excited utterance exception in Florida

2024See State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1988) (“The essential elements necessary to fall within the excited utterance exception are that (1) there must be an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must be made while the person is under the stress of excitement caused by the event.”); Young v. State, 979 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2008) (holding that a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of the excited utterance exception to hearsay is reviewed for an abuse

2017The excited utterance exception authorizes admission of hearsay containing “[a] statement or excited utterance relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was trader the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” § 90.803(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). “[T]o qualify as an excited utterance, the statement must be made: (1) ‘regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement’; (2) ‘before there was time to contrive or misrepresent’; and (3) ‘while the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event.’” Hudson, 992 So.2d at 107 (quoting Henya

2017The excited utterance exception authorizes admission of hearsay containing “[a] statement or excited utterance relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was trader the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” § 90.803(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). “[T]o qualify as an excited utterance, the statement must be made: (1) ‘regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement’; (2) ‘before there was time to contrive or misrepresent’; and (3) ‘while the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event.’” Hudson, 992 So.2d at 107 (quoting Henya

2017As interpreted by the courts, to qualify for admission under the excited utterance exception, “the statement must be made: (1) ‘regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement’; (2) ‘before there was time to contrive or misrepresent’; and (3) ‘while the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event.’” Hudson, 992 So.2d at 107 (quoting Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 251 (Fla. 1996)); see also Hayward, 24 So.3d at 29 (relying on Hudson for the same proposition).

2017As interpreted by the courts, to qualify for admission under the excited utterance exception, “the statement must be made: (1) ‘regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement’; (2) ‘before there was time to contrive or misrepresent’; and (3) ‘while the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event.’” Hudson, 992 So.2d at 107 (quoting Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 251 (Fla. 1996)); see also Hayward, 24 So.3d at 29 (relying on Hudson for the same proposition).

2017As interpreted by the courts, to qualify for admission under the excited utterance exception, "the statement must be made: (1) 'regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement'; (2) 'before there was time to contrive or misrepresent'; and (3) 'while the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event.' " Hudson, 992 So. 2d at 107 (quoting Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 251 (Fla. 1996)); see also Hayward, 24 So. 3d at 29 (relying on Hudson for the same proposition).

2018The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the statements fall within the excited utterance exception in section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (2017). "[T]o qualify as an excited utterance, the *628 statement must be made: (1) 'regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement'; (2) 'before there was time to contrive or misrepresent'; and (3) 'while the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event.' " Pasha v. State , 225 So.3d 688 , 707 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Hudson v. State , 992 So.2d 96 , 107 (Fla. 2008) ). 3 We find that Mrs. Raymond's statements made

2017As interpreted by the courts, to qualify for admission under the excited utterance exception, “the statement must be made: (1) ‘regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement’; (2) ‘before there was time to contrive or misrepresent’; and (3) ‘while the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event.’” Hudson, 992 So.2d at 107 (quoting Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 251 (Fla. 1996)); see also Hayward, 24 So.3d at 29 (relying on Hudson for the same proposition).

2014As announced by the supreme court in Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870 (Fla. 2000), the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule requires a showing that there was an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, and the statement was made under the stress or excitement caused by the event before the de-clarant had time to reflect or contrive.

2006The court permitted the testimony based upon the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. § 90.803(2), Fla. Stat. The supreme court’s opinion in Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla.2000), explains the excited utterance exception: [I]n order for an excited utterance to be admissible, the following requirements must be met: (1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement c

2016See § 90.803(2), Fla. Stat. (2013); Willis v. State, 727 So.2d 952, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that an excited utterance, admissible as substantive evidence, was sufficient to support a revocation of probation).

2003Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870 (Fla.2000) set out the criteria for an excited utterance: "(1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event." Id. at 873 ; see Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 251 (Fla.1996); Willis v. State, 727 So.2d 952, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

2013The rationale for allowing the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay is that such statements “contain sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness in that ‘the declarant does not have the reflective capacity necessary for conscious misrepresentation’ while in a state of excitement.” Strong v. State, 947 So.2d 552, 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting Rogers v. State, 660 So.2d 237, 240 (Fla.1995)).

2004Recognizing these statements were hearsay, the State sought their admission under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. *269 Section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (2002), provides for the admission of an available declarant's out-of-court "statement or excited utterance relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." The admissibility of an excited utterance is premised on the notion that in such circumstances "the declarant does not have the reflective capacity necessary for conscious misrep

2018See id. (finding witness's statements made during 911 call qualified as admissible excited utterances); see also Taylor v. State , 146 So.3d 113 , 114-16 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (finding victim's statements to law enforcement following shooting were admissible excited utterances because there was no evidence that victim had sufficient time for reflection and the State presented evidence that victim was still in a state of panic as she relayed the events, which had occurred just minutes before); Barron v. State , 990 So.2d 1098 , 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (finding statements made during 911 call plac

2017See, e.g., Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 748 (Fla. 2007) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court's determination that there had not been sufficient time for reflective thought); Taylor v. State, 146 So. 3d 113, 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) ("Whether the declarant made an excited utterance is a 2 We do not further address whether this particular statement was not hearsay within the stated definition and its exceptions in section 90.801 because this issue was not raised and because, assuming that it was hearsay, it was still admissible under the excited utterance exception of secti

2017In support of the trial court's reliance on the excited utterance exception in the order denying Livingston's motion for new trial, the majority quotes from Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 750 (Fla. 2007), for the proposition that "the trial court was free to 'base [its] evidentiary ruling on an alternate basis that was not suggested by the parties.' " This proposition from Williams is not contrary to the analysis that I make -14- here.

2017See, e.g., Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 748 (Fla. 2007) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court's determination that there had not been sufficient time for reflective thought); Taylor v. State, 146 So. 3d 113, 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) ("Whether the declarant made an excited utterance is a 2 We do not further address whether this particular statement was not hearsay within the stated definition and its exceptions in section 90.801 because this issue was not raised and because, assuming that it was hearsay, it was still admissible under the excited utterance exception of secti

2018One More Recent Case for Comparison Our research has discovered one recent case, Beckman v. State, 230 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), which neither party’s brief has discussed, but which addresses the argument upon which the state seeks to prevail in this case – that the defendant’s self-serving statement should not be admitted under the excited utterance exception.

2018A. Excited Utterance—Section 90.803(2) of the Florida Statutes As explained by the Florida Supreme Court, for a statement to qualify as an excited utterance under section 90.803(2) of the Florida Statutes, the following essential elements are necessary: “(1) there must be an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must be made while the person is under the stress of excitement caused by the event.” State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1988); see also Beckman v. State,

2024See State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1988) (“The essential elements necessary to fall within the excited utterance exception are that (1) there must be an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must be made while the person is under the stress of excitement caused by the event.”); Young v. State, 979 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2008) (holding that a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of the excited utterance exception to hearsay is reviewed for an abuse

2021See, e.g., Evans v. State, 838 So. 2d 1090, 1093 (Fla. 2002) (“The statements at issue do not qualify under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. . . . [The 7 declarants’] statements clearly were not made before they had time to contrive or misrepresent.

2021Id. at *4 (emphasis added and footnote omitted); see also State v. Magers, 189 P.3d 126, 134 (Wash. 2008) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting statements as excited utterances even though the declarant initially lied by denying the defendant’s presence in the house; it was reasonable to conclude that the declarant’s initial statement was due to her fear of the defendant).

2019Id.; see also Rolle v. State, 215 So. 3d 75, 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (finding victim’s statement made “a few hours” after the startling event qualified as an excited utterance given evidence of the victim’s ongoing state of trauma); Edmond v. State, 559 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (finding excited utterance exception applied to statements made two to three hours after crime was committed, where witness was still frightened and emotional).

2019Id.; see also Rolle v. State, 215 So. 3d 75, 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (finding victim’s statement made “a few hours” after the startling event qualified as an excited utterance given evidence of the victim’s ongoing state of trauma); Edmond v. State, 559 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (finding excited utterance exception applied to statements made two to three hours after crime was committed, where witness was still frightened and emotional).

2017A victim’s prior consistent' statement may be admitted as substantive evidence, however, when it meets an exception to the rule against hearsay, Rodriguez v. State, 609 So.2d 493, 500 (Fla. 1992), or when it is not hearsay, see Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1, 23 (Fla. 2003). 2 The excited utterance exception makes a hearsay statement admissible when the statement relates “to a startling event or condition [and was] made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” § 90.803(2).

2017A victim's prior consistent statement may be admitted as substantive evidence, however, when it meets an exception to the rule against hearsay, -7- Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 500 (Fla. 1992), or when it is not hearsay, see Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 23 (Fla. 2003).2 The excited utterance exception makes a hearsay statement admissible when the statement relates "to a startling event or condition [and was] made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." § 90.803(2).

2017See I.R.C. v. State, 968 So.2d 583, 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (explaining that appellate courts reverse only on the basis of arguments presented); cf. Morrison v. State, 161 So.3d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (reaching argument concerning absence of hearing and predicate findings where appellant specifically raised the issue), Second, die predicate "the State laid during trial was directiy related to the elements of the excited utterance exception—including evidence of the defendant’s excited state at the time of the 911 call—which gives assurance that the trial court's decision was based on that

2017See I.R.C. v. State, 968 So.2d 583, 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (explaining that appellate courts reverse only on the basis of arguments presented); cf. Morrison v. State, 161 So.3d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (reaching argument concerning absence of hearing and predicate findings where appellant specifically raised the issue), Second, die predicate "the State laid during trial was directiy related to the elements of the excited utterance exception—including evidence of the defendant’s excited state at the time of the 911 call—which gives assurance that the trial court's decision was based on that

2017A victim’s prior consistent' statement may be admitted as substantive evidence, however, when it meets an exception to the rule against hearsay, Rodriguez v. State, 609 So.2d 493, 500 (Fla. 1992), or when it is not hearsay, see Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1, 23 (Fla. 2003). 2 The excited utterance exception makes a hearsay statement admissible when the statement relates “to a startling event or condition [and was] made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” § 90.803(2).

2017A victim's prior consistent statement may be admitted as substantive evidence, however, when it meets an exception to the rule against hearsay, -7- Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 500 (Fla. 1992), or when it is not hearsay, see Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 23 (Fla. 2003).2 The excited utterance exception makes a hearsay statement admissible when the statement relates "to a startling event or condition [and was] made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." § 90.803(2).

2017See Ibar v. State, 938 So.2d 451, 467 (Fla. 2006).

2017See Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 467 (Fla. 2006).

2017Under that standard of review, we are bound to affirm the trial court's admission of Mr. Yeater's identification of Mr. Roop to 911 so long as that decision was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable in the sense that reasonable people could not conclude that the State's predicate was sufficient to admit it as an excited utterance.3 See Graham v. State, 207 So. 3d 135, 142 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 3 We pause to express concern about the procedure the trial court followed in admitting the recording.

2017“A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Davis v. State, 121 So.3d 462, 481 (Fla. 2013).

2017See I.R.C. v. State, 968 So.2d 583, 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (explaining that appellate courts reverse only on the basis of arguments presented); cf. Morrison v. State, 161 So.3d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (reaching argument concerning absence of hearing and predicate findings where appellant specifically raised the issue), Second, die predicate "the State laid during trial was directiy related to the elements of the excited utterance exception—including evidence of the defendant’s excited state at the time of the 911 call—which gives assurance that the trial court's decision was based on that

2017See I.R.C. v. State, 968 So.2d 583, 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (explaining that appellate courts reverse only on the basis of arguments presented); cf. Morrison v. State, 161 So.3d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (reaching argument concerning absence of hearing and predicate findings where appellant specifically raised the issue), Second, die predicate "the State laid during trial was directiy related to the elements of the excited utterance exception—including evidence of the defendant’s excited state at the time of the 911 call—which gives assurance that the trial court's decision was based on that

2014See Thomas v. State, 125 So.3d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).