excited utterance exception in Colorado

2026See Martinez, 18 P.3d at 835 (an assault is a “startling 9 event”); see also King, 121 P.3d at 237-38 (the excited utterance exception applies to statements made in response to questioning so long as the circumstances demonstrate the statements were made in response to a sufficiently startling event). ¶ 21 The record demonstrates that the incident was sufficiently startling to render inoperative the victim’s normal reflective thought processes, there was only a short lapse of time between the event and the victim’s out-of-court statements, the victim continued to be distressed, and the stateme

2005Martinez, supra .

2026See Martinez, 18 P.3d at 835 (an assault is a “startling 9 event”); see also King, 121 P.3d at 237-38 (the excited utterance exception applies to statements made in response to questioning so long as the circumstances demonstrate the statements were made in response to a sufficiently startling event). ¶ 21 The record demonstrates that the incident was sufficiently startling to render inoperative the victim’s normal reflective thought processes, there was only a short lapse of time between the event and the victim’s out-of-court statements, the victim continued to be distressed, and the stateme

2025District courts are “afforded wide discretion in determining whether a 10 statement is admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 238 . 2.

2025See Hulsing, 825 P.2d at 1032 (concluding that evidence of police questioning children “within 15-20 minutes of the time the police first arrived at the scene and within less than an hour after the children had witnessed or heard the incident occur,” as well as children’s emotional condition, was more than sufficient for the trial court to have admitted the statements under the excited utterance exception).4 III.

2025See Hulsing, 825 P.2d at 1032 (“The excited utterance exception extends to statements made in response to questioning.

1989Thus, in Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448 , 615 P.2d 720 (1980), we held that where a child told her mother that the defendant “hurt my pee-pee, Momma” approximately thirty minutes after the incident of abuse, the child’s statement fell within the excited utterance exception 5 to *1089 the hearsay rule and was therefore admissible.

1989Thus, in Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448 , 615 P.2d 720 (1980), we held that where a child told her mother that the defendant “hurt my pee-pee, Momma” approximately thirty minutes after the incident of abuse, the child’s statement fell within the excited utterance exception 5 to *1089 the hearsay rule and was therefore admissible.

1984In addition to the lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement, other factors to be considered in determining whether the statement qualifies as an excited utterance under the requirement of spontaneity include whether it was made in response to an inquiry, O.E.P., 654 P.2d at 318; United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 , 101 S.Ct. 1709 , 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.1979); whether it is accompanied by outward signs of excitement or emotional distress, O.E.P., 654 P.2d at 318; and

1983E.g., Lancas *683 ter v. People, supra (see also cases cited therein); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 , 101 S.Ct. 1709 , 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.1979); Jackson v. State, 31 Md.App. 332 , 356 A.2d 299 (1976); cf. People in the Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312 (Colo.1982) (civil case involving dependency or neglect).

1984In addition to the lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement, other factors to be considered in determining whether the statement qualifies as an excited utterance under the requirement of spontaneity include whether it was made in response to an inquiry, O.E.P., 654 P.2d at 318; United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 , 101 S.Ct. 1709 , 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.1979); whether it is accompanied by outward signs of excitement or emotional distress, O.E.P., 654 P.2d at 318; and

1984In addition to the lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement, other factors to be considered in determining whether the statement qualifies as an excited utterance under the requirement of spontaneity include whether it was made in response to an inquiry, O.E.P., 654 P.2d at 318; United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 , 101 S.Ct. 1709 , 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.1979); whether it is accompanied by outward signs of excitement or emotional distress, O.E.P., 654 P.2d at 318; and

1992People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675, 678-79 (Colo.1983); CRE 602.

1991See People v. Dement, supra. Excited utterances withstand confrontation clause challenges because, as the Supreme Court noted in Idaho v. Wright, supra: “The basis for the ‘excited utterance’ exception for example, is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous.” Consequently, because of their historical efficacy and inherent gu

1982See, e.g., People v. Roark, 643 P.2d 756 (Colo.1982) (statement by five year old eyewitness made twelve hours following a beating admissible); State v. Noble, 342 So.2d 170 (La.1977) (statement by four year old victim admissible when made two days after incident); People v. Lovett, 85 Mich.App. 534 , 272 N.W.2d 126 (1976) (statement of three year old eyewitness made one week after event admissible where child had been out of town during intervening period); Love v. State, 64 Wis.2d 432 , 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974) (statement by three year old victim made on day following event admissible).

1982See, e.g., People v. Roark, 643 P.2d 756 (Colo.1982) (statement by five year old eyewitness made twelve hours following a beating admissible); State v. Noble, 342 So.2d 170 (La.1977) (statement by four year old victim admissible when made two days after incident); People v. Lovett, 85 Mich.App. 534 , 272 N.W.2d 126 (1976) (statement of three year old eyewitness made one week after event admissible where child had been out of town during intervening period); Love v. State, 64 Wis.2d 432 , 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974) (statement by three year old victim made on day following event admissible).

2004An excited utterance is an exception to the hearsay rule and is defined as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” CRE 803(2); People in Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312 (Colo.1982).

1984In addition to the lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement, other factors to be considered in determining whether the statement qualifies as an excited utterance under the requirement of spontaneity include whether it was made in response to an inquiry, O.E.P., 654 P.2d at 318; United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 , 101 S.Ct. 1709 , 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.1979); whether it is accompanied by outward signs of excitement or emotional distress, O.E.P., 654 P.2d at 318; and

2025See Compan , 121 P.3d at 882; People v. Hagos , 250 P.3d 596, 622-23 (Colo.App. 2009); 47 see also People v. Lagunas , 710 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Colo.App. 1985) ("Because the duration of stress will obviously vary with the intensity of the experience and the emotional endowment of the individual, the exception necessarily vests the trial court with broad discretion in applying the rule."). ¶104 We therefore conclude that the trial court didn't abuse its discretion by admitting the statements under the excited utterance exception. [5] 48 iii.

2025Once Marshall-Fields got to his uncle's house, he called his friend Thomas Goodish and told him about the incident at Gibby's. ¶99 In its pretrial order, the court ruled that these statements Marshall-Fields made "about the incident at Gibby's Bar on June 19, 2005, are admissible under CRE 803(2), 803(3) and 807 with a limiting instruction that the evidence can only be considered on Counts 14 and 19 [witness intimidation and bribery]." We perceive no abuse of the trial court's discretion because the statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. ¶100 The

2014People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533 , 536 (Colo.App.2004), aff'd, 121 P.3d 876 (Colo.2005). *8 ¶ 32 "The trial court is in the best position to consider the effect of the startling event on the declarant and is therefore accorded wide discretion in determining admissibility under the excited utterance exception." Id.

2005See People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 536 (Colo.App.2004) ( cert. granted 2004 WL 2376474 (Oct. 25, 2004)) ("The excited utterance exception has been liberally interpreted to extend to statements made following a lapse of time after the startling event itself.

2004An excited utterance is a "statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." CRE 808(2); see also People v. Martinez, 83 P.3d 1174 (Colo.App.2008); People v. Martinez, 18 P.3d 881 (Colo.App.2000); People v. Mitchell, 829 P.2d 409 (Colo.App.1991); cf. People v. Moscat, 8 Misc.3d 789 , 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2004)(applying Cromford and concluding that a 911 call for help is nontestimonial and does not implicate the Confrontation Clause; its admissibility is determined by applying state's evid

2004People v. Martinez, supra. The excited utterance exception has been liberally interpreted to extend to statements made following a lapse of time after the startling event itself.

1989See W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo.1984).

1986W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo.1984).

2025So, to be admissible as an excited utterance, the proponent of the statement must show that " (1) the event was sufficiently startling to render normal reflective thought processes of the observer inoperative; (2) the statement was a spontaneous reaction to the event; and (3) direct or circumstantial evidence exists to allow the jury to infer that the declarant had the opportunity to observe the startling event." Id. at ¶ 42 , 530 P.3d at 1225 ( quoting People v. Pernell , 2014 COA 157 , ¶ 31 , 414 P.3d 1 , 7 ) .

2025So, to be admissible as an excited utterance, the proponent of the statement must show that "(1) the event was sufficiently startling to render normal reflective thought processes of the observer inoperative; (2) the statement was a spontaneous reaction to the event; and (3) direct or circumstantial evidence exists to allow the jury to infer that the declarant had the opportunity to observe the startling event." Id. at ¶ 42, 530 P.3d at 1225 (quoting People v. Pernell , 2014 COA 157, ¶ 31, 414 P.3d 1, 7).

2025See Compan , 121 P.3d at 882 ; People v. Hagos , 250 P.3d 596, 622-23 ( Colo.App. 2009 ) ; see also People v. Lagunas , 710 P.2d 1145, 1148 ( Colo.App. 1985 ) ( "Because the duration of stress will obviously vary with the intensity of the experience and the emotional endowment of the individual, the exception necessarily vests the trial court with broad discretion in applying the rule." ) . ¶104 We therefore conclude that the trial court didn't abuse its discretion by admitting the statements under the excited utterance exception. [5] iii.

2025See Compan , 121 P.3d at 882; People v. Hagos , 250 P.3d 596, 622-23 (Colo.App. 2009); 47 see also People v. Lagunas , 710 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Colo.App. 1985) ("Because the duration of stress will obviously vary with the intensity of the experience and the emotional endowment of the individual, the exception necessarily vests the trial court with broad discretion in applying the rule."). ¶104 We therefore conclude that the trial court didn't abuse its discretion by admitting the statements under the excited utterance exception. [5] 48 iii.

2025Once Marshall-Fields got to his uncle's house, he called his friend Thomas Goodish and told him about the incident at Gibby's. ¶99 In its pretrial order, the court ruled that these statements Marshall-Fields made "about the incident at Gibby's Bar on June 19, 2005 , are admissible under CRE 803 (2) , 803 (3) and 807 with a limiting instruction that the evidence can only be considered on Counts 14 and 19 [witness intimidation and bribery] ." We perceive no abuse of the trial court 's discretion because the statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. ¶10

2025Once Marshall-Fields got to his uncle's house, he called his friend Thomas Goodish and told him about the incident at Gibby's. ¶99 In its pretrial order, the court ruled that these statements Marshall-Fields made "about the incident at Gibby's Bar on June 19, 2005, are admissible under CRE 803(2), 803(3) and 807 with a limiting instruction that the evidence can only be considered on Counts 14 and 19 [witness intimidation and bribery]." We perceive no abuse of the trial court's discretion because the statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. ¶100 The

2025Once Marshall-Fields got to his uncle's house, he called his friend Thomas Goodish and told him about the incident at Gibby's. ¶99 In its pretrial order, the court ruled that these statements Marshall-Fields made "about the incident at Gibby's Bar on June 19, 2005, are admissible under CRE 803(2), 803(3) and 807 with a limiting instruction that the evidence can only be considered on Counts 14 and 19 [witness intimidation and bribery]." We perceive no abuse of the trial court's discretion because the statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. ¶100 The

2025Once Marshall-Fields got to his uncle's house, he called his friend Thomas Goodish and told him about the incident at Gibby's. ¶99 In its pretrial order, the court ruled that these statements Marshall-Fields made "about the incident at Gibby's Bar on June 19, 2005, are admissible under CRE 803(2), 803(3) and 807 with a limiting instruction that the evidence can only be considered on Counts 14 and 19 [witness intimidation and bribery]." We perceive no abuse of the trial court's discretion because the statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. ¶100 The

2025Statements About Marshall-Fields's Dreams ¶105 Marshall-Fields's friend, Stephanie Hayashido, testified that, while they were at the apartment complex after leaving Gibby's, Marshall-Fields told her that "he had a dream and he said that it was a sign from God that he was going to die because he died in his dream, or that God told him he was going to die in his dream." Defense counsel objected, but the court determined the statement was admissible to show Marshall-Fields's state of mind, which was relevant to the intimidation charge. ¶106 Although fear statements may be admissible if the victim

2025Statements About Marshall-Fields's Dreams ¶105 Marshall-Fields's friend, Stephanie Hayashido, testified that, while they were at the apartment complex after leaving Gibby's, Marshall-Fields told her that "he had a dream and he said that it was a sign from God that he was going to die because he died in his dream, or that God told him he was going to die in his dream." Defense counsel objected, but the court determined the statement was admissible to show Marshall-Fields's state of mind, which was relevant to the intimidation charge. ¶106 Although fear statements may be admissible if the victim

2025See Compan , 121 P.3d at 882 ; People v. Hagos , 250 P.3d 596, 622-23 ( Colo.App. 2009 ) ; see also People v. Lagunas , 710 P.2d 1145, 1148 ( Colo.App. 1985 ) ( "Because the duration of stress will obviously vary with the intensity of the experience and the emotional endowment of the individual, the exception necessarily vests the trial court with broad discretion in applying the rule." ) . ¶104 We therefore conclude that the trial court didn't abuse its discretion by admitting the statements under the excited utterance exception. [5] iii.

2025See Compan , 121 P.3d at 882; People v. Hagos , 250 P.3d 596, 622-23 (Colo.App. 2009); 47 see also People v. Lagunas , 710 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Colo.App. 1985) ("Because the duration of stress will obviously vary with the intensity of the experience and the emotional endowment of the individual, the exception necessarily vests the trial court with broad discretion in applying the rule."). ¶104 We therefore conclude that the trial court didn't abuse its discretion by admitting the statements under the excited utterance exception. [5] 48 iii.

2004See People v. Martinez, supra, 18 P.3d at 835 ; People v. Fincham, 799 P.2d 419, 423 (Colo. App.l990)(no error in admitting statement where court is satisfied that the event was sufficient to cause adequate excitement); Kielsmier v. Foster, 669 P.2d 630, 633 (Colo.App.l983)(admitting, as excited utterance, statement made by injured biker to ambulance driver at scene of accident).