enumerated factors in Washington

2003In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Boelter, 139 Wash.2d 81, 96 , 985 P.2d 328 (1999).

2003In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Boelter, 139 Wn.2d 81, 96 , 985 P.2d 328 (1999).

2003In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Boelter, 139 Wash.2d 81, 96 , 985 P.2d 328 (1999).

2003In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Boelter, 139 Wn.2d 81, 96 , 985 P.2d 328 (1999).

2000Cruz, 139 Wn.2d at 193 .

2000Cruz, 139 Wash.2d at 193 , 985 P.2d 384 .

2026While “an enumerated exception is not always necessary to find that a duty is owed to an individual and not to the public at large,” Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma, 193 Wn.2d 537 , 549, 442 P.3d 608 (2019), the public duty doctrine essentially asks “whether the government owes a duty to particular individuals.” Ehrhart v. King County, 195 Wn.2d 388 , 400, 460 P.3d 612 (2020).

2025Id.

2024As detailed in the Crossguns opinion, “Washington first held that such evidence may be admissible over 100 years ago, early in our state’s jurisprudence, though we did not then use the term ‘lustful disposition.’ We later adopted the label ‘lustful disposition.’” 199 Wn.2d 282, 290-91 , 505 P.3d 529 (2022) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Crowder, 119 Wash. 450, 452 , 205 P. 850 (1922)). - 14 - No. 86166-2-I/15 of evidence but argues that admission here was nonetheless proper under ER 404(b) to demonstrate motive, intent, opportunity, absence of mistake, and as res gestae.

2024As detailed in the Crossguns opinion, “Washington first held that such evidence may be admissible over 100 years ago, early in our state’s jurisprudence, though we did not then use the term ‘lustful disposition.’ We later adopted the label ‘lustful disposition.’” 199 Wn.2d 282, 290-91 , 505 P.3d 529 (2022) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Crowder, 119 Wash. 450, 452 , 205 P. 850 (1922)). - 14 - No. 86166-2-I/15 of evidence but argues that admission here was nonetheless proper under ER 404(b) to demonstrate motive, intent, opportunity, absence of mistake, and as res gestae.

2024As detailed in the Crossguns opinion, “Washington first held that such evidence may be admissible over 100 years ago, early in our state’s jurisprudence, though we did not then use the term ‘lustful disposition.’ We later adopted the label ‘lustful disposition.’” 199 Wn.2d 282, 290-91 , 505 P.3d 529 (2022) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Crowder, 119 Wash. 450, 452 , 205 P. 850 (1922)). - 14 - No. 86166-2-I/15 of evidence but argues that admission here was nonetheless proper under ER 404(b) to demonstrate motive, intent, opportunity, absence of mistake, and as res gestae.

2024As detailed in the Crossguns opinion, “Washington first held that such evidence may be admissible over 100 years ago, early in our state’s jurisprudence, though we did not then use the term ‘lustful disposition.’ We later adopted the label ‘lustful disposition.’” 199 Wn.2d 282, 290-91 , 505 P.3d 529 (2022) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Crowder, 119 Wash. 450, 452 , 205 P. 850 (1922)). - 14 - No. 86166-2-I/15 of evidence but argues that admission here was nonetheless proper under ER 404(b) to demonstrate motive, intent, opportunity, absence of mistake, and as res gestae.

2019The rescue doctrine recognizes that a duty to exercise reasonable care arises when a person undertakes "to render aid to or warn a person in danger." Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 293 , 299, 545 P.2d 13 (1975).

2019The rescue doctrine recognizes that a duty to exercise reasonable care arises when a person undertakes "to render aid to or warn a person in danger." Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 293 , 299, 545 P.2d 13 (1975).

2019While there are four exceptions to the public duty doctrine that provide for liability even in the face of otherwise public duties, see Munich, 175 Wash.2d at 879 , 288 P.3d 328 , an enumerated exception is not always necessary to find that a duty is owed to an individual and not to the public at large. 7 Instead, the public duty doctrine is simply a "focusing tool" to ensure that the government is not held liable in tort for duties owed solely to the general public.

2019While there are four exceptions to the public duty doctrine that provide for liability even in the face of otherwise public duties, see Munich, 175 Wash.2d at 879 , 288 P.3d 328 , an enumerated exception is not always necessary to find that a duty is owed to an individual and not to the public at large. 7 Instead, the public duty doctrine is simply a "focusing tool" to ensure that the government is not held liable in tort for duties owed solely to the general public.

2016Hsu, 852 F.2d at 410 . ¶113 The touchstone of the analysis under Mosley is whether a “review of the circumstances” leading up to the statements made to police show the “ ‘right to cut off *134 questioning’ was fully respected.” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474). ¶114 Here, the undisputed findings support the conclusion that the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored.

2016Hsu, 852 F.2d at 410 . ¶113 The touchstone of the analysis under Mosley is whether a “review of the circumstances” leading up to the statements made to police show the “ ‘right to cut off *134 questioning’ was fully respected.” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474). ¶114 Here, the undisputed findings support the conclusion that the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored.

2012Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. McCallum, 2002 WI App 259 , 258 Wis. 2d 210 , 655 N.W.2d 474 , 486 n.14.

2012Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. McCallum, 2002 WI App 259 , 258 Wis. 2d 210 , 655 N.W.2d 474 , 486 n.14.

2009State v. Cooper, 130 Wash.2d 770, 774 , 928 P.2d 406 (1996); State v. Pink, 144 Wash.App. 945, 952 , 185 P.3d 634 (2008).

2009State v. Cooper, 130 Wash.2d 770, 774 , 928 P.2d 406 (1996); State v. Pink, 144 Wash.App. 945, 952 , 185 P.3d 634 (2008).

2009Authority to arrest was not an enumerated requirement at common law. [18] Cf. State v. Malone, 106 Wash.2d 607 , 610 n. 1, 612, 724 P.2d 364 (1986) (holding an Idaho police officer had authority to pursue a suspect into Washington under common law "fresh pursuit" doctrine — even though the officer had no authority to arrest under Idaho law — because eluding an officer was a felony under Washington law). [19] The State lacks jurisdiction over Indians who breaks laws on reservations, except for eight exceptions under RCW 37.12.010 in which the State has concurrent jurisdiction.

2009Authority to arrest was not an enumerated requirement at common law. [18] Cf. State v. Malone, 106 Wash.2d 607 , 610 n. 1, 612, 724 P.2d 364 (1986) (holding an Idaho police officer had authority to pursue a suspect into Washington under common law "fresh pursuit" doctrine — even though the officer had no authority to arrest under Idaho law — because eluding an officer was a felony under Washington law). [19] The State lacks jurisdiction over Indians who breaks laws on reservations, except for eight exceptions under RCW 37.12.010 in which the State has concurrent jurisdiction.

2009State v. Cooper, 130 Wash.2d 770, 774 , 928 P.2d 406 (1996); State v. Pink, 144 Wash.App. 945, 952 , 185 P.3d 634 (2008).

2009State v. Cooper, 130 Wash.2d 770, 774 , 928 P.2d 406 (1996); State v. Pink, 144 Wash.App. 945, 952 , 185 P.3d 634 (2008).

2000Cruz, 139 Wash.2d at 193 , 985 P.2d 384 .

1993App. 601, 606-07 , 699 P.2d 804 , review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1019 (1985), the court enumerated the factors showing prejudice as (1) the strength of the State's evidence on each count; (2) the clarity *887 of defenses to each count; (3) the propriety of the court's instruction to the jury to consider the evidence of each crime separately; and (4) the admissibility of the evidence of the other crimes, even if they had been tried separately or never charged or joined.