excited utterance exception in Georgia

2017Moreover, “[t]estimony that the declarant appeared nervous and upset, combined with a reasonable basis for emotional upset, will usually suffice for admission under the excited utterance exception.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Daniel v. State, 285 Ga. 406, 410 (6) ( 677 SE2d 120 ) (2009) (reviewing admissibility of an excited utterance under Georgia’s old Evidence Code).

2017Moreover, “[t]estimony that the declarant appeared nervous and upset, combined with a reasonable basis for emotional upset, will usually suffice for admission under the excited utterance exception.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Daniel v. State, 285 Ga. 406, 410 (6) ( 677 SE2d 120 ) (2009) (reviewing admissibility of an excited utterance under Georgia’s old Evidence Code).

2019We have explained that “‘the excited utterance need not be made contemporaneously [with] the startling event.’” Robbins v. State, 300 Ga. 387, 389 ( 793 SE2d 62 ) (2016) (quoting United States v. Belfast, 611 F3d 783, 817 (11th Cir. 2010)).4 Rather, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the statement was made while the declarant was “‘still . . . under the stress or excitement that the startling event caused.’” Robbins, 300 Ga. at 389 (quoting Belfast, 611 F3d at 817 (citing cases affirming issue were admissible under both the excited utterance exce

2019We have explained that “‘the excited utterance need not be made contemporaneously [with] the startling event.’” Robbins v. State, 300 Ga. 387, 389 ( 793 SE2d 62 ) (2016) (quoting United States v. Belfast, 611 F3d 783, 817 (11th Cir. 2010)).4 Rather, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the statement was made while the declarant was “‘still . . . under the stress or excitement that the startling event caused.’” Robbins, 300 Ga. at 389 (quoting Belfast, 611 F3d at 817 (citing cases affirming issue were admissible under both the excited utterance exce

2023See Blackmon v. State, 306 Ga. 90, 94 (2) n.3 (829 SE2d 75) (2019) (noting that the trial court erred in concluding that hearsay statements “were admissible under both the excited utterance exception and the residual exception” because “[t]he residual exception applies . . . only to statements not specifically covered by any law,” and “[t]hus, if the hearsay statements at issue were admissible under the excited utterance law, they were not admissible under the residual exception” (citations and punctuation omitted)).

2023See Blackmon v. State, 306 Ga. 90, 94 (2) n.3 (829 SE2d 75) (2019) (noting that the trial court erred in concluding that hearsay statements “were admissible under both the excited utterance exception and the residual exception” because “[t]he residual exception applies . . . only to statements not specifically covered by any law,” and “[t]hus, if the hearsay statements at issue were admissible under the excited utterance law, they were not admissible under the residual exception” (citations and punctuation omitted)).

2021Crucially, she points to no evidence “that show[s the speakers were] actually experiencing stress or excitement at the time of [their] statement[s] to [Westmoreland] so as to eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation and provide sufficient assurance that the statement[s were] 4 trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous.” Jenkins v. State, 303 Ga. 314, 318 (2) ( 812 SE2d 238 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020Jenkins v. State, 303 Ga. 314, 317 (2) ( 812 SE2d 238 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that Yilla’s statement was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. 5 See Lyons v. State, 309 Ga. 15, 21 (4) (843 SE2d 825) (2020) (“The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”).

2025We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that Yilla’s statement was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. 5 See Lyons v. State, 309 Ga. 15, 21 (4) (843 SE2d 825) (2020) (“The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”).

2023See Atkins v. State, 310 Ga. 246, 249-252 (2) (850 SE2d 103) (2020) (considering on appeal whether the trial court had abused its discretion in concluding that hearsay statements were inadmissible under both the excited-utterance exception and the residual-hearsay exception, where the defendant had argued both exceptions “[i]n the alternative”). 15 impressions and excited utterances are properly before this Court.

2023See Atkins v. State, 310 Ga. 246, 249-252 (2) (850 SE2d 103) (2020) (considering on appeal whether the trial court had abused its discretion in concluding that hearsay statements were inadmissible under both the excited-utterance exception and the residual-hearsay exception, where the defendant had argued both exceptions “[i]n the alternative”). 15 impressions and excited utterances are properly before this Court.

2021See McCord v. State, 305 Ga. 318, 324 (2) (a) (ii) (825 SE2d 122) (2019).

2021See McCord v. State, purposes, including, but not limited to: proof of motive, opportunity, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.” 9 305 Ga. 318, 324 (2) (a) (ii) ( 825 SE2d 122 ) (2019) (even if the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence as a present sense impression, such evidence was nevertheless admissible under the excited utterance exception and the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence was not in error).

2019We have explained that “‘the excited utterance need not be made contemporaneously [with] the startling event.’” Robbins v. State, 300 Ga. 387, 389 ( 793 SE2d 62 ) (2016) (quoting United States v. Belfast, 611 F3d 783, 817 (11th Cir. 2010)).4 Rather, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the statement was made while the declarant was “‘still . . . under the stress or excitement that the startling event caused.’” Robbins, 300 Ga. at 389 (quoting Belfast, 611 F3d at 817 (citing cases affirming issue were admissible under both the excited utterance exce

2019We have explained that “‘the excited utterance need not be made contemporaneously [with] the startling event.’” Robbins v. State, 300 Ga. 387, 389 ( 793 SE2d 62 ) (2016) (quoting United States v. Belfast, 611 F3d 783, 817 (11th Cir. 2010)).4 Rather, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the statement was made while the declarant was “‘still . . . under the stress or excitement that the startling event caused.’” Robbins, 300 Ga. at 389 (quoting Belfast, 611 F3d at 817 (citing cases affirming issue were admissible under both the excited utterance exce

2019See, e.g., Woodward v. Williams , 263 F.3d 1135 , 1138, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the victim's statement, "He is going to kill me," related to the startling event of the appellant intruding into her house and shoving her father, and that the statement was properly admitted under the excited-utterance exception); United States v. Hartmann , 958 F.2d 774 , 784 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the trial court did not commit plain error by admitting as an excited utterance the victim's statement to his lawyers that his wife and her lover were planning to kill him).

2019See, e.g., Woodward v. Williams, 263 F3d 1135, 1138, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the victim’s statement, “He is going to kill me,” related to the startling event of the appellant intruding into her house and shoving her father, and that the statement was properly admitted under the excited utterance exception); United States v. Hartmann, 958 F2d 774, 784 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the trial court did not commit plain error by admitting as an excited utterance the victim’s statement to his lawyers that his wife and her lover were planning to kill him).

2019Appx. 434 , 437 (10th Cir. 2005) ("To come within the excited utterance exception, the declarant need not show signs of excitement immediately upon witnessing or experiencing a startling event."); Joy , 192 F.3d at 766 ("[A] court need not find that the declarant was completely incapable of deliberative thought at the time [s]he uttered the declaration.").

2019Appx. 434, 437 (10th Cir. 2005) (“To come within the excited utterance exception, the declarant need not show signs of excitement immediately upon witnessing or experiencing a startling event.”); Joy, 192 F3d at 766 (“[A] court need not find that the declarant was completely incapable of deliberative thought at the time [she] uttered the declaration.”).

2017See, e.g., United States v. Davis , 330 Fed.

2017See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 330 Fed.

2014We agree, see Cox v. State, 274 Ga. 204, 206 (3) ( 553 SE2d 152 ) (2001), and counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.

2014We agree, see Cox v. State, 274 Ga. 204, 206 (3) ( 553 SE2d 152 ) (2001), and counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.

2021See McCord v. State, 305 Ga. 318, 324 (2) (a) (ii) (825 SE2d 122) (2019).

2021See McCord v. State, purposes, including, but not limited to: proof of motive, opportunity, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.” 9 305 Ga. 318, 324 (2) (a) (ii) ( 825 SE2d 122 ) (2019) (even if the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence as a present sense impression, such evidence was nevertheless admissible under the excited utterance exception and the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence was not in error).

2018Further, the justification for the exception "derives from the teaching of experience that the stress of nervous excitement or physical shock 'stills the reflective faculties,' thus removing an impediment to truthfulness. [Cits.]" United States v. Sewell , 90 F.3d 326 , 327 (II) (8th Cir. 1996).

2018Further, the justification for the exception “derives from the teaching of experience that the stress of nervous excitement or physical shock ‘stills the reflective faculties,’ thus removing an impediment to truthfulness. [Cits.]” United States v. Sewell, 90 F3d 326, 327 (II) (8th Cir. 1996).

2018As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the basis for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. [Cits.] Idaho v. Wright , 497 U.S. 805 , 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990).

2018As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the basis for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. [Cits.] Idaho v. Wright , 497 U.S. 805 , 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990).

2025See Downer v. State, 314 Ga. 617 , 630–31 (2022) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that a witness’s hearsay testimony that the declarant told her he was on the phone with the defendant, as he was speaking with him, fell within the present-sense-impression exception); Varner, 306 Ga. at 731–32 (holding that the declarant’s statements repeating to investigators the statements that the wounded victim mumbled, immediately as the victim mumbled them, qualified as 14 present sense impressions).6 (b) Although the trial court determined that the second text messa

2023By conceding that the State “can’t use . . . [Rule] 803 by itself” to admit Dixon’s statements, the State affirmatively waived any argument that Dixon’s statements were independently admissible as present sense impressions or excited utterances.12 See statements could not be admitted under Rule 803 because she was unavailable to testify reflects an apparent misunderstanding of Rule 803, which identifies hearsay exceptions that apply “regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.” Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 244 (3) (d) (869 SE2d 423) (2022) (discussing the excited utterance e

2023By conceding that the State “can’t use . . . [Rule] 803 by itself” to admit Dixon’s statements, the State affirmatively waived any argument that Dixon’s statements were independently admissible as present sense impressions or excited utterances.12 See statements could not be admitted under Rule 803 because she was unavailable to testify reflects an apparent misunderstanding of Rule 803, which identifies hearsay exceptions that apply “regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.” Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 244 (3) (d) (869 SE2d 423) (2022) (discussing the excited utterance e

2023“The critical inquiry is whether the declarant is still in a state of excitement resulting from that event when the declaration is made.” Lopez v. State, 311 Ga. 269, 271 (1) (857 SE2d 467) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023“The critical inquiry is whether the declarant is still in a state of excitement resulting from that event when the declaration is made.” Lopez v. State, 311 Ga. 269, 271 (1) (857 SE2d 467) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023See also Dukes, 311 Ga. at 569 (3) (defense counsel affirmatively waived a claim that the trial court erred “by prohibiting counsel from further cross-examining the medical examiner about the effects of amphetamines on a person” because defense counsel stated at trial that the medical examiner “was not qualified to give any additional testimony on the topic”).

2023See also Dukes, 311 Ga. at 569 (3) (defense counsel affirmatively waived a claim that the trial court erred “by prohibiting counsel from further cross-examining the medical examiner about the effects of amphetamines on a person” because defense counsel stated at trial that the medical examiner “was not qualified to give any additional testimony on the topic”).

2023By conceding that the State “can’t use . . . [Rule] 803 by itself” to admit Dixon’s statements, the State affirmatively waived any argument that Dixon’s statements were independently admissible as present sense impressions or excited utterances.12 See statements could not be admitted under Rule 803 because she was unavailable to testify reflects an apparent misunderstanding of Rule 803, which identifies hearsay exceptions that apply “regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.” Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 244 (3) (d) (869 SE2d 423) (2022) (discussing the excited utterance e

2023By conceding that the State “can’t use . . . [Rule] 803 by itself” to admit Dixon’s statements, the State affirmatively waived any argument that Dixon’s statements were independently admissible as present sense impressions or excited utterances.12 See statements could not be admitted under Rule 803 because she was unavailable to testify reflects an apparent misunderstanding of Rule 803, which identifies hearsay exceptions that apply “regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.” Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 244 (3) (d) (869 SE2d 423) (2022) (discussing the excited utterance e

2022However, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the CAD reports into evidence at trial under the excited utterance exception.3 See Jackson v. State, 311 Ga. 626, 632 (3) ( 859 SE2d 46 ) (2021). 3 Kamusoko makes no distinction between any particular statements or declarants and, therefore, has abandoned any challenges he may have regarding particular statements or declarants.

2022However, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the CAD reports into evidence at trial under the excited utterance exception.3 See Jackson v. State, 311 Ga. 626, 632 (3) ( 859 SE2d 46 ) (2021). 3 Kamusoko makes no distinction between any particular statements or declarants and, therefore, has abandoned any challenges he may have regarding particular statements or declarants.

2022See generally Hunt v. State, 336 Ga. App. 821, 829 (2) (b) ( 783 SE2d 456 ) (2016) (there is nothing for this Court to review where the appellant failed to identify precisely what statements he challenged).

2022See generally Hunt v. State, 336 Ga. App. 821, 829 (2) (b) ( 783 SE2d 456 ) (2016) (there is nothing for this Court to review where the appellant failed to identify precisely what statements he challenged).

2019See Watson v. State, 303 Ga. 758 , 763 n.4 ( 814 SE2d 396 ) (2018). 3 Over Appellant’s objection, the trial court ruled that the statements at The excited utterance exception says that “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition” shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule.