enumerated factors in California

2026(In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 , 636 (Caden C.).) The first element, visitation, is “straightforward,” requiring that the “ ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The second element focuses on the child and is determined by taking into consideration factors such as “the age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 8 27 Cal.Ap

2022(In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 , 636 (Caden C.).) The first element, visitation, is “straightforward,” requiring that the “ ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The second element focuses on the child and is determined by taking into consideration factors such as “ ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the 18 parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid., citing In re Autum

2015The enumerated factors may be considered “[a]mong” others “under the particular circumstances of each case.” ’ [Citations.] ‘No single factor is determinative, and instead a court must examine all the circumstances to determine whether to apply the doctrine.’ ” ( Zoran, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 811–812; see Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at pp. 838–840.) We review the trial court’s alter ego ruling for substantial evidence, with “all conflicts in the evidence . . . resolved in favor of the respondent, and . . . all legitimate and reasonable inferences

2011The enumerated factors may be considered ‘[a]mong’ others ‘under the particular circumstances of each case.’ ” (Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 223, 249-250 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 ], citation omitted, quoting Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 825, 838-840 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 806 ].) Plaintiffs have proffered evidence to support only two of the above factors: that Cooper was the sole owner of all of the stock in the corporation, and that corporate formalities were disregarded. 3 Nevertheless, no single factor is determinative

2024The enumerated factors may be considered “[a]mong” others “under the particular circumstances of each case.”’” (Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799 , 811- 812; accord, Kao v. Joy Holiday, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.) With respect to a corporation’s liability for the acts of another company, courts have applied a variation of the alter ego doctrine, typically referred to as the joint enterprise or single- business-enterprise theory of liability. “‘The “single-business- 17 enterprise” theory is an equitable doctrine applied to reflect partnership-type liability principles when co

2022The enumerated factors may be considered “[a]mong” others “under the particular circumstances of each case.” ’ [Citations.] ‘No single factor is determinative, and instead a court must examine all the circumstances to determine whether to apply the doctrine.’ ” (Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799 , 811–812.) 2.

2024The enumerated factors may be considered “[a]mong” others “under the particular circumstances of each case.”’” (Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799 , 811- 812; accord, Kao v. Joy Holiday, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.) With respect to a corporation’s liability for the acts of another company, courts have applied a variation of the alter ego doctrine, typically referred to as the joint enterprise or single- business-enterprise theory of liability. “‘The “single-business- 17 enterprise” theory is an equitable doctrine applied to reflect partnership-type liability principles when co

2015The enumerated factors may be considered “[a]mong” others “under the particular circumstances of each case.” ’ [Citations.] ‘No single factor is determinative, and instead a court must examine all the circumstances to determine whether to apply the doctrine.’ ” ( Zoran, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 811–812; see Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at pp. 838–840.) We review the trial court’s alter ego ruling for substantial evidence, with “all conflicts in the evidence . . . resolved in favor of the respondent, and . . . all legitimate and reasonable inferences

2014The enumerated factors may be considered ‘[a]mong’ others ‘under the particular circumstances of each case.’ [Citation.]” (Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 223, 249-250 .) “Because it is founded on equitable principles, application of the alter ego [doctrine] ‘“is not made to depend upon prior decisions involving factual situations which appear to be similar. . . .”’ [Citations]” (Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1108 .) Rather, “‘[t]he conditions under which the corporate entity may be disregarded va

2011The enumerated factors may be considered ‘[a]mong’ others ‘under the particular circumstances of each case.’ ” (Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 223, 249-250 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 ], citation omitted, quoting Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 825, 838-840 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 806 ].) Plaintiffs have proffered evidence to support only two of the above factors: that Cooper was the sole owner of all of the stock in the corporation, and that corporate formalities were disregarded. 3 Nevertheless, no single factor is determinative

2022(Nationwide, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 326; see First Federal, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 729 [the UCL and FAL set forth “six relevant factors a court may consider in determining an appropriate penalty, and the court is authorized to impose a penalty based on evidence as to any one or more of the enumerated factors”].) “[A]lthough the civil penalties under the UCL and the FAL ‘may have a punitive or deterrent aspect, their primary purpose is to secure obedience to statutes and regulations imposed to assure important public policy objectives. ...

2022(Nationwide, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 326; see First Federal, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 729 [the UCL and FAL set forth “six relevant factors a court may consider in determining an appropriate penalty, and the court is authorized to impose a penalty based on evidence as to any one or more of the enumerated factors”].) “[A]lthough the civil penalties under the UCL and the FAL ‘may have a punitive or deterrent aspect, their primary purpose is to secure obedience to statutes and regulations imposed to assure important public policy objectives. ...

2022The focus of [both] statutory scheme[s] is preventative.’ ” (Nationwide, at p. 326; see First Federal, at p. 732 [“Civil penalties, like punitive damages, are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter future misconduct.”].) “We review the trial court’s imposition of … civil penalties under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Under this standard, ‘[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our notions of fairness for the trial court’s. [Citations.] “To merit reversal, both an abuse of discretion by the trial court must be ‘clear’ and the demonstration of it on appeal ‘strong[.]

2022The focus of [both] statutory scheme[s] is preventative.’ ” (Nationwide, at p. 326; see First Federal, at p. 732 [“Civil penalties, like punitive damages, are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter future misconduct.”].) “We review the trial court’s imposition of … civil penalties under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Under this standard, ‘[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our notions of fairness for the trial court’s. [Citations.] “To merit reversal, both an abuse of discretion by the trial court must be ‘clear’ and the demonstration of it on appeal ‘strong[.]

2022The focus of [both] statutory scheme[s] is preventative.’ ” (Nationwide, at p. 326; see First Federal, at p. 732 [“Civil penalties, like punitive damages, are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter future misconduct.”].) “We review the trial court’s imposition of … civil penalties under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Under this standard, ‘[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our notions of fairness for the trial court’s. [Citations.] “To merit reversal, both an abuse of discretion by the trial court must be ‘clear’ and the demonstration of it on appeal ‘strong[.]

2022The focus of [both] statutory scheme[s] is preventative.’ ” (Nationwide, at p. 326; see First Federal, at p. 732 [“Civil penalties, like punitive damages, are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter future misconduct.”].) “We review the trial court’s imposition of … civil penalties under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Under this standard, ‘[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our notions of fairness for the trial court’s. [Citations.] “To merit reversal, both an abuse of discretion by the trial court must be ‘clear’ and the demonstration of it on appeal ‘strong[.]

2022The focus of [both] statutory scheme[s] is preventative.’ ” (Nationwide, at p. 326; see First Federal, at p. 732 [“Civil penalties, like punitive damages, are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter future misconduct.”].) “We review the trial court’s imposition of … civil penalties under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Under this standard, ‘[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our notions of fairness for the trial court’s. [Citations.] “To merit reversal, both an abuse of discretion by the trial court must be ‘clear’ and the demonstration of it on appeal ‘strong[.]

2022The focus of [both] statutory scheme[s] is preventative.’ ” (Nationwide, at p. 326; see First Federal, at p. 732 [“Civil penalties, like punitive damages, are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter future misconduct.”].) “We review the trial court’s imposition of … civil penalties under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Under this standard, ‘[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our notions of fairness for the trial court’s. [Citations.] “To merit reversal, both an abuse of discretion by the trial court must be ‘clear’ and the demonstration of it on appeal ‘strong[.]

2010Otherwise, disclosure is not required." BWM's interpretation of section 1281.9 is certainly not justified by its text, which does no more than include the enumerated factors as "matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt about [whether] the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be impartial." If the enumerated grounds were exclusive, the duty to disclose would be far more limited than the Legislature obviously intended by requiring disclosure of " all matters " that might cause an informed reasonable person to doubt the arbitrator's ability to b

2010Otherwise, disclosure is not required." BWM's interpretation of section 1281.9 is certainly not justified by its text, which does no more than include the enumerated factors as "matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt about [whether] the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be impartial." If the enumerated grounds were exclusive, the duty to disclose would be far more limited than the Legislature obviously intended by requiring disclosure of " all matters " that might cause an informed reasonable person to doubt the arbitrator's ability to b

1988(See e.g., People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 282-286 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ]; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 10 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 671 P.2d 813 ] [requiring more explicit instructions in future cases].) Defendant reasons as follows: 1) although the jury was instructed to consider “all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case,” 2) the jury then heard a list of “factors” which it should “consider, take into account, and be guided by,” and therefore (3) “a reasonable juror might interpret [the instruction as requiri

1988(See e.g., People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 282-286 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ]; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 10 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 671 P.2d 813 ] [requiring more explicit instructions in future cases].) Defendant reasons as follows: 1) although the jury was instructed to consider “all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case,” 2) the jury then heard a list of “factors” which it should “consider, take into account, and be guided by,” and therefore (3) “a reasonable juror might interpret [the instruction as requiri

2026(In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re K.H. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 406 , 417–418.) “Adoption is the preferred plan and, absent an enumerated exception, the juvenile court is required to select adoption as the permanent plan. [Citation.] The burden falls to the parent to show that the termination of parental rights would be 9 detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions.” (Ibid.; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A), (B)(i)–(vi).) One of the exceptions to the preference for adoption is the beneficial relationship exception. (§

2026Guiding Principles “The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification efforts have failed.” (In re J.D. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 594 , 612.) At this hearing, “the juvenile court has three options: (1) to terminate parental rights and order adoption as a long-term plan; (2) to appoint a legal guardian for the dependent child; or (3) to order the child be placed in long-term foster care. [Citation.] Adoption is the preferred plan and, absent an enumerated exception, the juvenile court is required to select adoption as the pe

2023At this hearing “the juvenile court has three options: (1) to terminate parental rights and order adoption as a long-term plan; (2) to appoint a legal guardian for the dependent child; or (3) to order the child be placed in long-term foster care. [Citation.] Adoption is the preferred plan and, absent an enumerated exception, the juvenile court is required to select adoption as the permanent plan. [Citation.] The burden falls to the parent to show that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions.” (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529

2013DISCUSSION Adoption must be selected as the permanent plan for an adoptable child and parental rights must be terminated unless “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” due to an enumerated exception to adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such exception to termination of parental rights is if “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 .) Mother contends th

2026In addition to the enumerated factors, “the court may consider any other criteria that the court deems relevant to its decision, so long as the court identifies them on the record, provides a statement of reasons for adopting them, and states why the defendant does or does not satisfy the criteria.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(11); accord, In re Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1050 .) The trial court also has discretion to resentence appellant to life without the possibility of parole at the hearing. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(10).) As in Lynch and Salazar, the trial court’s negative finding on the rehabilita

2026In addition to the enumerated factors, “the court may consider any other criteria that the court deems relevant to its decision, so long as the court identifies them on the record, provides a statement of reasons for adopting them, and states why the defendant does or does not satisfy the criteria.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(11); accord, In re Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1050 .) The trial court also has discretion to resentence appellant to life without the possibility of parole at the hearing. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(10).) As in Lynch and Salazar, the trial court’s negative finding on the rehabilita

2021The exception provides that the court shall terminate parental rights unless “[t]he court finds a compelling reason 4 for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The existence of this relationship is determined by taking into consideration “the age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and ch

2021The exception provides that the court shall terminate parental rights unless “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The existence of this relationship is determined by taking into consideration “[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and ch

2026(Id. at p. 640.) Because Mother argues that the court erred in concluding she had not met her burden of proof, the more precise question is “whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the [parent] as a matter of law.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517 , 1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 1010 & fn. 7; see In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1153 .) We ask “whether the [parent’s] evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that i

2025(Id. at p. 578; see also Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 444 [trial court’s definition of “ ‘reckless indifference to human life’ as ‘knowingly engag[ing] in criminal activity that he or she knows involves a grave risk of death’ ” was “one that a jury may reasonably be expected to understand”].) Because of this, a trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to define for a jury “reckless indifference to human life,” whether by inclusion of the enumerated factors or anything else.

2025(Id. at p. 578; see also Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 444 [trial court’s definition of “ ‘reckless indifference to human life’ as ‘knowingly engag[ing] in criminal activity that he or she knows involves a grave risk of death’ ” was “one that a jury may reasonably be expected to understand”].) Because of this, a trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to define for a jury “reckless indifference to human life,” whether by inclusion of the enumerated factors or anything else.

2024(People v. Yanaga, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 627; see Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 460 [“[I]t is well settled that when a case is remanded for resentencing after an appeal, the defendant is entitled to ‘all the normal rights and procedures available at his original sentencing’ . . . including consideration of any pertinent circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was imposed.”].) “[U]nless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise,” the trial court is “deemed to have” considered all of the enumerated factors.

2024The enumerated factors may be considered “[a]mong” others “under the particular circumstances of each case.”’” (Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799 , 811- 812; accord, Kao v. Joy Holiday, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.) With respect to a corporation’s liability for the acts of another company, courts have applied a variation of the alter ego doctrine, typically referred to as the joint enterprise or single- business-enterprise theory of liability. “‘The “single-business- 17 enterprise” theory is an equitable doctrine applied to reflect partnership-type liability principles when co