19 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schick v. Dept. of Agric. & Cons. Servicesgreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Schick v. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 599 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1992) (construing section 73.907, Florida Statutes (1987), which lists the factors to be considered in awarding fees for eminent domain proceedings). 1994Schick v. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Serv's, 599 So.2d 641, 643-44 (Fla. 1992) (footnote omitted). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cottongreen2 sentences1999See also State v. Cotton, 728 So.2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), rev. granted, No. 94,996, 737 So.2d 551 (Fla.1999). 1999See also State v. Cotton, 728 So.2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), rev. granted, No. 94,996, 737 So.2d 551 (Fla.1999). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Wisegreen2 sentences2000See State v. Wise, 744 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(holding that, pursuant to section 775.082(8)(d)1, the trial court has the responsibility to make findings of fact and exercise its discretion in determining the application of an enumerated exception to the mandatory sentence), review granted, 741 So.2d 1137 (1999). 1999Weekly D657 , 744 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), rev. granted, No. 95,230, 741 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 1999), we construed the statute in a way that reserved some discretion in the trial court for sentencing, by interpreting section 775.082(8)(d)l. as placing responsibility with the trial court to make findings of fact and exercise its discretion in determining the application of an enumerated exception to the mandatory sentence. | 1 | 3 |
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruengreen1 sentence2025See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 56–57 (explaining how surety laws did not lend support for state laws requiring an individual to show a special need to carry a firearm, because those state laws turned the analogy on its head). b. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Amend. to Fla. Rules of Civ. Proc.green1 sentence2014See, In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1996). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
Hartley v. Guetzloegreen2 sentences2012Id. at 612 (approving district court decision reversing the denial of attorney’s fees under section 768.79 based solely on the reasonableness of the rejection of the offer); see also Hartley v. Guetzloe, 712 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (reversing denial of attorney’s fees under legally sufficient offer of judgment because the trial court denied the motion based solely on one of the enumerated factors under section 768.79(7)(b)). 2012Id. at 612 (approving district court decision reversing the denial of attorney’s fees under section 768.79 based solely on the reasonableness of the rejection of the offer); see also Hartley v. Guetzloe, 712 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (reversing denial of attorney’s fees under legally sufficient offer of judgment because the trial court denied the motion based solely on one of the enumerated factors under section 768.79(7)(b)). | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Mooregreen1 sentence1993In reviewing the trial court's decision to award permanent alimony, this court "must affirm if there is a reasonable basis in the record for such a determination." Moore v. Moore, 543 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (citing Walter v. Walter, 464 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1985), and Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)). | 1 | 1 |
Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. Colemangreen1 sentence1985See Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. Coleman, 458 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Regency Inn v. Johnsongreen1 sentence1985Whether the acceptance of a particular job with lower earnings amounts to a voluntary limitation [of employment] should be determined on the enumerated factors [which appear in Regency Inn v. Johnson, 422 So.2d 870, 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) ] (including of course availability of jobs) and not based simply on a requirement for continued diligent search by claimant after completion of his normal work schedule. | 1 | 1 |
Foley Lumber Co. v. Koestergreen1 sentence1976In Foley Lumber Co. v. Koester, supra, at 638-639, the Court enumerated the factors which in that case established privity between an owner and a materialman: the owner went to see the materialman to get a price for tile work; the owner returned later to select the tile and its colors; when the time came to install the tile, the owner phoned the materialman to tell him to install the tile according to the colors, materials, and prices previously agreed upon between them; the bill for the merchandise was made directly to the owner and not the contractor; the materialman did not know the contrac | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rollinson v. Stategreen1 sentence2000But cf. Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585, 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(Gross, J., concurring specially)(observing that a "recent amendment to the statute nullifies our reading of the statute in State v. Wise ")(citing Ch. 99-188, Laws of Fla. (1998 Supp.)). [4] The same question has been certified in other cases. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak
green
2 sentences2018In TGI Friday's , the Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the proposition that "award and entitlement amount to the same thing, and thus the judge could properly use the enumerated factors of subsection (7)(b) as the basis for denying all fees to an otherwise qualifying offeror." Id. at 612 . 2018In TGI Friday's , the Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the proposition that "award and entitlement amount to the same thing, and thus the judge could properly use the enumerated factors of subsection (7)(b) as the basis for denying all fees to an otherwise qualifying offeror." Id. at 612 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
KENNETH WHITTAKER v. STATE OF FLORIDA
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 272-73 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Oyler v. Boles
green
2 sentences2000Of course, a defendant may still mount an equal protection challenge where prosecutorial discretion is alleged to have been deliberately exercised pursuant to an "unjustifiable standard." Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(observing that, "[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as r 2000Of course, a defendant may still mount an equal protection challenge where prosecutorial discretion is alleged to have been deliberately exercised pursuant to an "unjustifiable standard." Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(observing that, "[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as r | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2000Of course, a defendant may still mount an equal protection challenge where prosecutorial discretion is alleged to have been deliberately exercised pursuant to an "unjustifiable standard." Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(observing that, "[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as r 2000Of course, a defendant may still mount an equal protection challenge where prosecutorial discretion is alleged to have been deliberately exercised pursuant to an "unjustifiable standard." Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(observing that, "[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as r | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Kennedy v. Kennedy
green
1 sentence1994The majority also found reversible error based on the court's failure to make findings of fact relative to the enumerated factors. 622 So.2d at 1034 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Moreno v. Moreno
green
1 sentence1993There is no indication that the trial court did not consider the other enumerated factors, (c) and (e); rather, the record indicates that the trial court was aware of the statute and, if the trial court considered those two factors relevant, it would have made specific findings relative thereto. [2] Additionally, this case was tried *1044 in June 1991, prior to the amendment to section 61.08(1), effective July 1, 1991, which requires trial courts to make "findings of fact relative to the factors enumerated in [section 61.08(2)]." § 61.08(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] Compare Moreno v. Moreno, 606 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Walter v. Walter
green
1 sentence1993In reviewing the trial court's decision to award permanent alimony, this court "must affirm if there is a reasonable basis in the record for such a determination." Moore v. Moore, 543 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (citing Walter v. Walter, 464 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1985), and Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Canakaris v. Canakaris
green
1 sentence1993In reviewing the trial court's decision to award permanent alimony, this court "must affirm if there is a reasonable basis in the record for such a determination." Moore v. Moore, 543 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (citing Walter v. Walter, 464 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1985), and Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Foy v. Fleming
green
1 sentence1989Foy v. Fleming, 168 So.2d at 179 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Menendez v. Menendez
green
1 sentence1985In Menendez v. Menendez, 435 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 441 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1983), we referred to income percentages suggested by the concurring opinion in Hughes v. Hughes, 421 So.2d 544 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), but only as another factor to be considered with the enumerated factors set out in Peak v. Peak. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Hughes v. Hughes
green
1 sentence1985In Menendez v. Menendez, 435 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 441 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1983), we referred to income percentages suggested by the concurring opinion in Hughes v. Hughes, 421 So.2d 544 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), but only as another factor to be considered with the enumerated factors set out in Peak v. Peak. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Simpson v. Merrill
green
1 sentence1972Cf. Simpson v. Merrill, Fla.1970, 234 So.2d 350 ; Homer v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc., Fla.App.1970, 249 So.2d 491 ; R-C-B-S Corporation v. Walter, Fla.App.1969, 225 So.2d 426 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Russell v. Atlantic Bag & Paper Co.
green
1 sentence1972Cf. Simpson v. Merrill, Fla.1970, 234 So.2d 350 ; Homer v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc., Fla.App.1970, 249 So.2d 491 ; R-C-B-S Corporation v. Walter, Fla.App.1969, 225 So.2d 426 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Homer v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc.
green
1 sentence1972Cf. Simpson v. Merrill, Fla.1970, 234 So.2d 350 ; Homer v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc., Fla.App.1970, 249 So.2d 491 ; R-C-B-S Corporation v. Walter, Fla.App.1969, 225 So.2d 426 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.