enumerated factors in Michigan

2023“Where the trial court has failed to analyze the issue of child custody in accord with the mandates of MCL 722.23 and make reviewable findings of fact, the proper remedy is to remand for a new child custody hearing.” Bowers v Bowers, 190 Mich App 51, 56 ; 475 NW2d 394 (1991).

2023“Where the trial court has failed to analyze the issue of child custody in accord with the mandates of MCL 722.23 and make reviewable findings of fact, the proper remedy is to remand for a new child custody hearing.” Bowers v Bowers, 190 Mich App 51, 56 ; 475 NW2d 394 (1991).

2024“Thereafter, the trial court must consider all of the remaining Wood and MRPC 1.5(a) factors to determine whether an up or down adjustment is appropriate.” Pirgu, 499 Mich at 281 . -4- The Pirgu Court recognized that its decision in Smith required trial courts to consult two different lists of factors that contain “significant overlap,” which “unnecessarily complicates the analysis and increases the risk that courts may engage in incomplete or duplicative consideration of the enumerated factors.” Id.

2024“Thereafter, the trial court must consider all of the remaining Wood and MRPC 1.5(a) factors to determine whether an up or down adjustment is appropriate.” Pirgu, 499 Mich at 281 . -4- The Pirgu Court recognized that its decision in Smith required trial courts to consult two different lists of factors that contain “significant overlap,” which “unnecessarily complicates the analysis and increases the risk that courts may engage in incomplete or duplicative consideration of the enumerated factors.” Id.

2018It is true that, as emphasized by defendant, "a 'critical safeguard' identified in Miranda was a person's right to cut off questioning." People v. Adams , 245 Mich. App. 226 , 230, 627 N.W.2d 623 (2001), quoting Michigan v. Mosley , 423 U.S. 96 , 103, 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed. 2d 313 (1975).

2018It is true that, as emphasized by defendant, "a 'critical safeguard' identified in Miranda was a person's right to cut off questioning." People v. Adams , 245 Mich. App. 226 , 230, 627 N.W.2d 623 (2001), quoting Michigan v. Mosley , 423 U.S. 96 , 103, 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed. 2d 313 (1975).

2018It is true that, as emphasized by defendant, "a 'critical safeguard' identified in Miranda was a person's right to cut off questioning." People v. Adams , 245 Mich. App. 226 , 230, 627 N.W.2d 623 (2001), quoting Michigan v. Mosley , 423 U.S. 96 , 103, 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed. 2d 313 (1975).

2018It is true that, as emphasized by defendant, "a 'critical safeguard' identified in Miranda was a person's right to cut off questioning." People v. Adams , 245 Mich. App. 226 , 230, 627 N.W.2d 623 (2001), quoting Michigan v. Mosley , 423 U.S. 96 , 103, 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed. 2d 313 (1975).

2018When a defendant’s conduct at issue is not gang related, testimony regarding defendant’s or others’ gang affiliations is generally inadmissible in hopes of preventing jurors from assuming that the defendant is a person of bad character or prone to violent behavior. [Bynum, 496 Mich at 625 - 626].

2018When a defendant’s conduct at issue is not gang related, testimony regarding defendant’s or others’ gang affiliations is generally inadmissible in hopes of preventing jurors from assuming that the defendant is a person of bad character or prone to violent behavior. [Bynum, 496 Mich at 625 - 626].

2018But an exception exists for “bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner[.]” MCL 691.1405.6 Further, the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity is itself limited by the no-fault act, “which generally abrogates ‘tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle,’ unless the damages come within an enumerated exception.” Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 75 ; 860 NW2d 67 (2014), quo

2018But an exception exists for “bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner[.]” MCL 691.1405.6 Further, the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity is itself limited by the no-fault act, “which generally abrogates ‘tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle,’ unless the damages come within an enumerated exception.” Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 75 ; 860 NW2d 67 (2014), quo

1997By voluntarily entering into the plea agreement, the defendant authorized the court to determine that *238 the defendant had considered his own financial situation and concluded that he has or will have the ability to pay. 22 c We also agree with the Court of Appeals in Hart that “the restitution agreement cannot be construed as establishing a waiver of the right to have a court review such things as ability to pay and resources,” but the statute does not “require [] the court to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the enumerated factors . . . .” Rather, the trial “court merely must consider

1997People v Hart, 211 Mich App 703, 707 ; 536 NW2d 605 (1995); Grant, supra. Here, we agree with the trial court that an evidentiary hearing to determine defendant’s ability to make restitution was not required.

2021Instead, plaintiff’s argument under this section rests on this Court’s decision in Southfield, 320 Mich App at 353 .

2017My colleagues focused on the enumerated factors in Mamon, 435 Mich 1 .

2014Relevant to the present cases, MCL 500.3135(1), (2), and (3)(b) allow third-party tort actions for noneconomic damages if the “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement” threshold is met, while MCL 500.3135(3)(c) allows for third-party tort actions for certain kinds of economic damages, specifically “[d]amages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss . . . in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in” the sections applicable to those three 89 MCL 500.3135(3). 90 Hardy v Oakland Co, 461 Mich 561, 565 ; 607 NW2d 718 (2000

2014Relevant to the present cases, MCL 500.3135(1), (2), and (3)(b) allow third-party tort actions for noneconomic damages if the “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement” threshold is met, while MCL 500.3135(3)(c) allows for third-party tort actions for certain kinds of economic damages, specifically “[d]amages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss . . . in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in” the sections applicable to those three 89 MCL 500.3135(3). 90 Hardy v Oakland Co, 461 Mich 561, 565 ; 607 NW2d 718 (2000

2014Relevant to the present cases, MCL 500.3135(1), (2), and (3)(b) allow third-party tort actions for noneconomic damages if the “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement” threshold is met, while MCL 500.3135(3)(c) allows for third-party tort actions for certain kinds of economic damages, specifically “[d]amages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss . . . in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in” the sections applicable to those three 89 MCL 500.3135(3). 90 Hardy v Oakland Co, 461 Mich 561, 565 ; 607 NW2d 718 (2000

2014Relevant to the present cases, MCL 500.3135(1), (2), and (3)(b) allow third-party tort actions for noneconomic damages if the “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement” threshold is met, while MCL 500.3135(3)(c) allows for third-party tort actions for certain kinds of economic damages, specifically “[d]amages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss . . . in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in” the sections applicable to those three 89 MCL 500.3135(3). 90 Hardy v Oakland Co, 461 Mich 561, 565 ; 607 NW2d 718 (2000

2008Wood, supra at 588 .

2008Wood, supra at 588 , 321 N.W.2d 653 .

2007However, as we noted in Office Planning Group, Inc v Baraga-Houghton-Keweenaw Child Dev Bd, 472 Mich 479, 498 ; 697 NW2d 871 (2005), post-Cort cases have retreated from consideration of ah the enumerated factors, and now focus exclusively on evidence of legislative intent “ ‘to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.’ ” (Citation omitted.) See People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436 , 445 n 7; 719 NW2d 579 (2006) (“Because the Legislature did not provide a remedy in the statute, we may not create a remedy that only the Legislature has the power to create.”); Office Plannin

2007However, as we noted in Office Planning Group, Inc v Baraga-Houghton-Keweenaw Child Dev Bd, 472 Mich 479, 498 ; 697 NW2d 871 (2005), post-Cort cases have retreated from consideration of ah the enumerated factors, and now focus exclusively on evidence of legislative intent “ ‘to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.’ ” (Citation omitted.) See People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436 , 445 n 7; 719 NW2d 579 (2006) (“Because the Legislature did not provide a remedy in the statute, we may not create a remedy that only the Legislature has the power to create.”); Office Plannin

2007Bd., 472 Mich. 479, 498 , 697 N.W.2d 871 (2005), post- Cort cases have retreated from consideration of all the enumerated factors, and now focus exclusively on evidence of legislative intent "`to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.'" (Citation omitted.) [25] See People v. Anstey, 476 Mich. 436 , 445 n. 7, 719 N.W.2d 579 (2006) ("Because the Legislature did not provide a remedy in the statute, we may not create a remedy that only the Legislature has the power to create."); Office Planning Group, supra ; Grand Traverse Co, supra at 465, 538 N.W.2d 1 ("[W]e cann

2005Next, it is important to take notice of the fact that footnote 17 is not a general proposition enunciated by our Supreme Court, but rather it is tied directly to one factor, factor d, and the Court emphasized that the enumerated factors are “not meant to be exclusive nor are any of the individual factors meant to be dispositive by themselves.” Kreiner, supra at 133-134 .

1998Indeed, in In re Barlow, supra at 236 , the Michigan Supreme Court recognized that the best interests factors from the Child Custody Act could not simply be applied to the context of a termination of parental rights case: Since, however, cases [involving possible termination of parental rights] may arise, as does this one, not in the context of two known disputing parties, application of the best interest test to these cases will differ from evaluation of the enumerated factors in the context of a typical dispute arising under the Child Custody Act.

1997People v Hart, 211 Mich App 703, 707 ; 536 NW2d 605 (1995); Grant, supra. Here, we agree with the trial court that an evidentiary hearing to determine defendant’s ability to make restitution was not required.

1993People v Passeno, 195 Mich App 91, 103 ; 489 NW2d 152 (1992).

1993People v Passeno, 195 Mich App 91, 103 ; 489 NW2d 152 (1992).

1985II We apply the totality of circumstances test and the enumerated factors to the cases before us to conclude that in each instance the statement was not the product of a situation which overbore the defendant’s will, Rogers v Richmond, 365 US 534 ; 81 S Ct 735 ; 5 L Ed 2d 760 (1961).

1985II We apply the totality of circumstances test and the enumerated factors to the cases before us to conclude that in each instance the statement was not the product of a situation which overbore the defendant’s will, Rogers v Richmond, 365 US 534 ; 81 S Ct 735 ; 5 L Ed 2d 760 (1961).

1982In Crawley v Schick, 48 Mich App 728, 737 ; 211 NW2d 217 (1973), the Court enumerated the factors to be considered when determining disputed attorney fees: "Where the amount of attorney fees is in dispute each case must be reviewed in light of its own particular facts.

1982In Crawley v Schick, 48 Mich App 728, 737 ; 211 NW2d 217 (1973), the Court enumerated the factors to be considered when determining disputed attorney fees: "Where the amount of attorney fees is in dispute each case must be reviewed in light of its own particular facts.

1981In Askew v Macomber, 398 Mich 212, 217-218 ; 247 NW2d 288 (1976), the Court enumerated the factors to be considered under this approach: "Under the economic reality test, among the relevant factors to be used are (1) control of a worker’s duties, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the right to hire and fire and the right to discipline, and (4) the performance of the duties as an integral part of the employer’s business towards the accomplishment of a common goal.” Clearly, plaintiff Wheeler Longworth was not defendant’s employee under the economic reality test.

1981In Askew v Macomber, 398 Mich 212, 217-218 ; 247 NW2d 288 (1976), the Court enumerated the factors to be considered under this approach: "Under the economic reality test, among the relevant factors to be used are (1) control of a worker’s duties, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the right to hire and fire and the right to discipline, and (4) the performance of the duties as an integral part of the employer’s business towards the accomplishment of a common goal.” Clearly, plaintiff Wheeler Longworth was not defendant’s employee under the economic reality test.