excited utterance exception in Connecticut

1999Mei v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., [ 159 Conn. 307, 315 , 268 A.2d 639 (1970)].” C.

1999Mei v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., [ 159 Conn. 307, 315 , 268 A.2d 639 (1970)].” C.

2026See, e.g., State v. Jacques, supra, 353 Conn. 162 (declining to exercise supervisory authority in part because “the concerns raised by the defendant are adequately addressed under the present analytical framework”); State v. Lockhart, supra, 298 Conn. 577 (declining to adopt, via this court’s supervi- 5 See, e.g., State v. Tomlinson, supra, 340 Conn. 586–87 (citing cases); see also, e.g., id., 587–88 (fact that declarant’s excited utterance answered question did not render it unreliable “[g]iven [the declarant’s] emotional state and the surrounding circumstances,” including that “the short pas

2026See, e.g., State v. Jacques, supra, 353 Conn. 162 (declining to exercise supervisory authority in part because “the concerns raised by the defendant are adequately addressed under the present analytical framework”); State v. Lockhart, supra, 298 Conn. 577 (declining to adopt, via this court’s supervi- 5 See, e.g., State v. Tomlinson, supra, 340 Conn. 586–87 (citing cases); see also, e.g., id., 587–88 (fact that declarant’s excited utterance answered question did not render it unreliable “[g]iven [the declarant’s] emotional state and the surrounding circumstances,” including that “the short pas

2026In support of his claim that this court should invoke its supervisory authority to abrogate the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, the defendant contends that the doctrinal foundation for that exception, which is that such statements are reliable because they are made “under such circumstances as to indicate absence of opportunity for contrivance and misrepresentation”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Stange, supra, 212 Conn. 617 ; has been eroded by contemporary State v. Franqui social science research, as well as by decisions from other jurisdictions that have cited

2026As with much of the folk psychology of evidence, it is difficult to take this rationale entirely seriously, since people are entirely capable of spontaneous lies in emotional circumstances. ‘Old and new studies agree that less than one second is required to fabricate a lie.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Id., 588 , quoting D.

2025On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly (1) denied his motion to suppress state- ments he had made to New Britain police detectives because he was in custody at the time but had not been advised of his Miranda1 rights, (2) determined that the victim’s statements to her mother, A, on the evening of the sexual assault were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay, and (3) limited the testimony of the defendant’s expert witness regarding the verification processes applicable for U visa applications and the options a person who has 1 Und

2025On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly (1) denied his motion to suppress state- ments he had made to New Britain police detectives because he was in custody at the time but had not been advised of his Miranda1 rights, (2) determined that the victim’s statements to her mother, A, on the evening of the sexual assault were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay, and (3) limited the testimony of the defendant’s expert witness regarding the verification processes applicable for U visa applications and the options a person who has 1 Und

2019Id., at 408, 134 S.Ct. 1683 .

2016Hearsay statements, otherwise inadmissible, may be admitted into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein when (1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kendall , 123 Conn.App. 625 , 666, 2 A.3d 990 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 902 , 10 A.3d 521 (2010).

2016Hearsay statements, otherwise inadmissible, may be admitted into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein when (1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kendall , 123 Conn.App. 625 , 666, 2 A.3d 990 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 902 , 10 A.3d 521 (2010).

2016Hearsay statements, otherwise inadmissible, may be admitted into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein when (1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kendall , 123 Conn.App. 625 , 666, 2 A.3d 990 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 902 , 10 A.3d 521 (2010).

2016Hearsay statements, otherwise inadmissible, may be admitted into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein when (1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kendall , 123 Conn.App. 625 , 666, 2 A.3d 990 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 902 , 10 A.3d 521 (2010).

2008Hearsay statements, otherwise inadmissible, may be admitted into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein when (1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 373-74 , 908 A.2d 506 (2006).

2008Hearsay statements, otherwise inadmissible, may be admitted into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein when (1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 373-74 , 908 A.2d 506 (2006).

2001State v. McNair, 54 Conn. App. 807, 810 , 738 A.2d 689 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 913 , 739 A.2d 1249 (1999) (“[t]he excited utterance exception rests on the view that such assertions, made in reaction to a startling event, are trustworthy and void of self-interest” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2001State v. McNair, 54 Conn. App. 807, 810 , 738 A.2d 689 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 913 , 739 A.2d 1249 (1999) (“[t]he excited utterance exception rests on the view that such assertions, made in reaction to a startling event, are trustworthy and void of self-interest” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2001State v. McNair, 54 Conn. App. 807, 810 , 738 A.2d 689 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 913 , 739 A.2d 1249 (1999) (“[t]he excited utterance exception rests on the view that such assertions, made in reaction to a startling event, are trustworthy and void of self-interest” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2001State v. McNair, 54 Conn. App. 807, 810 , 738 A.2d 689 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 913 , 739 A.2d 1249 (1999) (“[t]he excited utterance exception rests on the view that such assertions, made in reaction to a startling event, are trustworthy and void of self-interest” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2000Whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that witness testimony regarding the [victim’s] fearful state of mind regarding the defendant was relevant to prove his motive to murder her and was more probative of his motive than it was prejudicial to the defendant?” State v. Wargo, 250 Conn. 922, 922-23 , 738 A.2d 662 (1999).

2000Whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that witness testimony regarding the [victim’s] fearful state of mind regarding the defendant was relevant to prove his motive to murder her and was more probative of his motive than it was prejudicial to the defendant?” State v. Wargo, 250 Conn. 922, 922-23 , 738 A.2d 662 (1999).

2000“The excited utterance exception rests on the view that such assertions, made in reaction to a startling event, are trustworthy and void of self-interest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bowman, 46 Conn. App. 131, 141 , 698 A.2d 908 (1997).

2000“The excited utterance exception rests on the view that such assertions, made in reaction to a startling event, are trustworthy and void of self-interest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bowman, 46 Conn. App. 131, 141 , 698 A.2d 908 (1997).