excited utterance exception in Washington

2015The excited utterance exception is based on the idea that under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control." The utterance of a person in such a state is believed to be " a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock," rather than an expression based on reflection or self interest. - State v. Chapin, 118 Wn. 2d 681, 686 , 826 P. 2d 194 ( 1992) ( quoting 6 J.

2015The excited utterance exception is based on the idea that under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control." The utterance of a person in such a state is believed to be " a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock," rather than an expression based on reflection or self interest. - State v. Chapin, 118 Wn. 2d 681, 686 , 826 P. 2d 194 ( 1992) ( quoting 6 J.

2019To determine whether the exception applies, the critical inquiry is often “whether the statement was made while the declarant was still under the influence of the event to the extent that 5 No. 52057-5-II the statement could not be the result of fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment.” State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 597 , 23 P.3d 1046 (2001) A trial court’s decision to admit hearsay testimony under the excited utterance exception is reviewed for an “abuse of discretion.” State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 854 , 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

2009See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 853-55 , 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (court held that the declarant was still under the stress of the excitement caused by a murder and the excited utterance exception applied, where the declarant’s statements were made one and one-half hour after the murder and in the intervening time the declarant helped dispose of the body and burglarize the victim’s house, and had traveled to another city where the van in which the murder occurred was burned).

2019To determine whether the exception applies, the critical inquiry is often “whether the statement was made while the declarant was still under the influence of the event to the extent that 5 No. 52057-5-II the statement could not be the result of fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment.” State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 597 , 23 P.3d 1046 (2001) A trial court’s decision to admit hearsay testimony under the excited utterance exception is reviewed for an “abuse of discretion.” State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 854 , 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

2009See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 853-55 , 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (court held that the declarant was still under the stress of the excitement caused by a murder and the excited utterance exception applied, where the declarant’s statements were made one and one-half hour after the murder and in the intervening time the declarant helped dispose of the body and burglarize the victim’s house, and had traveled to another city where the van in which the murder occurred was burned).

2013Under ER 803(a)(2) an excited utterance is "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."4 Essential to determining whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance "is 'whether the statement was made while the declarant was still under the influence of the event to the extent that [the] statement could not be the result offabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment.'"5 "[T]he startling event or condition that must occur for purposes of the excited utteranc

2013Under ER 803(a)(2) an excited utterance is "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."4 Essential to determining whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance "is 'whether the statement was made while the declarant was still under the influence of the event to the extent that [the] statement could not be the result offabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment.'"5 "[T]he startling event or condition that must occur for purposes of the excited utteranc

2019See State v. Magers, 164 Wn.2d 174, 188 , 189 P.3d 126 (2008) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the credibility of a victim’s 9 No. 52057-5-II statements in light of the circumstances and admitted them as excited utterances, despite the fact that one statement was a falsehood).

2015See State v. Magers, 164 Wn.2d 174, 188 , 189 P. 3d 126 ( 2008) ( plurality opinion) ( holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting statements as excited utterances even though the declarant initially lied); Young, 160 Wn.2d at 808 ( rejecting a bright -line rule that an excited utterance is never admissible once it has been recanted "); State v. 6 No. 44722 -3 - II Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 600 , 23 P. 3d 1046 ( 2001) ( holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting statements as excited utterances despite apparently self serving - omissions).

2019See State v. Magers, 164 Wn.2d 174, 188 , 189 P.3d 126 (2008) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the credibility of a victim’s 9 No. 52057-5-II statements in light of the circumstances and admitted them as excited utterances, despite the fact that one statement was a falsehood).

2015See State v. Magers, 164 Wn.2d 174, 188 , 189 P. 3d 126 ( 2008) ( plurality opinion) ( holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting statements as excited utterances even though the declarant initially lied); Young, 160 Wn.2d at 808 ( rejecting a bright -line rule that an excited utterance is never admissible once it has been recanted "); State v. 6 No. 44722 -3 - II Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 600 , 23 P. 3d 1046 ( 2001) ( holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting statements as excited utterances despite apparently self serving - omissions).

2025The court held that the excited utterance exception was inapplicable because the declarant “had the opportunity to, and did in fact, decide to fabricate a portion of her story.” Id. at 759 .

2015State v. Brown, 127 Wn.2d 749 , 758 -59, 903 P. 2d 459 ( 1995) ( internal quotation marks omitted) alteration in the original). 5 No. 44722 -3 -II To have evidence properly admitted under the excited utterance exception, the proponent must meet three interrelated requirements: " that ( 1) a startling event or condition occurred, ( 2) the declarant made the statement while under the stress of excitement of the startling event or condition, and ( 3) the statement related to the startling event or condition." Ohlson, 162 Wn.2d at 8 .

2015State v. Brown, 127 Wn.2d 749 , 758 -59, 903 P. 2d 459 ( 1995) ( internal quotation marks omitted) alteration in the original). 5 No. 44722 -3 -II To have evidence properly admitted under the excited utterance exception, the proponent must meet three interrelated requirements: " that ( 1) a startling event or condition occurred, ( 2) the declarant made the statement while under the stress of excitement of the startling event or condition, and ( 3) the statement related to the startling event or condition." Ohlson, 162 Wn.2d at 8 .

2007In Brown, we said: While we are sympathetic to the Court of Appeals' desire to defer to the trial court's evaluation of the complaining witness' credibility and hence ultimately of the [statement's] reliability, this approach has no place in the excited utterance rule. 127 Wash.2d at 758 , 903 P.2d 459 . ¶ 13 However, in 2001 we reaffirmed that the deferential abuse of discretion standard should be used in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit an excited utterance.

2026While Lee is correct that the excited utterance exception does not list “reliability” as a formal element under ER 803(a)(2), Washington law acknowledges the theory underlying the exception—that statements made under the stress of a startling event are inherently trustworthy and reliable because such “stressful circumstances are believed to operate to temporarily overcome the ability to reflect and consciously fabricate.” State v. Dixon, 37 Wn.

2009App. 867, 873 , 684 P.2d 725 (1984), is that the “res gestae” exception is more restrictive than the excited utterance exception because excited utterances do not have to be contemporaneous with the event. ¶29 The res gestae doctrine evolved into several present day hearsay exceptions, usually identified as the present sense impression, the excited utterance, and statements of present bodily condition, mental states, and emotions. 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 268, at 245-46 (6th ed. 2006).

2018The party seeking to admit the hearsay under the excited utterance exception must satisfy three closely connected requirements: “that (1) a startling event or condition 3 No. 34947-1-III State v. Kelly occurred, (2) the declarant made the statement while under the stress of excitement of the startling event or condition, and (3) the statement related to the startling event or condition.” State v. Young, 160 Wn.2d 799, 806 , 161 P.3d 967 (2007).

2015The excited utterance exception is defined as “[ a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” ER 803(a)( 2). “[ T]he proponent of excited utterance evidence must satisfy three closely connected requirements’ that (1) a startling event or condition occurred, (2) the declarant made the statement while under the stress of excitement of the startling event or condition, and (3) the statement related to the startling event or condition.” State v. Young, 160 Wn.2d 799, 806 , 161 P.3d 967 (2007).

1992See State v. Palomo, 113 Wn.2d 789, 797 , 783 P.2d 575 (1989) (admission of an out-of-court declarant's statements under the excited utterance exception did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 , 112 L.

1992See State v. Palomo, 113 Wn.2d 789, 797 , 783 P.2d 575 (1989) (admission of an out-of-court declarant's statements under the excited utterance exception did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 , 112 L.

2007This court has previously recognized that, “[flor purposes of the excited utterance exception,... it is the event’s effect on the declarant that must be focused upon.” Chapin, 118 Wn.2d at 687 (citing State v. Carlson, 311 Or. 201, 216 , 808 P.2d 1002 (1991)). ¶34 Young’s rule would require the proponent of excited utterance evidence to proffer independent corroborating proof that a startling event occurred simply to put one piece of evidence — the excited utterance — before the trier of fact. 8 Such a requirement not only overemphasizes the role that the startling event plays in lending an ex

2007This court has previously recognized that, “[flor purposes of the excited utterance exception,... it is the event’s effect on the declarant that must be focused upon.” Chapin, 118 Wn.2d at 687 (citing State v. Carlson, 311 Or. 201, 216 , 808 P.2d 1002 (1991)). ¶34 Young’s rule would require the proponent of excited utterance evidence to proffer independent corroborating proof that a startling event occurred simply to put one piece of evidence — the excited utterance — before the trier of fact. 8 Such a requirement not only overemphasizes the role that the startling event plays in lending an ex

2000See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992); Palomo, 113 Wash.2d at 798 , 783 P.2d 575 . [253] Palomo, 113 Wash.2d at 796-98 , 783 P.2d 575 . [254] State v. Chapin, 118 Wash.2d 681, 686 , 826 P.2d 194 (1992). [255] Report of Proceedings (Jan. 27, 1998) at 1508-09. [256] Chapin, 118 Wash.2d at 688 , 826 P.2d 194 . [257] Id. [258] Id. [259] See id.; see also State v. Hardy, 133 Wash.2d 701, 714 , 946 P.2d 1175 (1997). [260] Report of Proceedings (Jan. 27, 1998) at 1526. [261] Id. at 1507-08. [262] 527 U.S. 116 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999). [2

1989Ed. 2d 597 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1979), for the broad proposition that the confrontation clause bars admissibility of hearsay statements unless unavailability of the declarant is shown. 3 *795 However, Roberts considered an Ohio statute that required a showing of unavailability for admission of prior testimony, 4 In the present case, the statement of Ms. Serrato was admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule which does not require unavailability of the declarant.