excited utterance exception in Pennsylvania

2000The Commonwealth further contends that the motorist’s statement is lacking the requisite indicia of reliability needed for admissibility pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule because there is no evidence of record that the motorist actually witnessed the shooting. ¶ 16 For a hearsay statement to qualify as an excited utterance, the statement must be: “[a] spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occurrence, which that person had just participated in or closely witnes

2000The Commonwealth further contends that the motorist’s statement is lacking the requisite indicia of reliability needed for admissibility pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule because there is no evidence of record that the motorist actually witnessed the shooting. ¶ 16 For a hearsay statement to qualify as an excited utterance, the statement must be: “[a] spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occurrence, which that person had just participated in or closely witnes

2024Finally, “a statement, which otherwise qualifies as an excited utterance, is not precluded from falling within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule when made in response to questioning.” Commonwealth - 10 - J-S21037-24 v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 282-83 (Pa. 2006) (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Banks, 311 A.2d 576, 580 (Pa. 1973)).

2024Continuing, the Court held that “a statement, which otherwise qualifies as an excited utterance, is not precluded from falling within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule when made in response to questioning.” Id. at 282-283 (citations omitted).

2026“While the excited utterance exception has been codified as part of our rules of evidence since 1998, see Pa.R.E. 803(2), the common law definition of an excited utterance remains applicable.” Id. - 22 - J-A25039-25 1) whether the declarant, in fact, witnessed the startling event; 2) the time that elapsed between the startling event and the declaration; 3) whether the statement was in narrative form (inadmissible); and, 4) whether the declarant spoke to others before making the statement, or had the opportunity to do so.

2021“While the excited utterance exception has been codified as part of our rules of evidence since 1998 . . ., the common law definition of an excited utterance remains applicable.” Commonwealth v. Murray, 83 A.3d 137, 157 (Pa. 2013).

1998Compare Commonwealth v. Sanford, 397 Pa.Super. 581, 589-90 , 580 A.2d 784, 788 (1990)(linding the excited utterance exception applicable where the testimony of the child’s mother and physician circumstantially established the event evincing that the child perceived “some unexpected or shocking occurrence”), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 586 , 588 A.2d 508 (1991) with Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. 132 , 139-40 nn. 6-8, 383 A.2d 858 , 861-62 nn. 6-8 (1978) (declining to apply the excited utterance exception where a minor declarant’s location within the trailer home coupled with her testimony indi

1998Compare Commonwealth v. Sanford, 397 Pa.Super. 581, 589-90 , 580 A.2d 784, 788 (1990)(linding the excited utterance exception applicable where the testimony of the child’s mother and physician circumstantially established the event evincing that the child perceived “some unexpected or shocking occurrence”), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 586 , 588 A.2d 508 (1991) with Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. 132 , 139-40 nn. 6-8, 383 A.2d 858 , 861-62 nn. 6-8 (1978) (declining to apply the excited utterance exception where a minor declarant’s location within the trailer home coupled with her testimony indi

1998To come within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, a statement must be: “‘... a spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occur rence, which that person had just participated in or closely witnessed, and made in reference to some phase of that occurrence which he perceived, and this declaration must be made so near the occurrence both in time and place as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated in whole or in part from his reflective faculties.” Allen v. Mack, 345 Pa.

1998To come within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, a statement must be: “‘... a spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occur rence, which that person had just participated in or closely witnessed, and made in reference to some phase of that occurrence which he perceived, and this declaration must be made so near the occurrence both in time and place as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated in whole or in part from his reflective faculties.” Allen v. Mack, 345 Pa.

2016See Commonwealth v. Counterman, . . . 719 A.2d 284, 299 ([Pa.] 1988) (statement by children, who ultimately perished in a house fire, that their father was lighting a fire inside the house was admissible when, minutes later, the house became ablaze); Commonwealth v. Sanford, . . . 580 A.2d 784, 788 ([Pa.] 1990) (finding the excited utterance exception applicable where the testimony of the child’s mother and physician circumstantially established the event evincing that the child perceived “some unexpected or shocking occurrence”).

2013See Commonwealth v. Counterman, 553 Pa. 370 , 719 A.2d 284, 299 (1998) (statement by children, who ultimately perished in a house fire, that their father was lighting a fire inside the house was admissible when, minutes later, the house became ablaze); Commonwealth v. Sanford, 397 Pa.Super. 581 , 580 A.2d 784, 788 (1990) (finding the excited utterance exception applicable where the testimony of the child’s mother and physician circumstantially established the event evincing that the child perceived “some unexpected or shocking occurrence”).

1999The record reveals a “sufficient confluence of time and events to vest special reliability in the *42 statements,” Coleman, 326 A.2d at 390 , for purposes of the excited utterance exception.

1980Wigmore, 6 Evidence, §1767, because it is used to refer to hearsay exceptions such as the excited utterance rule and three other exceptions, Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 116 , 326 A.2d 387, 389 (1974), and also to verbal acts not hearsay.

2024(Pa. 1978) observed that, unlike other exceptions to hearsay, the excited utterance exception has "... no clear-cut rule as to the time sequence required for astatement to qualify as an excited utterance, ... rather that fact- specific determination is to be made on acase-by-case basis." Gray, 867 A.2d at 570 .

2019See Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 571 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that a witness who watched the assault of her mother viewed a startling event for purposes of the excited utterance exception).

2020Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 265 (Pa. Super. 2009) (some internal citations omitted) (citing Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 119-120 (Pa. 2001).

2019The Rule defines an excited utterance as: “A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event.” In Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 119-20 (Pa. 2001), [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] held that for a statement to be considered an excited utterance, it must be made spontaneously and without opportunity for reflection: -4- J-S64012-18 [A] spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occurrence, which tha

2026“The excited utterance exception did not apply because [the statements were] self-serving, and the substance of what [Appellant] said on the 911 call was narrative in nature, and in consideration of the surrounding factors of the 911 call, the call was inadmissible.” Id.

2024Cf. Keys, 814 A.2d at 1257 (observing the purported domestic incident occurred ten blocks away from where the victim gave her police statement). - 12 - J-S21037-24 Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the complainant’s statements under the excited utterance exception.

2013Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 605 Pa. 325 , 989 A.2d 883, 909 (2010) (Castille, J. concurring) (“The underlying rationale of the excited utterance exception is the notion that a statement made in the excitement of a startling event, before the speaker has the opportunity to reflect on the event, has sufficient indicia of truthfulness to warrant admission.”).

2013Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 605 Pa. 325 , 989 A.2d 883, 909 (2010) (Castille, J. concurring) (“The underlying rationale of the excited utterance exception is the notion that a statement made in the excitement of a startling event, before the speaker has the opportunity to reflect on the event, has sufficient indicia of truthfulness to warrant admission.”).

2024Finally, “a statement, which otherwise qualifies as an excited utterance, is not precluded from falling within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule when made in response to questioning.” Commonwealth - 10 - J-S21037-24 v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 282-83 (Pa. 2006) (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Banks, 311 A.2d 576, 580 (Pa. 1973)).

1980While there is no fixed time limit either within which the declarations must be made to achieve excited utterance status, we are satisfied that a thirty minute period is not so extreme as to preclude admission of the declarations under the excited utterance exception, See, Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401 , 311 A.2d 576 (1974).

2007See Commonwealth v. Keys, 814 A.2d 1256 (Pa.Super.2003) (discussing excited utterance exception to hearsay rule); Pa.R.E. 802(2). ¶ 18 The trial court herein concluded that the statement was not admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule based upon Commonwealth v. Upshur, 764 A.2d 69 (Pa.Super.2000), where we upheld a trial court’s decision to preclude the introduction of a statement made by an unidentified person to a police officer because there was no evidence establishing that the declarant actually viewed the criminal incident.

2005Hood seizes upon Commonwealth v. Upshur, 764 A.2d 69, 76 (Pa.Super.2000) (en banc), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 566 Pa. 589 , 782 A.2d 538 (2001), in support of his argument that these tapes were inadmissible hearsay as they did not satisfy certain criteria of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

2009See e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 226 , 912 A.2d 268, 282 (2006) (shooting victim’s statement identifying defendant as one of the shooters, made less than ten minutes after being shot, while victim was bleeding from his gunshot wound and awaiting transport to the hospital, as well as second statement to police, made approximately 80 minutes later, were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, in murder prosecution, even if statements were made in response to questioning); Commonwealth v. Penn, 497 Pa. 232, 241-242 , 439 A.2d 1154, 1159 (1982), cert. den

2009See e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 226 , 912 A.2d 268, 282 (2006) (shooting victim’s statement identifying defendant as one of the shooters, made less than ten minutes after being shot, while victim was bleeding from his gunshot wound and awaiting transport to the hospital, as well as second statement to police, made approximately 80 minutes later, were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, in murder prosecution, even if statements were made in response to questioning); Commonwealth v. Penn, 497 Pa. 232, 241-242 , 439 A.2d 1154, 1159 (1982), cert. den

2026While we have provided that the excited utterance exception may apply to disclosure of child victims to a mother made after the passage of time when the disclosures were made at the first opportunity to do so, see Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 496 (Pa. 2009), in this instance, D.B. was an adult at the time of the relevant events, and the mother’s testimony did not assert that D.B. made the disclosure to her mother at the first opportunity to do so.

2021Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 496 (Pa. 2009).

2016Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/15, at 5 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 731 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. 1999)). -6- J-S13005-16 We disagree with the trial court’s analysis and find that the victim’s statements to Waltman are inadmissible hearsay and do not fall under the excited utterance exception.

2002Id. at 40 , 731 A.2d at 596 (citations omitted). ¶ 11 The excited utterance exception includes statements made in response to questioning as well as those made shortly after the event, not just those made immediately thereafter.

2009Commonwealth v. Stokes, 532 Pa. 242 , 615 A.2d 704, 712 (1992) (iquoting Commonwealth v. Green, 487 Pa. 322 , 409 A.2d 371, 373-74 (1979)) This Court has determined that a hearsay remark is admissible under the excited utterance exception even if it was the product of questioning.

2009Commonwealth v. Stokes, 532 Pa. 242 , 615 A.2d 704, 712 (1992) (iquoting Commonwealth v. Green, 487 Pa. 322 , 409 A.2d 371, 373-74 (1979)) This Court has determined that a hearsay remark is admissible under the excited utterance exception even if it was the product of questioning.

2003As this Court has stated, while there is no fixed time limit within which declarations must be made to be properly considered excited utterances, “we are satisfied that a thirty minute period is not so extreme as to preclude admission of ... declarations under the excited utterance exception.” Commonwealth v. Hess, 270 Pa.Super. 501 , 411 A.2d 830, 834 (1979).

2003As this Court has stated, while there is no fixed time limit within which declarations must be made to be properly considered excited utterances, “we are satisfied that a thirty minute period is not so extreme as to preclude admission of ... declarations under the excited utterance exception.” Commonwealth v. Hess, 270 Pa.Super. 501 , 411 A.2d 830, 834 (1979).

2023Under the excited utterance exception, the timing of the statement is crucial and must show that “the nervous excitement continues to dominate while the reflective processes remain in abeyance.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gore, 396 A.2d 1302, 1305 (Pa. Super. 1978)).

1984For additional support we observe that it was held in Commonwealth v. Gore, 262 Pa.Superior Ct. 540, 396 A.2d 1302 (1978); and Commonwealth v. Dugan, 252 Pa.Superior Ct. 377, 381 A.2d 967 (1977) that even though statements were made several hours later than the incident which cause them to be made, they were still “spontaneous” for purpose to the exception to the hearsay rule.

2016See Commonwealth v. Counterman, . . . 719 A.2d 284, 299 ([Pa.] 1988) (statement by children, who ultimately perished in a house fire, that their father was lighting a fire inside the house was admissible when, minutes later, the house became ablaze); Commonwealth v. Sanford, . . . 580 A.2d 784, 788 ([Pa.] 1990) (finding the excited utterance exception applicable where the testimony of the child’s mother and physician circumstantially established the event evincing that the child perceived “some unexpected or shocking occurrence”).

2015However, witnessing the actual accident occur is not required for the excited utterance exception; the person must only be “subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occurrence.” Id.

2026As well, “a statement, which otherwise qualifies as an excited utterance, is not precluded from falling within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule when made in response to questioning.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 109 A.3d 678 (Pa. 2015). [] Trial Court Opinion, 6/10/25, at 8-10.

2020Furthermore, “a statement, which otherwise qualifies as an excited - 12 - J-S40029-20 utterance, is not precluded from falling within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule when made in response to questioning.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1039 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 710 , 109 A.3d 678 (2015).

2024See Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 725 A.2d 154, 165 (Pa. 1999) (an excited utterance is an exception to the evidentiary rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay).

2000Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 555 Pa. 434, 457 , 725 A.2d 154, 165 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Washington, 547 Pa. 550, 559 , 692 A.2d 1018, 1022 (1997).

2020In Commonwealth v. Crosby, 791 A.2d 366 (Pa. Super. 2002), this Court stated, “The excited utterance exception includes statements made in response to questioning as well as those made shortly after the event, not just those made immediately thereafter.” Id. at 370 (citations omitted).

2020In Commonwealth v. Crosby, 791 A.2d 366 (Pa. Super. 2002), this Court stated, “The excited utterance exception includes statements made in response to questioning as well as those made shortly after the event, not just those made immediately thereafter.” Id. at 370 (citations omitted).

2021“Hearsay testimony is per se inadmissible in this Commonwealth, except as provided in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence[,] by other rules prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute.” Id. *** ____________________________________________ 8 The trial court notes that it heard oral argument at sidebar on this issue at the time of trial, and it ruled that Mr. Collado’s hearsay statements fit within the excited utterance exception.

2005“In addition, the present sense impression does not require that the comments be made to another person also present at the scene, but may be made over the telephone.” Cunningham, 805 A.2d at 573 . ¶ 28 We note, however, that the same issue of corroboration addressed under the excited utterance exception may relate to the present sense impression exception.

2024Indeed in Commonwealth v. Soudani, 155 A.2d 227, 230-31 (Pa. Super. 1959), afPd. 159 A.2d 686 -87 (Pa. 1960), the Superior Court found that statements uttered in response to questions by anurse administering aid, made 45 minutes after the assault had occurred, while the victim was in shock, and when the statements were made "... near the beginning of the 45 minutes period above referred to...," were admissible under the excited utterance exception.

1982Commonwealth v. Hess, 270 Pa.Super. 501 , 411 A.2d 830 (1979) (30 minutes); Lininger v. Kromer, 238 Pa.Super. 259 , 358 A.2d 89 (1976) (2 hours); Commonwealth v. Cheeks, supra, (45 minutes); Commonwealth v. Soudani, 190 Pa.Super. 628 , 155 A.2d 227 (1959) affirmed, 398 Pa. 546 , 159 A.2d 687, 689 (1960); cert. *538 denied, 364 U.S. 886 , 81 S.Ct. 177 , 5 L.Ed.2d 107 (1960) (45 minutes).

2024See Commonwealth v. Hood, 872 A.2d 175, 183 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating that when the exact times of 9-1-1 calls are documented, and the calls are close in time to the occurrence of the event, it adds credence to the argument that the calls fall under an excited utterance exception).

2024Like the excited utterance exception, “when the declarant is unidentified, the proponent shall show by independent corroborating evidence that the declarant actually perceived the event or condition.” Id.