17 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dorsey v. Tarpleygreen1 sentence2025The Court in Dorsey v. Tarpley, 381 Md. 109, 118 (2003), similarly confirmed that if, “based on the evidence, it is found that there was no parental mutual agreement” on the name “at birth, the [court] should be 3 In Schroeder, this Court enumerated the factors to be considered in the best interest analysis. | 1 | 1 |
Barton v. Hirshberggreen2 sentences2013See Barton, 137 Md.App. at 20 , 767 A.2d 874 . 2013See Barton, 137 Md.App. at 20 , 767 A.2d 874 . | 1 | 1 |
Simonds v. Simondsgreen2 sentences2007See FL § 11 — 106(b) (stating that the court shall consider all the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award, including the enumerated factors); see also, Simonds, supra, 165 Md.App. at 604-05, 886 A.2d 158 (noting that the enumerated factors in FL § 11-106(b) are “non-exclusive”). 2007See FL § 11 — 106(b) (stating that the court shall consider all the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award, including the enumerated factors); see also, Simonds, supra, 165 Md.App. at 604-05, 886 A.2d 158 (noting that the enumerated factors in FL § 11-106(b) are “non-exclusive”). | 1 | 1 |
Rucker v. Harford Countygreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275, 295 , 558 A.2d 399 (1989)(the doctrine of ejusdem generis means that when general words in a statute follow the designation of particular things, the general words are construed to include only those things of the same class or general nature as those specifically enumerated). 2003See, e.g., Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275, 295 , 558 A.2d 399 (1989)(the doctrine of ejusdem generis means that when general words in a statute follow the designation of particular things, the general words are construed to include only those things of the same class or general nature as those specifically enumerated). | 1 | 1 |
Folk v. Stategreen2 sentences2001The other enumerated factors were whether (1) "the contraband was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of the defendant;” (2) the defendant exercised ownership or some other kind of possessory interest in the location where the drugs were found; and (3) whether the circumstances indicated that "the defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.” Folk, 11 Md.App. at 518 , 275 A.2d 184 . 2 . 2001The other enumerated factors were whether (1) "the contraband was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of the defendant;” (2) the defendant exercised ownership or some other kind of possessory interest in the location where the drugs were found; and (3) whether the circumstances indicated that "the defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.” Folk, 11 Md.App. at 518 , 275 A.2d 184 . 2 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
MacKall v. State
green
2 sentences2024McEvoy’s testimony that the Del-Ton AR-15 was the “gun she was looking for[,]” there was “[n]o other testimony . . . [that] 7 specified [the stolen gun] was a Del-Ton AR-15[.]” Defense counsel compared the case to Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100 (1978), and stated that under Mackall, to “convict a person for carrying a deadly weapon . . . the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the purported deadly weapon did not fall within” an enumerated exception to the statutory definition of a “dangerous and deadly weapon” under Section 36(a) of what was then Article 27 of the Maryland C 2024McEvoy’s testimony that the Del-Ton AR-15 was the “gun she was looking for[,]” there was “[n]o other testimony . . . [that] 7 specified [the stolen gun] was a Del-Ton AR-15[.]” Defense counsel compared the case to Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100 (1978), and stated that under Mackall, to “convict a person for carrying a deadly weapon . . . the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the purported deadly weapon did not fall within” an enumerated exception to the statutory definition of a “dangerous and deadly weapon” under Section 36(a) of what was then Article 27 of the Maryland C | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Long v. Long
green
1 sentence2021Ms. Wasyluszko, however, has directed us to two instructive cases: Long v. Long, 129 Md. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hyle v. Motor Vehicle Administration
green
1 sentence2010Hyle , 348 Md. *83 at 153, 702 A.2d at 764 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Prince v. State
green
2 sentences2003In Prince , we held that statute constitutional because consideration of the enumerated factors therein “guaranteefs] the trustworthiness of the child’s statements.” Id. at 302 , 748 A.2d 1078 . *554 Although the challenged statement by Tiarah was not admitted under this statutory exception, these same factors provide a relevant framework for our Sixth Amendment review. 2003In Prince , we held that statute constitutional because consideration of the enumerated factors therein “guaranteefs] the trustworthiness of the child’s statements.” Id. at 302 , 748 A.2d 1078 . *554 Although the challenged statement by Tiarah was not admitted under this statutory exception, these same factors provide a relevant framework for our Sixth Amendment review. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Kirwan v. the Diamondback
green
2 sentences1999The recent case of Kirwan v. The Diamondback, supra, 352 Md. 74 , 721 A.2d 196 , illustrates that the PIA’s preference for disclosure mitigates against any interpretation that would expand the scope of an enumerated exception to the Act. 1999The recent case of Kirwan v. The Diamondback, supra, 352 Md. 74 , 721 A.2d 196 , illustrates that the PIA’s preference for disclosure mitigates against any interpretation that would expand the scope of an enumerated exception to the Act. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Tracey v. Tracey
green
2 sentences1994But, as we observed in Tracey, supra, a number of the enumerated factors are clearly equitable in nature, with little or no relation to the economic situations of the parties. 328 Md. at 391 -92 n. 3, 614 A.2d 590 . 1994But, as we observed in Tracey, supra, a number of the enumerated factors are clearly equitable in nature, with little or no relation to the economic situations of the parties. 328 Md. at 391 -92 n. 3, 614 A.2d 590 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
White v. State
green
2 sentences1993Citing White v. State, 324 Md. 626 , 598 A.2d 187 (1991), the State maintains that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it decided that the evidence that the victim’s past sexual *463 activity was not sufficiently linked to the facts of the case to be relevant to the victim’s alleged motive to falsify the rape charge. 1993Citing White v. State, 324 Md. 626 , 598 A.2d 187 (1991), the State maintains that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it decided that the evidence that the victim’s past sexual *463 activity was not sufficiently linked to the facts of the case to be relevant to the victim’s alleged motive to falsify the rape charge. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Hutchinson
green
2 sentences1992Id. at 203 , 411 A.2d at 1038 . 1992Id. at 203 , 411 A.2d at 1038 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Smiley v. Atkinson
green
2 sentences1991In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that appeal from a continuance is neither an enumerated exception to the final judgment rule, 61 Md.App. at 163, 485 A.2d at 697, citing Maryland Courts and Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 12-303 and Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md.App. 543 , 280 A.2d 277 (1971), aff'd, 265 Md. 129 , 287 A.2d 770 (1972), nor appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 61 Md. 1991In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that appeal from a continuance is neither an enumerated exception to the final judgment rule, 61 Md.App. at 163, 485 A.2d at 697, citing Maryland Courts and Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 12-303 and Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md.App. 543 , 280 A.2d 277 (1971), aff'd, 265 Md. 129 , 287 A.2d 770 (1972), nor appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 61 Md. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Smiley v. Atkinson
green
2 sentences1991In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that appeal from a continuance is neither an enumerated exception to the final judgment rule, 61 Md.App. at 163, 485 A.2d at 697, citing Maryland Courts and Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 12-303 and Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md.App. 543 , 280 A.2d 277 (1971), aff'd, 265 Md. 129 , 287 A.2d 770 (1972), nor appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 61 Md. 1991In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that appeal from a continuance is neither an enumerated exception to the final judgment rule, 61 Md.App. at 163, 485 A.2d at 697, citing Maryland Courts and Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 12-303 and Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md.App. 543 , 280 A.2d 277 (1971), aff'd, 265 Md. 129 , 287 A.2d 770 (1972), nor appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 61 Md. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Staley v. Staley
green
2 sentences1985This was such a case. *280 Section 12-103(b) states: “Before a court may award costs and counsel fees under this section, the court shall consider: (1) the financial status of each party; (2) the needs of each party; and (3) whether there was substantial justification for bringing or defending the proceeding.” 5 In Staley v. Staley, 25 Md.App. 99, 112 , 335 A.2d 114 , cert. denied 275 Md. 755 (1975), we viewed this statute as making a person seeking child support payments “a privileged suitor” who was “entitled to counsel fees and court costs____” The “entitled” language may have been a bit ex 1985This was such a case. *280 Section 12-103(b) states: “Before a court may award costs and counsel fees under this section, the court shall consider: (1) the financial status of each party; (2) the needs of each party; and (3) whether there was substantial justification for bringing or defending the proceeding.” 5 In Staley v. Staley, 25 Md.App. 99, 112 , 335 A.2d 114 , cert. denied 275 Md. 755 (1975), we viewed this statute as making a person seeking child support payments “a privileged suitor” who was “entitled to counsel fees and court costs____” The “entitled” language may have been a bit ex | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Grant v. Zich
green
2 sentences1984In Grant v. Zich, 53 Md.App. 610, 618 , 456 A.2d 75 , cert. granted, 296 Md. 110 (1983), we stated that the chancellor is not “necessarily required to go through a detailed checklist of the statutory factors. . . . ” Our review of the record and the chancellor’s memorandum opinion persuades us that the chancellor gave due consideration to the enumerated factors. 1984In Grant v. Zich, 53 Md.App. 610, 618 , 456 A.2d 75 , cert. granted, 296 Md. 110 (1983), we stated that the chancellor is not “necessarily required to go through a detailed checklist of the statutory factors. . . . ” Our review of the record and the chancellor’s memorandum opinion persuades us that the chancellor gave due consideration to the enumerated factors. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.