excited utterance exception in Rhode Island

2024Jean, 469 A.2d 736, 738 (R.I. 1983)). - 11 - Compare State v. Oisamaiye, 740 A.2d 338, 339-40 (R.I. 1999) (holding that statements by a nursing home patient made after he had calmed down from an earlier exciting experience were still given “in a state of nervous excitement”), with Burgess, 465 A.2d at 207 (concluding that statement declarant made to the fourth person who spoke with her after the incident was not admissible as an excited utterance).

2015Jean, 469 A.2d 736, 737-38 (R.I.1983) (affirming the admissibility of victim’s statements made in response to police officer’s questioning at the scene less than five hours after the startling event under the excited-utterance exception); see also State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980, 982 (R.I.1983).

2024“The guarantee of trustworthiness for the excited-utterance exception is assured as long as the declarant made the statements as an instinctive outpouring or an effusion.” State v. Krakue, 726 A.2d 458, 462 (R.I. 1999) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. St.

2024“The guarantee of trustworthiness for the excited-utterance exception is assured as long as the declarant made the statements as an instinctive outpouring or an effusion.” State v. Krakue, 726 A.2d 458, 462 (R.I. 1999) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. St.

2024“The rationale behind the excited utterance exception is that ‘a startling event may produce an effect that temporarily stills the declarant’s capacity of reflection and produces statements free of conscious fabrication.’” State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299, 314 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1222 (R.I. 2002)).

2024“The rationale behind the excited utterance exception is that ‘a startling event may produce an effect that temporarily stills the declarant’s capacity of reflection and produces statements free of conscious fabrication.’” State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299, 314 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1222 (R.I. 2002)).

2003State v. Arruda, 785 A.2d 565, 567 (R.I.2001) (mem.) (holding that communications by a victim of sexual abuse to the state’s witnesses were admissible as excited utterances even if made some time after the stressful incident occurred because, considering her appearance and emotional state, the witness was still laboring under the stress of her recent experience); State v. Oisamaiye, 740 A.2d 338, 339-40 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) (holding that, although the time between nursing-home patient’s injuries and the statements he made after he calmed down were unknown, his statements explaining what hap

2001Recently this Court held that statements by a nursing home patient made only after he had calmed down from an earlier excitable experience would be admissible as excited utterances because the “guarantee of trustworthiness [for the excited-utterance exception] is assured as long as the declar-ant made the statement as an ‘instinctive outpouring’ or an ‘effusion.’ ” State v. Oisamaiye, 740 A.2d 338, 339 (R.I.1999) (quoting State v. St.

2024“The rationale behind the excited utterance exception is that ‘a startling event may produce an effect that temporarily stills the declarant’s capacity of reflection and produces statements free of conscious fabrication.’” State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299, 314 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1222 (R.I. 2002)).

2024“The rationale behind the excited utterance exception is that ‘a startling event may produce an effect that temporarily stills the declarant’s capacity of reflection and produces statements free of conscious fabrication.’” State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299, 314 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1222 (R.I. 2002)).

2015Jean, 469 A.2d 736, 737-38 (R.I.1983) (affirming the admissibility of victim’s statements made in response to police officer’s questioning at the scene less than five hours after the startling event under the excited-utterance exception); see also State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980, 982 (R.I.1983).

1989Furthermore, as we have stated today and held previously, “[e]ven under the stricter standards of admissibility required by the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule [Rule 803(2) ], the fact that a statement was made in response to an inquiry does not render the statement inadmissible.” Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d at 631 ; State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d at 982 .

2018On appeal, the state admits that "it appears that defendant's assessment of the 911 phone call prior to trial was correct: The 911 caller did not personally obtain the license plate number at the scene, but received it from a third-party witness." Therefore, the state "assumes arguendo that the recording constitutes inadmissible hearsay" and argues that the erroneous admission of the 911 call at trial nevertheless amounted to harmless error because the evidence was cumulative. 1 Standard of Review This Court reviews "a trial justice's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence pursuant t

2015See Morales, 895 A.2d at 116-17, 119-21 (affirming trial justice’s determination that statements made by seven-yeqr-old-sexual-assault victim to her aunt and mother the morning after the crime occurred qualified for admission under the excited-utterance exception).

2004A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Under the excited utterance exception, "strict contemporaneity" is not a requirement, rather the declarant need only appear to be "still laboring under the stress of the nervous excitement engendered by the event he describes." State v. Vaccaro, 298 A.2d 788 , 790 (R.I. 1973).

1975I. 59, 62-63, 298 A.2d 788, 790 (1973), we said that “Spontaneous exclamations may be admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule even if not strictly contemporaneous with the exciting cause if, from a consideration of all the facts in the case, it appears that the declarant, when he spoke, was still laboring under the stress of the nervous excitement engendered by the event he describes.

2024When claiming that a statement falls under the excited-utterance exception, the state bears “the burden of proving that the statement is spontaneous and was made before the declarant had an opportunity to contrive or misrepresent.” State v. Burgess, 465 A.2d 204, 207 (R.I. 1983).

2024When claiming that a statement falls under the excited-utterance exception, the state bears “the burden of proving that the statement is spontaneous and was made before the declarant had an opportunity to contrive or misrepresent.” State v. Burgess, 465 A.2d 204, 207 (R.I. 1983).

2003State v. Arruda, 785 A.2d 565, 567 (R.I.2001) (mem.) (holding that communications by a victim of sexual abuse to the state’s witnesses were admissible as excited utterances even if made some time after the stressful incident occurred because, considering her appearance and emotional state, the witness was still laboring under the stress of her recent experience); State v. Oisamaiye, 740 A.2d 338, 339-40 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) (holding that, although the time between nursing-home patient’s injuries and the statements he made after he calmed down were unknown, his statements explaining what hap

1998Section 14-1-69 provides that a child’s hearsay statements to a person about an act of abuse, neglect, or misconduct are admissible in any custody and/or termination trial in the court’s discretion, “if that statement was made spontaneously within a reasonable time after the act is alleged to have occurred, and if the statement was made to someone the child would normally turn to for sympathy, protection, or advice.” In enacting § 14-1-69, “the Legislature relaxed the standards of spontaneity and timeliness generally applicable to hearsay proffered under the excited-utterance exception to the

2024While having to discuss the details of a sexual assault allegation is certainly traumatizing for any victim, the excited-utterance exception attaches to the initial event, and the rationale behind the exception is that when the declarant made the statement, they were “still laboring under the stress of the nervous excitement engendered by the event * * * describe[d].” Jalette, 119 R.I. at 619 , 382 A.2d at 529 .

2024While having to discuss the details of a sexual assault allegation is certainly traumatizing for any victim, the excited-utterance exception attaches to the initial event, and the rationale behind the exception is that when the declarant made the statement, they were “still laboring under the stress of the nervous excitement engendered by the event * * * describe[d].” Jalette, 119 R.I. at 619 , 382 A.2d at 529 .

2006See Jalette, 119 R.I. at 621 , 382 A.2d at 530 ; see also Nordstrom, 104 R.I. at 476-77 , 244 A.2d at 840-41 (holding that statements made by a five-year-old girl to her mother when they were first reunited approximately thirty hours after the alleged sexual assault, and soon after the girl was separated from the defendant, were an instinctive outpouring which resulted from the child’s overwhelming emotional and shocking experience and thus were admissible under the excited utterance exception).

2006See Jalette, 119 R.I. at 621 , 382 A.2d at 530 ; see also Nordstrom, 104 R.I. at 476-77 , 244 A.2d at 840-41 (holding that statements made by a five-year-old girl to her mother when they were first reunited approximately thirty hours after the alleged sexual assault, and soon after the girl was separated from the defendant, were an instinctive outpouring which resulted from the child’s overwhelming emotional and shocking experience and thus were admissible under the excited utterance exception).

2006The existence of this evidence *121 of Jane’s demeanor when she made the statements at issue distinguishes this case from State v. Poulin, 415 A.2d 1307, 1311 (R.I.1980), in which we held that the trial justice erred in admitting certain hearsay evidence under the excited utterance exception because there was a total absence of “demeanor evidence” presented at trial.

2006See Vaccaro, 111 R.I. at 63 , 298 A.2d at 790 ; see also Wright, 817 A.2d at 606 .

2003State v. Arruda, 785 A.2d 565, 567 (R.I.2001) (mem.) (holding that communications by a victim of sexual abuse to the state’s witnesses were admissible as excited utterances even if made some time after the stressful incident occurred because, considering her appearance and emotional state, the witness was still laboring under the stress of her recent experience); State v. Oisamaiye, 740 A.2d 338, 339-40 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) (holding that, although the time between nursing-home patient’s injuries and the statements he made after he calmed down were unknown, his statements explaining what hap

2002“The admissibility of an excited utterance is obviously within the trial justice’s discretion and ‘any decision made by a trial justice concerning the admission of excited utterances shall not be overturned unless clearly wrong.’ ” State v. Medina, 767 A.2d 655, 658 (R.I.2001) (quoting Krakue, 726 A.2d at 462 ).

1999Cf. Scholl, 661 A.2d at 59 (dying declaration exception also a well-established exception which satisfies Confrontation Clause concerns).

1998The Legislature replaced the requirement that the declarant be “ ‘laboring under the stress of nervous excitement’ with the requirement that the statement be ‘made to someone the child would normally turn to for sympathy, protection, or advice.’ ” Id. at 395 (quoting In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d 572, 574 (R.I.1988)).

1997See State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384, 1386 (R.I.1990).

1997Those statements were admissible pursuant to the excited utterance exception, often referred to as “the spontaneous utterance rule.” It “embraces statements which are uttered under the stress of excitement produced by a startling event and made before the declarant has had an opportunity to reflect or contrive.” Martin v. Estrella, 107 R.I. 247, 257 , 266 A.2d 41, 48 (1970).

1997Those statements were admissible pursuant to the excited utterance exception, often referred to as “the spontaneous utterance rule.” It “embraces statements which are uttered under the stress of excitement produced by a startling event and made before the declarant has had an opportunity to reflect or contrive.” Martin v. Estrella, 107 R.I. 247, 257 , 266 A.2d 41, 48 (1970).

1989State v. Burns, 524 A.2d 564, 567 (R.I.1987); State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d at 982 .

1989In doing so, the Legislature, in effect, “created a new, relaxed excited-utterance exception * * * specifically designed for the young child-witness.” In re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 631 (R.I.1989).

1989Furthermore, as we have stated today and held previously, “[e]ven under the stricter standards of admissibility required by the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule [Rule 803(2) ], the fact that a statement was made in response to an inquiry does not render the statement inadmissible.” Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d at 631 ; State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d at 982 .