enumerated factors in Arizona

2016Because the paramount goal of the inquiry is to determine what will serve the children’s best interests, Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102, ¶ 18 (2003), § 25-403 provides that the court must consider and make specific findings regarding “all” factors relevant to the children’s well-being, A.R.S. § 25-403; see also Downs v. Scheffler, 206 Ariz. 496, 499, 500, ¶¶ 8, 13 (App. 2003).

2015See Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 10 (App. 2013) (citing Hays, 205 Ariz. at 102, ¶ 18 ).

2025To do so, we consider the enumerated factors in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), as this court applied in Haverstick, 234 Ariz. at 167 , ¶ 15: (1) “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,” (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,” (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,” (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence,” (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,” (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may ra

2022To determine whether the law’s punitive effects outweigh its regulatory purpose, we consider the enumerated factors in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 168–69 (1963), as this court applied in Haverstick, 234 Ariz. at 167 ¶ 15: [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alt

2025To do so, we consider the enumerated factors in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), as this court applied in Haverstick, 234 Ariz. at 167 , ¶ 15: (1) “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,” (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,” (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,” (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence,” (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,” (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may ra

2025To do so, we consider the enumerated factors in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), as this court applied in Haverstick, 234 Ariz. at 167 , ¶ 15: (1) “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,” (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,” (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,” (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence,” (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,” (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may ra

2023See City of Phoenix v. Superior Court (Ariz. State Hosp.), 139 Ariz. 175, 178 (1984) (noting “special or specific statutory provisions will usually control over those that are general”).

2022See Haverstick, 234 Ariz. at 167 ¶ 16; see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003).

2022To determine whether the law’s punitive effects outweigh its regulatory purpose, we consider the enumerated factors in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 168–69 (1963), as this court applied in Haverstick, 234 Ariz. at 167 ¶ 15: [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alt

2022See Haverstick, 234 Ariz. at 167 ¶ 16; see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003).

2021Prizzia v. Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d 461, 468 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) (“Because it did not allow the parties to present evidence pertaining to the statutory factors, the trial court could not have based its decision on a proper review of those factors.”). ¶16 Mother nonetheless contends that the family court's failure to make a record under A.R.S. § 25–1010(D) of its conference with the Texas court analyzing the A.R.S. § 25–1037(B) provisions constituted harmless error, citing Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282 (1977).

2018See Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 5 .

2016Because the paramount goal of the inquiry is to determine what will serve the children’s best interests, Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102, ¶ 18 (2003), § 25-403 provides that the court must consider and make specific findings regarding “all” factors relevant to the children’s well-being, A.R.S. § 25-403; see also Downs v. Scheffler, 206 Ariz. 496, 499, 500, ¶¶ 8, 13 (App. 2003).

2015Nothing in the statute suggests that relatives are the intended beneficiaries of the kinship foster care program or that the program was designed to protect potential placements “against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred.” Sullivan, 237 Ariz. at 550, ¶ 9 , 354 P.3d 424 . ¶ 18 According to Grandparents, “the most compelling legally created duty” arises from Arizona Administrative Code (“A.AC.”) R65-6614.

2015Nothing in the statute suggests that relatives are the intended beneficiaries of the kinship foster care program or that the program was designed to protect potential placements “against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred.” Sullivan, 237 Ariz. at 550, ¶ 9 , 354 P.3d 424 . ¶ 18 According to Grandparents, “the most compelling legally created duty” arises from Arizona Administrative Code (“A.AC.”) R65-6614.

2015See Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 10 (App. 2013) (citing Hays, 205 Ariz. at 102, ¶ 18 ).

2010See Amparano v. ASARCO, Inc., 208 Ariz. 370, 375, ¶ 14 , 93 P.3d 1086, 1091 (App.2004). ¶ 7 In general, venue lies in the county where a defendant resides, unless the cause of action falls within an enumerated exception.

2010See Amparano v. ASARCO, Inc., 208 Ariz. 370, 375, ¶ 14 , 93 P.3d 1086, 1091 (App.2004). ¶ 7 In general, venue lies in the county where a defendant resides, unless the cause of action falls within an enumerated exception.

2007County of Maricopa, 209 Ariz. 268 , 100 P.3d 18 (2004), forecloses this argument. ¶48 Approximately one month after the indictment, the State filed a notice simply stating its intent “to prove one or more of the enumerated factors contained in A.R.S. § 13-703(F).” Garza argues that the notice violated Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(i)(2), which now requires notice of specific alleged aggravating circumstances to be provided no later than sixty days after arraignment. ¶ 49 The current version of Rule 15.1, however, applies “only to cases in which the charging document was filed on or a

2007County of Maricopa, 209 Ariz. 268 , 100 P.3d 18 (2004), forecloses this argument. ¶48 Approximately one month after the indictment, the State filed a notice simply stating its intent “to prove one or more of the enumerated factors contained in A.R.S. § 13-703(F).” Garza argues that the notice violated Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(i)(2), which now requires notice of specific alleged aggravating circumstances to be provided no later than sixty days after arraignment. ¶ 49 The current version of Rule 15.1, however, applies “only to cases in which the charging document was filed on or a

1991See also Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Juvenile Action No. J-92130, 139 Ariz. 170 , 677 P.2d 943 (App.1984) (although a statute requiring monetary assessments and restitution orders in juvenile cases was recognized to serve the non-punitive, regulatory purposes of rehabilitation and restitution, it was held to be sufficiently penal to foreclose retroactive application).

1991See also Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Juvenile Action No. J-92130, 139 Ariz. 170 , 677 P.2d 943 (App.1984) (although a statute requiring monetary assessments and restitution orders in juvenile cases was recognized to serve the non-punitive, regulatory purposes of rehabilitation and restitution, it was held to be sufficiently penal to foreclose retroactive application).