enumerated factors in Colorado

2025We disagree. ¶ 44 Under section 13-17-103(1), C.R.S. 2024, a court must make “specific factual findings” regarding the enumerated factors “only when granting an award of fees, not when denying an award.” Munoz v. Measner, 247 P.3d 1031, 1032 (Colo. 2011). “[W]hen denying attorney fees, the trial court must make sufficient findings such that adequate appellate review can be exercised.” Id. 25 ¶ 45 The Tracys requested attorney fees related to the Surofcheks’ pursuit of their abuse of process counterclaim after that portion of the original judgment was reversed.

2025We disagree. ¶ 44 Under section 13-17-103(1), C.R.S. 2024, a court must make “specific factual findings” regarding the enumerated factors “only when granting an award of fees, not when denying an award.” Munoz v. Measner, 247 P.3d 1031, 1032 (Colo. 2011). “[W]hen denying attorney fees, the trial court must make sufficient findings such that adequate appellate review can be exercised.” Id. 25 ¶ 45 The Tracys requested attorney fees related to the Surofcheks’ pursuit of their abuse of process counterclaim after that portion of the original judgment was reversed.

2025See People in Interest of I.J.O., 2019 COA 151, ¶ 23 (requiring juvenile court to make explicit findings regarding any factor in section 19-3-604(2) it considers to be relevant); cf. People in Interest of A.M.K., 68 P.3d 563, 565-66 (Colo. App. 2003) (noting that district court need not make findings on each and every statutory best interests factor, provided the court considered the “pertinent factors”).

2025See People in Interest of I.J.O., 2019 COA 151, ¶ 23 (requiring juvenile court to make explicit findings regarding any factor in section 19-3-604(2) it considers to be relevant); cf. People in Interest of A.M.K., 68 P.3d 563, 565-66 (Colo. App. 2003) (noting that district court need not make findings on each and every statutory best interests factor, provided the court considered the “pertinent factors”).

2019See State v. Medved , 2019 CO 1 , ¶ 19, 433 P.3d 33 , 37 ("[I]n interpreting a statute, we must accept the General Assembly's choice of language and not add or imply words that simply are not there." (quoting People v. Diaz , 2015 CO 28 , ¶ 15, 347 P.3d 621 , 625 )); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 94 (2012) ("[An] absent provision cannot be supplied by the courts."). ¶17 While the enumerated factors might implicate certain potentially privileged information (or at least confidential information), nowhere does the statute grant Brown th

2019See State v. Medved , 2019 CO 1 , ¶ 19, 433 P.3d 33 , 37 ("[I]n interpreting a statute, we must accept the General Assembly's choice of language and not add or imply words that simply are not there." (quoting People v. Diaz , 2015 CO 28 , ¶ 15, 347 P.3d 621 , 625 )); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 94 (2012) ("[An] absent provision cannot be supplied by the courts."). ¶17 While the enumerated factors might implicate certain potentially privileged information (or at least confidential information), nowhere does the statute grant Brown th

2019See State v. Medved , 2019 CO 1 , ¶ 19, 433 P.3d 33 , 37 ("[I]n interpreting a statute, we must accept the General Assembly's choice of language and not add or imply words that simply are not there." (quoting People v. Diaz , 2015 CO 28 , ¶ 15, 347 P.3d 621 , 625 )); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 94 (2012) ("[An] absent provision cannot be supplied by the courts."). ¶17 While the enumerated factors might implicate certain potentially privileged information (or at least confidential information), nowhere does the statute grant Brown th

2019See State v. Medved , 2019 CO 1 , ¶ 19, 433 P.3d 33 , 37 ("[I]n interpreting a statute, we must accept the General Assembly's choice of language and not add or imply words that simply are not there." (quoting People v. Diaz , 2015 CO 28 , ¶ 15, 347 P.3d 621 , 625 )); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 94 (2012) ("[An] absent provision cannot be supplied by the courts."). ¶17 While the enumerated factors might implicate certain potentially privileged information (or at least confidential information), nowhere does the statute grant Brown th

2014See Quezada, 731 P.2d at 734 (the enumerated factors a court should consider when examining whether a defendant invoked his rights are not exhaustive and a trial court need not make specific findings with respect to each factor).

2012Corp., 782 P.2d 13, 18 (Colo.1989) (citations omitted). 139 Here, many of the enumerated factors favored admitting the hearsay statements of Client 1 and Client 2.

2012One of those exceptions applies here: the statute explicitly waives a public entity's immunity for injuries resulting from the "operation of any public hospital." § 24-10-106(1)(b), C.R.S.2011. ' 19 When a public entity's immunity from suit is waived, a plaintiff's recovery is limited to $150,000 per occurrence from one or more public entities. § 24-10-114(1)(a), C.R.S.2011; Lee v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 229 (Colo.1986)(the cap on lability "provide[s] fiscal certainty to governmental operations and thereby secure[s] the continuing availability of these services to the public."

2012Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 274 (Colo.1995). 118 The CGIA provides immunity to all public entities from suit for all actions that lie in tort, or that could lie in tort, unless an enumerated exception applies. §§ 24-10-105, -106, -110, C.R.S.2011; Brescioni v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 158 , 155 (Colo.App.1998)(the CGIA provides public entities immunity from suit).

2008See Speedy Messenger, 129 P.3d at 1096 ; see also § 8-70-115(1)(d), C.R.S.2008 (document may satisfy the requirements of subsection (1)(c) if it demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of the factors that are appropriate to the parties' situation).

2005See People v. J.J.H., 17 P.3d 159 (Colo.2001); see also State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 500 (Colo.2000)(“If courts can give effect to the ordi *1034 nary meaning of words used by the legislature, the statute should be construed as written, giving full effect to the words chosen, as it is presumed that the General Assembly meant what it clearly said.”).

2005See People v. J.J.H., 17 P.3d 159 (Colo.2001); see also State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 500 (Colo.2000)(“If courts can give effect to the ordi *1034 nary meaning of words used by the legislature, the statute should be construed as written, giving full effect to the words chosen, as it is presumed that the General Assembly meant what it clearly said.”).

1992The Texas Supreme Court, moreover, rejected the enumerated factors risk-utility test altogether because of the "difficulty of formulating a series of specific factors which fact finders will be instructed to balance." Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex.1979). [11] We also note, however, that evidence of a feasible design alternative is not always necessary.

1992The Texas Supreme Court, moreover, rejected the enumerated factors risk-utility test altogether because of the "difficulty of formulating a series of specific factors which fact finders will be instructed to balance.” Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex.1979). .We also note, however, that evidence of a feasible design alternative is not always necessary.

1992See In re Marriage of Plummer, 735 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo.1987); Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 288 , 497 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1972).

1992See In re Marriage of Plummer, 735 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo.1987); Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 288 , 497 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1972).

1992See In re Marriage of Plummer, 735 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo.1987); Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 288 , 497 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1972).

1992See In re Marriage of Plummer, 735 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo.1987); Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 288 , 497 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1972).

1978See Commonwealth v. Moody, 382 A.2d 442, 449-50, n. 19 (Pa. 1977).