starting point analysis in Connecticut

1999"If a public duty exists, an official can be liable only if the act complained of is a ministerial act, or one of the narrow exceptions to discretionary acts applies." 1 Id., 170 . "[A]lthough the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private." Id., 170 . "[A] municipal employee . . . has a qualified immunity in the performance of a governmental duty, but he may be liable if he misperforms a ministerial act, as opposed

1999"If a public duty exists, an official can be liable only if the act complained of is a ministerial act, or one of the narrow exceptions to discretionary acts applies." 1 Id., 170 . "[A]lthough the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private." Id., 170 . "[A] municipal employee . . . has a qualified immunity in the performance of a governmental duty, but he may be liable if he misperforms a ministerial act, as opposed

2021A property’s highest and best use is commonly defined as the use that will most likely produce the highest market value, greatest finan- cial return, or the most profit from the use of a particular piece of real estate.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United Technol- ogies Corp. v. East Windsor, 262 Conn. 11, 25 , 807 A.2d 955 (2002). ’’The highest and best use determination is inextrica- bly intertwined with the marketplace because fair mar- ket value is defined as the price that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller based on the highest and b

2021A property’s highest and best use is commonly defined as the use that will most likely produce the highest market value, greatest finan- cial return, or the most profit from the use of a particular piece of real estate.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United Technol- ogies Corp. v. East Windsor, 262 Conn. 11, 25 , 807 A.2d 955 (2002). ’’The highest and best use determination is inextrica- bly intertwined with the marketplace because fair mar- ket value is defined as the price that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller based on the highest and b

2001Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501 , 505 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989). "[A]lthough the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 170 .

2001Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501 , 505 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989). "[A]lthough the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 170 .

2014The standard of review for interpretation of a con- tract is well settled. ‘‘[I]n the absence of a claim of ambiguity, the interpretation of [a] contract presents a question of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reid v. Landsberger, 123 Conn. App. 260, 285 , 1 A.3d 1149 (Bishop, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 933 , 10 A.3d 517 (2010).

2014The standard of review for interpretation of a con- tract is well settled. ‘‘[I]n the absence of a claim of ambiguity, the interpretation of [a] contract presents a question of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reid v. Landsberger, 123 Conn. App. 260, 285 , 1 A.3d 1149 (Bishop, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 933 , 10 A.3d 517 (2010).

2014The standard of review for interpretation of a con- tract is well settled. ‘‘[I]n the absence of a claim of ambiguity, the interpretation of [a] contract presents a question of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reid v. Landsberger, 123 Conn. App. 260, 285 , 1 A.3d 1149 (Bishop, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 933 , 10 A.3d 517 (2010).

2014The standard of review for interpretation of a con- tract is well settled. ‘‘[I]n the absence of a claim of ambiguity, the interpretation of [a] contract presents a question of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reid v. Landsberger, 123 Conn. App. 260, 285 , 1 A.3d 1149 (Bishop, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 933 , 10 A.3d 517 (2010).

2009“It is axiomatic that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract.” D’Agostino v. Housing Authority, 95 Conn. App. 834, 838 , 898 A.2d 228 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 905 , 907 A.2d 88 (2006); accord W.R.

2009“It is axiomatic that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract.” D’Agostino v. Housing Authority, 95 Conn. App. 834, 838 , 898 A.2d 228 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 905 , 907 A.2d 88 (2006); accord W.

2009“It is axiomatic that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract.” D’Agostino v. Housing Authority, 95 Conn. App. 834, 838 , 898 A.2d 228 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 905 , 907 A.2d 88 (2006); accord W.R.

2009“It is axiomatic that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract.” D’Agostino v. Housing Authority, 95 Conn. App. 834, 838 , 898 A.2d 228 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 905 , 907 A.2d 88 (2006); accord W.R.

2009“It is axiomatic that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract.” D’Agostino v. Housing Authority, 95 Conn. App. 834, 838 , 898 A.2d 228 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 905 , 907 A.2d 88 (2006); accord W.R.

2009“It is axiomatic that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract.” D’Agostino v. Housing Authority, 95 Conn. App. 834, 838 , 898 A.2d 228 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 905 , 907 A.2d 88 (2006); accord W.

2003“The doctrine of governmental immunity has provided some exceptions to the general rule of tort liability for municipal employees. [A] municipal employee . . . has a qualified immunity in the performance of a governmental duty, but he may be liable if he misperforms a ministerial act, as opposed to a discretionary act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 107 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998).

2003“The doctrine of governmental immunity has provided some exceptions to the general rule of tort liability for municipal employees. [A] municipal employee . . . has a qualified immunity in the performance of a governmental duty, but he may be liable if he misperforms a ministerial act, as opposed to a discretionary act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 107 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998).

1988On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect to perform it or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may support an individual action for damages.” ’ ” Id., 166 , quoting Shore v. Stoning-ton, 187 Conn. 147, 152 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982), quoting Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 589-90 , 116 A.2d 429 (1955). “[T]he public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis” with regard to the question of municipal liability.

1988On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect to perform it or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may support an individual action for damages.” ’ ” Id., 166 , quoting Shore v. Stoning-ton, 187 Conn. 147, 152 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982), quoting Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 589-90 , 116 A.2d 429 (1955). “[T]he public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis” with regard to the question of municipal liability.

2000“The United States Supreme Court’s decision ia Roviaro v. United States, [supra, 353 U.S. 53 ], provides a starting point for our analysis of how courts should balance the state’s interest in protecting informants against the defendant’s interest in obtaining information useful in conducting his defense.

1999“The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rovi-aro v. United States, [supra, 353 U.S. 53 ], 1 provides a starting point for our analysis of how courts should balance the state’s interest in protecting informants against the defendant’s interest in obtaining information useful in conducting Ms defense.

1995Although historically "`[a] municipality itself was generally immune from liability for its tortious acts at common law; Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589 , 593 , 479 A.2d 793 (1984) . . . [municipal] employees faced the same personal tort liability as private individuals.' Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, [ 208 Conn. 161 , 165 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988)]." Id., quoting Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501 , 505 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989). "`[T]he public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis' with regard to the question of municipal liability." (Citations omitted).

1995Although historically "`[a] municipality itself was generally immune from liability for its tortious acts at common law; Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589 , 593 , 479 A.2d 793 (1984) . . . [municipal] employees faced the same personal tort liability as private individuals.' Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, [ 208 Conn. 161 , 165 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988)]." Id., quoting Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501 , 505 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989). "`[T]he public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis' with regard to the question of municipal liability." (Citations omitted).

1992"Whether the acts complained of . . . were governmental or ministerial is a factual question which depends upon the nature of the act complained of." Gauvin v. New Haven, 187 Conn. 180 , 186 , 445 A.2d 1 (1982).

1992"Whether the acts complained of . . . were governmental or ministerial is a factual question which depends upon the nature of the act complained of." Gauvin v. New Haven, 187 Conn. 180 , 186 , 445 A.2d 1 (1982).

2016"To obtain a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it." Borkowski v. Borkowski , 228 Conn. 729 , 737-38, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).

2016"To obtain a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it." Borkowski v. Borkowski , 228 Conn. 729 , 737-38, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).

2016Sherman was, in fact, committed to the notion that only one third-party culpability defense should be asserted, a proposition [the habeas] court believes may well be within [Sherman's] informed discretion, he unreasonably chose a third party against whom there was scant evidence and ignored a third party against whom there was a plethora of evidence." 10 As to the prejudice component of Strickland , the habeas court further concluded that this deficiency prejudiced the petitioner's defense because, if Sherman had presented a defense **454 implicating Thomas Skakel, the jury likely would have h

2016Sherman was, in fact, committed to the notion that only one third-party culpability defense should be asserted, a proposition [the habeas] court believes may well be within [Sherman's] informed discretion, he unreasonably chose a third party against whom there was scant evidence and ignored a third party against whom there was a plethora of evidence." 10 As to the prejudice component of Strickland , the habeas court further concluded that this deficiency prejudiced the petitioner's defense because, if Sherman had presented a defense **454 implicating Thomas Skakel, the jury likely would have h

2016A Alimony The defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to modify his alimony obligation "by failing to properly find net income and by failing to properly compare circumstances at the time of the remand to the judgment." Specifically, the defendant argues that the court "improperly identified the defendant's June 4, 2009 financial affidavit as the starting point of analysis when the proper starting point was the court's finding of net income in the judgment on August 5, 2009," and that the court improperly declined to reduce his alimony obligation "base

2016A Alimony The defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to modify his alimony obligation "by failing to properly find net income and by failing to properly compare circumstances at the time of the remand to the judgment." Specifically, the defendant argues that the court "improperly identified the defendant's June 4, 2009 financial affidavit as the starting point of analysis when the proper starting point was the court's finding of net income in the judgment on August 5, 2009," and that the court improperly declined to reduce his alimony obligation "base

2014“We note that if a verdict is defective in form alone, rather than as a matter of law, the parties should have objected at a time when the mistake could have been corrected.” Tisdale v. Riverside Cemetery Assn., 78 Conn. App. 250, 257-58 , 826 A.2d 232 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 909 , 832 A.2d 74 (2003).

2014“We note that if a verdict is defective in form alone, rather than as a matter of law, the parties should have objected at a time when the mistake could have been corrected.” Tisdale v. Riverside Cemetery Assn., 78 Conn. App. 250, 257-58 , 826 A.2d 232 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 909 , 832 A.2d 74 (2003).

2014“We note that if a verdict is defective in form alone, rather than as a matter of law, the parties should have objected at a time when the mistake could have been corrected.” Tisdale v. Riverside Cemetery Assn., 78 Conn. App. 250, 257-58 , 826 A.2d 232 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 909 , 832 A.2d 74 (2003).

2014“We note that if a verdict is defective in form alone, rather than as a matter of law, the parties should have objected at a time when the mistake could have been corrected.” Tisdale v. Riverside Cemetery Assn., 78 Conn. App. 250, 257-58 , 826 A.2d 232 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 909 , 832 A.2d 74 (2003).

2013Thus for one to recover from a municipal corporation in tort it must be shown that the duty breached was owed to the injured person as an individual and was not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the public in general [i.e., a duty to all is a duty to no one].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310 , 335 n.13, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). “ [Although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be pub

2013Thus for one to recover from a municipal corporation in tort it must be shown that the duty breached was owed to the injured person as an individual and was not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the public in general [i.e., a duty to all is a duty to no one].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310 , 335 n.13, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). “ [Although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be pub