excited utterance exception in Tennessee

2026“Underlying the excited utterance exception is the theory that ‘circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.’” State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 823 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Land, 34 S.W.3d 516, 528 (Tenn. Crim.

2025“Underlying the excited utterance exception is the theory that ‘circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces the utterances free of conscious fabrication.’” State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 823 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Land, 34 S.W.3d 516 , 528 Tenn. Crim.

2025The “ultimate test” of whether a statement is admissible within the excited utterance exception is “spontaneity and logical relation to the main event and where an act or declaration springs out of the transaction while the parties are still laboring under the excitement or strain of the circumstances and at a time so near it as to preclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.” Franklin, 308 S.W.3d at 823 (quoting State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn. 1993)).

2024The “ultimate test” of whether a statement is admissible within the excited utterance exception is “spontaneity and logical relation to the main event and where an act or declaration springs out of the transaction while the parties are still laboring under the excitement or strain of the circumstances and at a time so near it as to preclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.” Franklin, 308 S.W.3d at 823 (quoting State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn. 1993)).

2026“Underlying the excited utterance exception is the theory that ‘circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.’” State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 823 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Land, 34 S.W.3d 516, 528 (Tenn. Crim.

2025“Underlying the excited utterance exception is the theory that ‘circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces the utterances free of conscious fabrication.’” State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 823 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Land, 34 S.W.3d 516 , 528 Tenn. Crim.

2015State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d at 820 . *479 The excited utterance exception carries a competency requirement.

2013Our supreme court has stated three prerequisites to admission pursuant to the excited utterance exception: The first requirement is “a startling event or condition” that “‘suspend[s] the normal, reflective thought processes of the declarant.’” State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. 1997)) (other internal quotations omitted) [(abrogated by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 580-81 (Tenn. 2004))].

2013Our supreme court has stated three prerequisites to admission pursuant to the excited utterance exception: The first requirement is “a startling event or condition” that “‘suspend[s] the normal, reflective thought processes of the declarant.’” State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. 1997)) (other internal quotations omitted) [(abrogated by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 580-81 (Tenn. 2004))].

2013Our supreme court has stated three prerequisites to admission pursuant to the excited utterance exception: The first requirement is “a startling event or condition” that “‘suspend[s] the normal, reflective thought processes of the declarant.’” State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. 1997)) (other internal quotations omitted) [(abrogated by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 580-81 (Tenn. 2004))].

2013Our supreme court has stated three prerequisites to admission pursuant to the excited utterance exception: The first requirement is “a startling event or condition” that “‘suspend[s] the normal, reflective thought processes of the declarant.’” State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. 1997)) (other internal quotations omitted) [(abrogated by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 580-81 (Tenn. 2004))].

2013Our supreme court has stated three prerequisites to admission pursuant to the excited utterance exception: The first requirement is “a startling event or condition” that “‘suspend[s] the normal, reflective thought processes of the declarant.’” State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. 1997)) (other internal quotations omitted) [(abrogated by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 580-81 (Tenn. 2004))].

2006See White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8; State v. Taylor, 771 S.W.2d 387, 393-94 (Tenn. 1989).

2006See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 355 n.8 (1992); State v. Taylor, 771 S.W.2d 387, 393-94 (Tenn. 1989).

2006See White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8; State v. Taylor, 771 S.W.2d 387, 393-94 (Tenn. 1989).

2006See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 355 n.8 (1992); State v. Taylor, 771 S.W.2d 387, 393-94 (Tenn. 1989).

2024State v. Person, 781 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Crim.

2016State v. Person, 781 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Crim.

2018See Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 479 .

2018Evid. 803(2). ‘The standard of review for rulings on hearsay evidence has multiple layers.” Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 479 (Tenn. 2015), cert. denied.

2024These recordings will be referred to collectively as “Defendant’s recordings.” 3 State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 436 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that the hearsay exclusionary rule yields when it “operates to deprive a defendant of his or her right to present relevant and reliable evidence that is critical to establish a defense”). -4- during the time period of the recordings, and that the statements in the recordings were not admissible under the excited utterance exception.

2019“Admission of evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling on evidence will be disturbed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 490 (Tenn. 2004).

2017“It is well-settled that the duty to prepare a record which ‘conveys a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of the appeal’ rests on the appellant.” State v. Bobadilla, 181 S.W.3d 641, 643 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Tenn. R.

2016State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997). 1. 911 call The Defendant contends that the trial court improperly admitted Ms. West’s 911 call because it was a hearsay statement and did not qualify under the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay.

2012State v. Parlar, 350 S.W.3d 883, 900 (Tenn. 2011).

2010See State v. Farmer, 927 S.W.2d 582, 595 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996) (holding the state of mind exception assumes “the declarant’s own state of mind [is] relevant to a material issue” but excludes hearsay testimony admitted to prove a third party’s conduct).

2010The court listened to the tape and found that the statements on the tape were excited utterances and that although most of the statements on the tape “may be cumulative . . . [in that] they have been testified to[,] . . . it won’t be anything so prejudicial because they’ve heard it already[.]” The court noted that the tape would have been admissible in the State’s case-in-chief, but it also found that it was relevant in rebuttal to show, among other things, that the defendant was not welcome at Roberts’ house, “that his intent was not to go over there and talk,” and that the defendant and Robe

2010His statements, which related to the shooting, were correctly admitted under 6 the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.5 State v. Summerall, 926 S.W.2d 272, 277-78 (Tenn. Crim.

2008State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 105 (Tenn. 2006) Generally, out of court statements introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted are inadmissible as hearsay.

2006Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that a sex crime defendant’s statements did not qualify for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule because they were not “spontaneous.” See State v. Kelly, 770 A.2d 908, 936 (Conn. 2001).

2006The court held that because one and one-half hours had passed between the event and being awakened, the defendant had “ample time for reasoned reflection” and therefore failed to meet “his burden of proving that he did not have an opportunity to think about and fabricate a story that night after the assault.” Id.

2006Because we have already concluded that the statements at issue qualify for the excited utterance exception to the general rule precluding hearsay, we also conclude the Defendant’s confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment and right to “meet the witness face to face” under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution were not 5 To support this general rule, the Maclin Court cited the following cases: People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396 , 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757-58 (2004); People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, (Colo., Dec. 20, 2004); State v

2006Because we have already concluded that the statements at issue qualify for the excited utterance exception to the general rule precluding hearsay, we also conclude the Defendant’s confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment and right to “meet the witness face to face” under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution were not 5 To support this general rule, the Maclin Court cited the following cases: People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396 , 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757-58 (2004); People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, (Colo., Dec. 20, 2004); State v

2006Because we have already concluded that the statements at issue qualify for the excited utterance exception to the general rule precluding hearsay, we also conclude the Defendant’s confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment and right to “meet the witness face to face” under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution were not 5 To support this general rule, the Maclin Court cited the following cases: People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396 , 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757-58 (2004); People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, (Colo., Dec. 20, 2004); State v

2006In State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 351 (Tenn. 2006), our high court rejected this per se rule, stating: We favor an approach that considers both the testimonial hearsay analysis and the excited utterance analysis and that considers the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether a particular excited utterance should be deemed testimonial.

2006Because we have already concluded that the statements at issue qualify for the excited utterance exception to the general rule precluding hearsay, we also conclude the Defendant’s confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment and right to “meet the witness face to face” under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution were not 5 To support this general rule, the Maclin Court cited the following cases: People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396 , 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757-58 (2004); People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, (Colo., Dec. 20, 2004); State v

2006Because we have already concluded that the statements at issue qualify for the excited utterance exception to the general rule precluding hearsay, we also conclude the Defendant’s confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment and right to “meet the witness face to face” under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution were not 5 To support this general rule, the Maclin Court cited the following cases: People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396 , 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757-58 (2004); People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, (Colo., Dec. 20, 2004); State v