excited utterance exception in Utah

2017In State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court committed harmless error in admitting testimony regarding the out-of-court statements of the victim under the excited utterance exception.

2017Id. at 449-50 .

2000The Court explained that the excited utterance exception was "firmly rooted" and that statements falling under it are "made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness." Id. at 355, 112 S.Ct. 736 at 742 .

1995In holding that the excited utterance exception does not violate the federal Confrontation Clause, Chief Justice William Rehnquist made that point for the Court in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 , 112 S.Ct. 736, 742-43 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992): But those same factors that contribute to the statements' reliability cannot be recaptured, even by later in-court testimony.

2025We then turn to the application of our hearsay rules and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements under the excited utterance exception. 17 STATE v. NAJERA Opinion of the Court A. The Admission of Beth’s Statements to the Officer Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause Because the Primary Purpose of the Interaction Was Not To Gather Evidence for Later Prosecution ¶59 The district court ruled that the statements Beth made to the officer were nontestimonial because “the primary purpose of talking to [Beth] was not to create an out-of-court-subst

2020We agree that at least some of the statements during the call were admissible as excited utterances. ¶21 Rule 803(2) defines an excited utterance as a “statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the 20180649-CA 10 2020 UT App 67 State v. Williams declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Utah R.

2020“In reviewing the admissibility of hearsay, legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, and the ultimate question of admissibility is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State v. C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, ¶ 29 , 250 P.3d 69 .

2020“In reviewing the admissibility of hearsay, legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, and the ultimate question of admissibility is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State v. C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, ¶ 29 , 250 P.3d 69 .

2020As to the first and third factors, the court explained that Williams appearing at his father’s motor home unexpectedly, breaking down the door, and assaulting the father and brother constituted “a startling event or condition” and that “all the information given related to the startling event or condition.” Because we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, we will set aside those findings only if they are “against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Brown v. State, 2013 UT 42, ¶ 37 , 308

2020As to the first and third factors, the court explained that Williams appearing at his father’s motor home unexpectedly, breaking down the door, and assaulting the father and brother constituted “a startling event or condition” and that “all the information given related to the startling event or condition.” Because we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, we will set aside those findings only if they are “against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Brown v. State, 2013 UT 42, ¶ 37 , 308

2017But the State argues that Fahina’s claim on appeal is unpreserved because he “only argued that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 [ 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] (2004),” and he “never argued below the claims that he now brings on appeal, i.e., that the testimony was not admissible under the excited utterance exception.” ¶ 21 The State is correct that Fahi-na’s argument against the application of the excited utterance exception is more robust on appeal than it was during trial.

2017But the State argues that Fahina’s claim on appeal is unpreserved because he “only argued that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 [ 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] (2004),” and he “never argued below the claims that he now brings on appeal, i.e., that the testimony was not admissible under the excited utterance exception.” ¶ 21 The State is correct that Fahi-na’s argument against the application of the excited utterance exception is more robust on appeal than it was during trial.

2017But as the Utah Supreme Court clarified in Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63 , 323 P.3d 998 , “[{issues must be preserved, not arguments for or against a particular ruling on an issue raised below.” Id. ¶ 45.

2017But as the Utah Supreme Court clarified in Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63 , 323 P.3d 998 , “[{issues must be preserved, not arguments for or against a particular ruling on an issue raised below.” Id. ¶ 45.

2008R. 807; and the excited utterance exception, see id.

2006"Our standard of review on the admissibility of hearsay evidence is complex, since the determination of admissibility 'often contains a number of rulings, each of which may require a different standard of review.'" State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ¶ 10 , 122 P.3d 639 (quoting Norman H.

2006Assuming correct application of the law to facts free from clear error, "we review the district court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion." Id. ¶ 14 The excited utterance exception allows the admission of a hearsay statement "relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Utah R.

2003Litigants must "cross-appeal or cross-petition if they wish to attack a judgment of a lower court for the purpose of enlarging their own rights or lessening the rights of their oppo *917 nent." State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 355 (Utah 1996) (citing Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 538-39 , 51 S.Ct. 243 , 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931)).

2003Litigants must "cross-appeal or cross-petition if they wish to attack a judgment of a lower court for the purpose of enlarging their own rights or lessening the rights of their oppo *917 nent." State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 355 (Utah 1996) (citing Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 538-39 , 51 S.Ct. 243 , 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931)).

2002When considering a trial court's determination regarding hearsay testimony, we must first determine " "whether the trial court's analysis involves a factual or a legal determination or some combination thereof." " State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, ¶ 13 , 4 P.3d 778 (quoting Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 978 (Utah 1998)).

2002When considering a trial court's determination regarding hearsay testimony, we must first determine " "whether the trial court's analysis involves a factual or a legal determination or some combination thereof." " State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, ¶ 13 , 4 P.3d 778 (quoting Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 978 (Utah 1998)).

2000Evid. 808(2) advisory committee note). 3 Lacking the "wherewithal to fabricate a falsehood, 'the cireumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous.'" Mickelson, 848 P.2d at 683 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)). €13 The classic example of an excited utterance is a witness's exact recollection of the declarant's spontaneous "sound bite"-an un-coached blurting out-made while the declar-ant observed the exciting event or clos

2000Evid. 808(2) advisory committee note). 3 Lacking the "wherewithal to fabricate a falsehood, 'the cireumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous.'" Mickelson, 848 P.2d at 683 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)). €13 The classic example of an excited utterance is a witness's exact recollection of the declarant's spontaneous "sound bite"-an un-coached blurting out-made while the declar-ant observed the exciting event or clos

2000The exception is much narrower than that, and is limited to truly "spontaneous outbursts." United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 , 111 S.Ct. 2824 , 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991).

2000The exception is much narrower than that, and is limited to truly "spontaneous outbursts." United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 , 111 S.Ct. 2824 , 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991).

2000The Roberts Court held that in order to admit hearsay statements at trial when the hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination, the State must show that the declarant is unavailable, and that the statement at issue " 'bears adequate indicia of reliability."" State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 402 (Utah 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1115 , 115 S.Ct. 910 , 130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)). 4 .

2000The Roberts Court held that in order to admit hearsay statements at trial when the hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination, the State must show that the declarant is unavailable, and that the statement at issue " 'bears adequate indicia of reliability."" State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 402 (Utah 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1115 , 115 S.Ct. 910 , 130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)). 4 .