12 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2026Va. 104, 106 , 358 S.E.2d 188, 190 (1987) (“Rule 803(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence correctly contains the heart of the hearsay exception that was formerly called a spontaneous declaration and which is now termed the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.”). 10 In the case before us now, the circuit court permitted the Petitioner to adduce testimony in front of the jury indicating that Tiffany McCune did not have a reputation for truthfulness. 19 discretion in reaching its conclusion. 2000See also Syl. pt. 1, in part, State v. Smith, 178 W.Va. 104 , 358 S.E.2d 188 (1987) ("Rule 803(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence correctly contains the heart of the hearsay exception that was formerly called a spontaneous declaration and which is now termed the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule."). | 3 | 6 |
State v. Farmergreen2 sentences2026This argument misses the point of the excited utterance exception. “[W]e have consistently recognized that an excited utterance or spontaneous declaration9 is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under the premise that a person stimulated by the excitement of an event and acting under the influence of that event will lack the reflective capacity essential for fabrication.” State v. Farmer, 185 W. 1992See State v. Farmer, 185 W.Va. 232 , 406 S.E.2d 458 (1991) (per curiam) for a discussion of the history of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 19 .Defendant also alleges three instances of jury misconduct. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2018The Court reversed because the statements clearly did not fall within the excited utterance exception and the state trooper had “no evidence to offer independent of his interview with . . . [the victim], his entire testimony was impermissible hearsay . . . . [that] significantly bolstered the testimony of the only eye witness . . . [and] its admission was obviously prejudicial.” Id. at 523 , 362 S.E.2d at 334 . 2018The Court reversed because the statements clearly did not fall within the excited utterance exception and the state trooper had “no evidence to offer independent of his interview with . . . [the victim], his entire testimony was impermissible hearsay . . . . [that] significantly bolstered the testimony of the only eye witness . . . [and] its admission was obviously prejudicial.” Id. at 523 , 362 S.E.2d at 334 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Raygreen2 sentences1988The more detailed treatment of this exception contained in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Young, 166 W.Va. 309 , 273 S.E.2d 592 (1980), is helpful to further refine the contours of the rule.” Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Young, 166 W.Va. 309 , 273 S.E.2d 592 (1980), referred to in Smith , provides a more comprehensive list of factors which are of assistance to us: “An alleged spontaneous declaration must be evaluated in light of the following factors: (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it mu 1988The more detailed treatment of this exception contained in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Young, 166 W.Va. 309 , 273 S.E.2d 592 (1980), is helpful to further refine the contours of the rule.” Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Young, 166 W.Va. 309 , 273 S.E.2d 592 (1980), referred to in Smith , provides a more comprehensive list of factors which are of assistance to us: “An alleged spontaneous declaration must be evaluated in light of the following factors: (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it mu | 1 | 2 |
Gannon v. Stategreen1 sentence2026Mich. 2010); see, e.g., Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272, 275 (Del. 1998) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 355 n.8 (1992)) (“The hearsay 16 2. | 1 | 1 |
White v. Illinoisgreen1 sentence2026Mich. 2010); see, e.g., Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272, 275 (Del. 1998) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 355 n.8 (1992)) (“The hearsay 16 2. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2026Va. 569, 577 , 461 S.E.2d 75, 83 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Sutherland, 231 W. 2026“In fact, the key difference between the present sense impression exception and the excited utterance exception is that present sense impression requires contemporaneity while the central requirement of an excited utterance is that the declarant still be under the pressure of the exciting event.” State v. Phillips, 194 W. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc.green2 sentences2000See Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182, 1186 (8th Cir.1981); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.Ga. 1993); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F.Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y.1989) aff'd, 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.1990). 2000See Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182, 1186 (8th Cir.1981); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.Ga.1993); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F.Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y.1989) aff'd, 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.1990). | 1 | 1 |
Frederich G. Meder Evelyn Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc.green2 sentences2000See Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182, 1186 (8th Cir.1981); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.Ga. 1993); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F.Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y.1989) aff'd, 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.1990). 2000See Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182, 1186 (8th Cir.1981); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.Ga.1993); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F.Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y.1989) aff'd, 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.1990). | 1 | 1 |
Kenrick David v. Pueblo Supermarket Of St. Thomasgreen1 sentence2000See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 , 947 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1986); David v. Pueblo Supermarket, 740 F.2d 230, 235 (3d Cir.1984). [4] I find little use for the decision in Alexander as guidance for my determination to join the majority in carving out an extension to the excited utterance rule. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 506074green1 sentence2000See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 , 947 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1986); David v. Pueblo Supermarket, 740 F.2d 230, 235 (3d Cir.1984). [4] I find little use for the decision in Alexander as guidance for my determination to join the majority in carving out an extension to the excited utterance rule. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Thomas N. Mooregreen1 sentence2000See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 , 947 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1986); David v. Pueblo Supermarket, 740 F.2d 230, 235 (3d Cir.1984). [4] I find little use for the decision in Alexander as guidance for my determination to join the majority in carving out an extension to the excited utterance rule. | 1 | 1 |
Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A.green2 sentences2000See Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182, 1186 (8th Cir.1981); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.Ga. 1993); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F.Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y.1989) aff'd, 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.1990). 2000See Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182, 1186 (8th Cir.1981); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.Ga.1993); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F.Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y.1989) aff'd, 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.1990). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Narcisogreen2 sentences1995See United States v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp. 252, 286 (E.D.Mich. 1995See United States v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp. 252, 286 (E.D.Mich. | 1 | 1 |
Booth v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 323 , 508 A.2d 976, 980 (1986). 1995Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 323 , 508 A.2d 976, 980 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Young
green
2 sentences2000A. The Excited Utterance Exception Prior to this Court's adoption of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the test that was used for evaluating a statement as a "spontaneous declaration" was set out in Syllabus point 2 of State v. Young, 166 W.Va. 309 , 273 S.E.2d 592 (1980), modified on other grounds, State v. Julius, 185 W.Va. 422 , 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991): An alleged spontaneous declaration must be evaluated in light of the following factors: (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a 2000A. The Excited Utterance Exception Prior to this Court's adoption of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the test that was used for evaluating a statement as a "spontaneous declaration" was set out in Syllabus point 2 of State v. Young, 166 W.Va. 309 , 273 S.E.2d 592 (1980), modified on other grounds, State v. Julius, 185 W.Va. 422 , 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991): An alleged spontaneous declaration must be evaluated in light of the following factors: (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a | 5 | 1987–2000 |
Ward v. Raleigh County Park Board
green
2 sentences1991In syllabus point 2 of Young , we reiterated six factors, outlined in Ward v. Raleigh County Park Board, 143 W.Va. 931 , 105 S.E.2d 881 (1958), that should be considered by the trial court in determining whether a statement or declaration is admissible as an excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule: An alleged spontaneous declaration must be evaluated in light of the following factors: (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a natural declaration or statement growing out of th 1991In syllabus point 2 of Young , we reiterated six factors, outlined in Ward v. Raleigh County Park Board, 143 W.Va. 931 , 105 S.E.2d 881 (1958), that should be considered by the trial court in determining whether a statement or declaration is admissible as an excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule: An alleged spontaneous declaration must be evaluated in light of the following factors: (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a natural declaration or statement growing out of th | 2 | 1987–1991 |
Kowalak v. Scutt
green
1 sentence2026“It is well established that the excited utterance exception is a firmly rooted hearsay exception for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” Kowalak v. Scutt, 712 F. Supp. 2d 657 , 686-87 n.2 (E.D. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State of West Virginia v. Timothy Ray Sutherland
green
1 sentence2026Va. 569, 577 , 461 S.E.2d 75, 83 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Sutherland, 231 W. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Miller, Carol A., and Miller, Howard C., Her Husband v. Keating, Lawrence M., and Texaco, Inc
green
2 sentences2000In determining the resolution of this issue, the majority opinion relied upon guidance from the decisions in People v. Alexander, 173 A.D.2d 296 , 569 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1991), and Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.1985). [4] The decision in Miller was a civil action involving an automobile accident. 2000In determining the resolution of this issue, the majority opinion relied upon guidance from the decisions in People v. Alexander, 173 A.D.2d 296 , 569 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1991), and Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.1985). 4 The decision in Miller was a civil action involving an automobile accident. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Shirley Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A. And Ajax Navigation Company
green
2 sentences2000See Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182, 1186 (8th Cir.1981); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.Ga. 1993); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F.Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y.1989) aff'd, 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.1990). 2000See Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182, 1186 (8th Cir.1981); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.Ga.1993); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F.Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y.1989) aff'd, 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.1990). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Alexander
neutral
2 sentences2000In determining the resolution of this issue, the majority opinion relied upon guidance from the decisions in People v. Alexander, 173 A.D.2d 296 , 569 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1991), and Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.1985). [4] The decision in Miller was a civil action involving an automobile accident. 2000In determining the resolution of this issue, the majority opinion relied upon guidance from the decisions in People v. Alexander, 173 A.D.2d 296 , 569 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1991), and Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.1985). [4] The decision in Miller was a civil action involving an automobile accident. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Julius
green
2 sentences2000A. The Excited Utterance Exception Prior to this Court's adoption of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the test that was used for evaluating a statement as a "spontaneous declaration" was set out in Syllabus point 2 of State v. Young, 166 W.Va. 309 , 273 S.E.2d 592 (1980), modified on other grounds, State v. Julius, 185 W.Va. 422 , 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991): An alleged spontaneous declaration must be evaluated in light of the following factors: (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a 2000A. The Excited Utterance Exception Prior to this Court's adoption of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the test that was used for evaluating a statement as a "spontaneous declaration" was set out in Syllabus point 2 of State v. Young, 166 W.Va. 309 , 273 S.E.2d 592 (1980), modified on other grounds, State v. Julius, 185 W.Va. 422 , 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991): An alleged spontaneous declaration must be evaluated in light of the following factors: (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Mitchell v. State
red
2 sentences1990In Mitchell v. State, ___ Miss. ___, 539 So.2d 1366 (1989) the court indicated that the mother's and babysitter's testimony involving hearsay statements made by a five-year-old female child should be analyzed under Rule 803(24) exception on remand. [19] In its instructions to the lower court, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated: We note that, as other courts have applied the `catch-all' to a child's out-of-court statement about an incident of sexual abuse, they have found that the statements did not fit under the excited utterance exception or under the exception for seeking medical treatment 1990In Mitchell v. State, — Miss. -, 539 So.2d 1366 (1989) the court indicated that the mother’s and babysitter’s testimony involving hearsay statements made by a five-year-old female child should be analyzed under Rule 803(24) exception on remand. 19 In its instructions to the lower court, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated: We note that, as other courts have applied the ‘catch-all’ to a child’s out-of-court statement about an incident of sexual abuse, they have found that the statements did not fit under the excited utterance exception or under the exception for seeking medical treatment. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Harvey M. Renville
green
2 sentences1990These statements do not fall under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule found in W.Va.R.Evid. 803(2) because they were not statements made by the declarant "relating to a startling event or condition ... while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Id. 1990These statements do not fall under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule found in W.Va.R.Evid. 803(2) because they were not statements made by the declarant “relating to a startling event or condition ... while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Id. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Matter of Lucas
green
1 sentence1990However, other courts have admitted statements like these made by child victims to a parent under other exceptions to the hearsay rule. *137 In Matter of Lucas , the court admitted statements made by a three-year-old child to her mother that a juvenile boy had sexually assaulted the little girl anally. 380 S.E.2d at 565 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Withrow
green
2 sentences1987Usually, the length of time between the occurrence and the victim’s statement decides whether the statement is admissible as evidence. 3 In the present case, the state, citing State v. Withrow, 142 W.Va. 522 , 96 S.E.2d 913 (1957), asserts that evidence of statements made by a child who has been sexually molested and describing the molestation are admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 1987Usually, the length of time between the occurrence and the victim’s statement decides whether the statement is admissible as evidence. 3 In the present case, the state, citing State v. Withrow, 142 W.Va. 522 , 96 S.E.2d 913 (1957), asserts that evidence of statements made by a child who has been sexually molested and describing the molestation are admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.