enumerated factors in Texas

2015See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) ("Only one predicate finding under section 161.001(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest."); see also Latham v. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 177 S.W.3d 341, 348 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2005, no pet.) ("A court may base a termination of parental rights upon a finding that a parent engaged in conduct described in one of the alleged grounds, plus a finding that termination is in the best interest of the children.").

2015See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362 .

2015See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) ("Only one predicate finding under section 161.001(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest."); see also Latham v. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 177 S.W.3d 341, 348 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2005, no pet.) ("A court may base a termination of parental rights upon a finding that a parent engaged in conduct described in one of the alleged grounds, plus a finding that termination is in the best interest of the children.").

2015See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) ("Only one predicate finding under section 161.001(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest."); see also Latham v. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 177 S.W.3d 341, 348 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2005, no pet.) ("A court may base a termination of parental rights upon a finding that a parent engaged in conduct described in one of the alleged grounds, plus a finding that termination is in the best interest of the children.").

2010Appellant’s analysis is flawed because, as Evans instructs, the enumerated factors are merely links which “Texas courts have recognized as sufficient, either singly or in combination, to establish a person’s possession of contraband.” Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 (emphasis added).

2009Appellant's analysis is flawed because, as Evans instructs, the enumerated factors are merely links which "Texas courts have recognized as sufficient, either singly or in combination , to establish a person's possession of contraband." Evans , 202 S.W.3d at 162 (emphasis added).

2024Jones v. State Page 5 Prible, 175 S.W.3d at 733 .

2024Prible, 175 S.W.3d at 733 .

2025See Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Tex. Crim.

2015Because alibi was merely a negation of elements in the State's case, its inclusion would be superfluous, and in fact, would be an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Tex. Crim.

2015See In re M.A.N.M., 231 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); C.M.

2014See In re M.A.N.M., 231 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); C.M.

2011Ass’n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that ―whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case‖ but that it considered the enumerated factors relevant to that determination); see also Cox, 300 S.W.3d at 433–34 (noting that 40 and we agree that they have relevance, particularly in determining whether an official act underlies the constructive discharge. 85 But we disagree that an employee may not prove constructive discharge without establishing these factors.86 If the employee shows that, considering the circumstances, a reasonable person i

2011Ass’n , 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that “whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case” but that it considered the enumerated factors relevant to that determination); see also Cox , 300 S.W.3d at 43 3–34 (noting that the Fifth Circuit has considered those factors in determining a constructive discharge claim). [85] See Suders , 542 U.S. at 1 4 8, 124 S. Ct. at 2355 (stating that “when an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge,” the Ellerth / Faragher affirmative defense may be asserted by the employer). [86] See,

2011Ass’n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that ―whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case‖ but that it considered the enumerated factors relevant to that determination); see also Cox, 300 S.W.3d at 433–34 (noting that 40 and we agree that they have relevance, particularly in determining whether an official act underlies the constructive discharge. 85 But we disagree that an employee may not prove constructive discharge without establishing these factors.86 If the employee shows that, considering the circumstances, a reasonable person i

2011Ass’n , 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that “whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case” but that it considered the enumerated factors relevant to that determination); see also Cox , 300 S.W.3d at 43 3–34 (noting that the Fifth Circuit has considered those factors in determining a constructive discharge claim). [85] See Suders , 542 U.S. at 1 4 8, 124 S. Ct. at 2355 (stating that “when an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge,” the Ellerth / Faragher affirmative defense may be asserted by the employer). [86] See,

2003And, in applying the enumerated factors above, we find that the admission of the shotgun and the marijuana had an "undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis." See id.; Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (stating that unfair prejudice refers to a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, an emotional one).

2003And, in appljung the enumerated factors above, we find that the admission of the shotgun and the marijuana had an “undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis.” See id.; Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (stating that unfair prejudice refers to a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, an emotional one).

2018See id. (providing that article 42.037(h) requires neither that the trial court render findings nor that revocations be conditioned on the quantity or quality of evidence adduced as to the enumerated factors).

2017The trial court was not required to weigh the factors in any particular manner; revocation is not “conditioned on the quantity or quality of evidence adduced as to the enumerated factors.” Bryant, 391 S.W.3d at 93 .

2022Forbes v. State Page 15 Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641-42 (Tex. Crim.

2021App. 2011) (citing Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex. Crim.

2021Brown explained that “[a]ll the signs I [saw] leading up to the cause of death [were] like the baby had been tortured or abused for a long period of time.” Owen offered a similar opinion: “Given the full context of all the information I had available to me . . . it’s unequivocal that this child was seriously abused over a long period of time; and these injuries are reflective of that abuse.” Although not an enumerated exception in Rule 404(b), evidence of another crime, wrong, or act also “may be admissible as same-transaction contextual evidence where ‘several crimes are intermixed, or blende

2017See Hitt v. State, 53 S.W.3d 697, 705 (Tex. App.— Austin 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding that article 38.37 supersedes Rule 404); McCulloch v. State, 39 S.W.3d 678, 684 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding that article 38.37 eliminates necessity of proving evidence falls within Rule 404(b)’s exceptions).

2017See Hitt v. State, 53 S.W.3d 697, 705 (Tex. App.— Austin 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding that article 38.37 supersedes Rule 404); McCulloch v. State, 39 S.W.3d 678, 684 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding that article 38.37 eliminates necessity of proving evidence falls within Rule 404(b)’s exceptions).

2015See Edwards, 343 S.W.3d at 221 . 2.

2015Because Judge Sauce-do considered floodwater.quality, an irrelevant factor not contained within the Ordinance, we determine the trial court erred when it concluded that Judge Saucedo did not abuse his discretion in considering floodwater quality. .See Dallas Morning News, 861 S.W.2d at 536; see also S. Plains Lamesa R.R., Ltd., 52 S.W.3d at 774 .

2015Martin, 459 S.W.3d at 557 (holding that under section 51.003(b)(5) of Property Code trial court could consider evidence of “the necessity and amount of any discount to be applied 14 to the future sales price” of property, even though that evidence was not within the historical “willing buyer-willing seller” construct).

2011Ass’n , 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that “whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case” but that it considered the enumerated factors relevant to that determination); see also Cox , 300 S.W.3d at 43 3–34 (noting that the Fifth Circuit has considered those factors in determining a constructive discharge claim). [85] See Suders , 542 U.S. at 1 4 8, 124 S. Ct. at 2355 (stating that “when an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge,” the Ellerth / Faragher affirmative defense may be asserted by the employer). [86] See,

2011Ass’n , 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that “whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case” but that it considered the enumerated factors relevant to that determination); see also Cox , 300 S.W.3d at 43 3–34 (noting that the Fifth Circuit has considered those factors in determining a constructive discharge claim). [85] See Suders , 542 U.S. at 1 4 8, 124 S. Ct. at 2355 (stating that “when an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge,” the Ellerth / Faragher affirmative defense may be asserted by the employer). [86] See,

2011Ass’n , 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that “whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case” but that it considered the enumerated factors relevant to that determination); see also Cox , 300 S.W.3d at 43 3–34 (noting that the Fifth Circuit has considered those factors in determining a constructive discharge claim). [85] See Suders , 542 U.S. at 1 4 8, 124 S. Ct. at 2355 (stating that “when an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge,” the Ellerth / Faragher affirmative defense may be asserted by the employer). [86] See,

2011Ass’n , 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that “whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case” but that it considered the enumerated factors relevant to that determination); see also Cox , 300 S.W.3d at 43 3–34 (noting that the Fifth Circuit has considered those factors in determining a constructive discharge claim). [85] See Suders , 542 U.S. at 1 4 8, 124 S. Ct. at 2355 (stating that “when an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge,” the Ellerth / Faragher affirmative defense may be asserted by the employer). [86] See,

2009App. 2007); Russeau, 171 S.W .3d at 881; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 592 (1993). 176 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90. 177 Kelly v. State, 824 S.W .2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim .

2003See Feltham, 41 S.W.3d at 387 (citing Baker, 985 S.W.2d at 277 ).

2003See Feltham, 41 S.W.3d at 387 (citing Baker, 985 S.W.2d at 277 ).

2003See Feltham, 41 S.W.3d at 387 (citing Baker, 985 S.W.2d at 277 ).

2003See Feltham, 41 S.W.3d at 387 (citing Baker, 985 S.W.2d at 277 ).