maryland

2021As the starting point for our analysis, we pointed out that municipalities do not possess any inherent powers and are limited to exercising “only those [powers] expressly granted by the Legislature[.]” Id. at 543 .

2021We identified the “municipal power implicated in this case” as being “the power to impose and waive impact fees.” Id. at 544 .

2012Id.

2008Accordingly, the starting point of our analysis of her claims is Maryland’s elective share statute, Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2008 Cum.Supp.), Estates and Trusts Article, § 3-203. 12 As we have noted, the “right of a spouse to take a share of an Estate in contravention of a Will ... [is] entirely statutory.” Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 573 , 880 A.2d 343 , 350 n. 5 (2005).

2008Accordingly, the starting point of our analysis of her claims is Maryland’s elective share statute, Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2008 Cum.Supp.), Estates and Trusts Article, § 3-203. 12 As we have noted, the “right of a spouse to take a share of an Estate in contravention of a Will ... [is] entirely statutory.” Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 573 , 880 A.2d 343 , 350 n. 5 (2005).

2007To determine if petitioner’s detention was lawful, the starting point for our analysis is the Supreme Court case of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 , 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 , and our recent case of Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249 , 872 A.2d 87 .

2007To determine if petitioner’s detention was lawful, the starting point for our analysis is the Supreme Court case of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 , 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 , and our recent case of Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249 , 872 A.2d 87 .

2007The first of those cases, Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143 , 14 A. 505 (1888) involved whether statements made by an attorney in the course of a judicial proceeding were subject to an absolute or qualified privilege.

2007The first of those cases, Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143 , 14 A. 505 (1888) involved whether statements made by an attorney in the course of a judicial proceeding were subject to an absolute or qualified privilege.

2007As a starting point for our analysis, we quote Judge Battaglia’s considerable discussion of the doctrine of laches in Ross v. Board of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 668-70 , 876 A.2d 692 (2005): Laches “is a defense in equity against stale claims, and is based upon grounds of sound public policy by discouraging fusty demands for the peace of society.” Parker v. Board of Election Supervisors, 230 Md. 126,130 , 186 A.2d 195 (1962).

2007As a starting point for our analysis, we quote Judge Battaglia’s considerable discussion of the doctrine of laches in Ross v. Board of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 668-70 , 876 A.2d 692 (2005): Laches “is a defense in equity against stale claims, and is based upon grounds of sound public policy by discouraging fusty demands for the peace of society.” Parker v. Board of Election Supervisors, 230 Md. 126,130 , 186 A.2d 195 (1962).

2007As a starting point for our analysis, we quote Judge Battaglia’s considerable discussion of the doctrine of laches in Ross v. Board of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 668-70 , 876 A.2d 692 (2005): Laches “is a defense in equity against stale claims, and is based upon grounds of sound public policy by discouraging fusty demands for the peace of society.” Parker v. Board of Election Supervisors, 230 Md. 126,130 , 186 A.2d 195 (1962).

2007As a starting point for our analysis, we quote Judge Battaglia’s considerable discussion of the doctrine of laches in Ross v. Board of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 668-70 , 876 A.2d 692 (2005): Laches “is a defense in equity against stale claims, and is based upon grounds of sound public policy by discouraging fusty demands for the peace of society.” Parker v. Board of Election Supervisors, 230 Md. 126,130 , 186 A.2d 195 (1962).

2007To determine if petitioner’s detention was lawful, the starting point for our analysis is the Supreme Court case of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 , 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 , and our recent case of Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249 , 872 A.2d 87 .

2007To determine if petitioner’s detention was lawful, the starting point for our analysis is the Supreme Court case of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 , 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 , and our recent case of Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249 , 872 A.2d 87 .

2006In Wright v. State, the Court of Appeals held that when a defendant reneges on a plea agreement and the plea agreement provides for the use, by the State, against the defendant, of inculpatory statements in that event, statements he made when negotiating and performing the plea agreement were admissible against him at trial, the State having neither rescinded nor breached the agreement. 307 Md. at 584-585 , 515 A.2d at 1173-1174 .

2006In Wright v. State, the Court of Appeals held that when a defendant reneges on a plea agreement and the plea agreement provides for the use, by the State, against the defendant, of inculpatory statements in that event, statements he made when negotiating and performing the plea agreement were admissible against him at trial, the State having neither rescinded nor breached the agreement. 307 Md. at 584-585 , 515 A.2d at 1173-1174 .

2004The mathematical comparison of incomes of the parties, including projected future incomes “is the starting point of the analysis” but “is never conclusive.” Blaine, supra, at 336 Md. at 71 , 646 A.2d 413 .

2004The mathematical comparison of incomes of the parties, including projected future incomes “is the starting point of the analysis” but “is never conclusive.” Blaine, supra, at 336 Md. at 71 , 646 A.2d 413 .

2001“The starting point for this inquiry is the language of the statute, read in its entirety and in the context of the statutory scheme.” Id. (citing GEICO v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 , 630 A.2d 713 (1993); Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 245 , 465 A.2d 1126 (1983)).

2001“The starting point for this inquiry is the language of the statute, read in its entirety and in the context of the statutory scheme.” Id. (citing GEICO v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 , 630 A.2d 713 (1993); Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 245 , 465 A.2d 1126 (1983)).

2001“The starting point for this inquiry is the language of the statute, read in its entirety and in the context of the statutory scheme.” Id. (citing GEICO v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 , 630 A.2d 713 (1993); Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 245 , 465 A.2d 1126 (1983)).

2001“If the words of the statute are clear and free from ambiguity, we need not look further.” Id. (quoting Tidewater, 337 Md. at 345 , 653 A.2d 468 ).

2001“The starting point for this inquiry is the language of the statute, read in its entirety and in the context of the statutory scheme.” Id. (citing GEICO v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 , 630 A.2d 713 (1993); Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 245 , 465 A.2d 1126 (1983)).

2001“The starting point for this inquiry is the language of the statute, read in its entirety and in the context of the statutory scheme.” Id. (citing GEICO v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 , 630 A.2d 713 (1993); Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 245 , 465 A.2d 1126 (1983)).

2000Gordon Family Partnership v. Gar on Jer , 348 Md. 129 , 137 , 702 A.2d 753 (1997).

2000Gordon Family Partnership v. Gar on Jer , 348 Md. 129 , 137 , 702 A.2d 753 (1997).

1998For example, in Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415 , 807 P.2d 633 (1991), relied upon by Dr. Ginsberg, the Canon stated that “‘[ejxcept in a proceeding involving him personally or in response to an official summons, a judge shall not testify as witness in any court proceeding.’ ” Fuller, 807 P.2d at 639 .

1998For example, in Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415 , 807 P.2d 633 (1991), relied upon by Dr. Ginsberg, the Canon stated that “‘[ejxcept in a proceeding involving him personally or in response to an official summons, a judge shall not testify as witness in any court proceeding.’ ” Fuller, 807 P.2d at 639 .

1992As the Court of Appeals opined in Comptroller v. Fairchild Industries, 303 Md. 280, 284 , 493 A.2d 341 (1985), “Entitlement to interest on a tax refund is a matter of grace which can only be authorized by legislative enactment.” Hence, the starting point of our analysis is the statutory provisions that establish the conditions under which a taxpayer is entitled to a state income tax refund and interest on that refund.

1992As the Court of Appeals opined in Comptroller v. Fairchild Industries, 303 Md. 280, 284 , 493 A.2d 341 (1985), “Entitlement to interest on a tax refund is a matter of grace which can only be authorized by legislative enactment.” Hence, the starting point of our analysis is the statutory provisions that establish the conditions under which a taxpayer is entitled to a state income tax refund and interest on that refund.

1981See, e.g., Davis v. State, 283 Md. 358, 369-370 , 390 A.2d 1112 (1978); Governor v. Exxon, 279 Md. 410, 431-432 , 370 A.2d 1102 (1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 , 98 S.Ct. 2207 , 57 L.Ed.2d 91 .(1978).

1981See, e.g., Davis v. State, 283 Md. 358, 369-370 , 390 A.2d 1112 (1978); Governor v. Exxon, 279 Md. 410, 431-432 , 370 A.2d 1102 (1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 , 98 S.Ct. 2207 , 57 L.Ed.2d 91 .(1978).

1981See, e.g., Davis v. State, 283 Md. 358, 369-370 , 390 A.2d 1112 (1978); Governor v. Exxon, 279 Md. 410, 431-432 , 370 A.2d 1102 (1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 , 98 S.Ct. 2207 , 57 L.Ed.2d 91 .(1978).

1981See, e.g., Davis v. State, 283 Md. 358, 369-370 , 390 A.2d 1112 (1978); Governor v. Exxon, 279 Md. 410, 431-432 , 370 A.2d 1102 (1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 , 98 S.Ct. 2207 , 57 L.Ed.2d 91 .(1978).