enumerated factors in Ohio

2023Cuyahoga Nos. 82258 and 82852, 2003-Ohio-6854, ¶ 58 , citing In re Glenn, 139 Ohio App.3d 105, 113 , 742 N.E.2d 1210 (8th Dist.2000) (“Once a court determines, by clear and convincing evidence one of the enumerated factors exists, the court must enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time.”).

2021“Once a court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the enumerated factors exists, the court must enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time.” In re Glenn, 139 Ohio App.3d 105, 113 , 742 N.E.2d 1210 (8th Dist.2000).

2008"Rigid rules generally have no place in this determination, as courts should apply the enumerated factors and consider the relevance, application, and persuasiveness of individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis." State v. McKinniss , 153 Ohio App.3d 654 , 2003-Ohio-4239 , 795 N.E.2d 160 , ¶ 7, citing State v. Robertson , 147 Ohio App.3d 94 , 2002-Ohio-494 , 768 N.E.2d 1207 , ¶ 20. {¶ 11} The trial court must determine whether the offender is a sexual predator by clear and convincing evidence.

2008"Rigid rules generally have no place in this determination, as courts should apply the enumerated factors and consider the relevance, application, and persuasiveness of individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis." State v. McKinniss , 153 Ohio App.3d 654 , 2003-Ohio-4239 , 795 N.E.2d 160 , ¶ 7, citing State v. Robertson , 147 Ohio App.3d 94 , 2002-Ohio-494 , 768 N.E.2d 1207 , ¶ 20. {¶ 11} The trial court must determine whether the offender is a sexual predator by clear and convincing evidence.

2026In her appeal, Mother asserts no specific challenge to the juvenile court’s best interest determination. {¶ 38} In determining the best interest of the child, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires consideration of the enumerated factors and “does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).” In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102 , ¶ 31.

2025Mother also focuses her challenge on her disagreement with the factual findings, arguing the evidence 22. demonstrated a contrary finding as to each of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)- (e). {¶ 46} As an initial matter, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires only consideration of the enumerated factors and “does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).” In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102 , ¶ 31.

2015Cuyahoga No. 75831, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 338 , *12 (Feb. 3, 2000), citing In re Shanequa H., 109 Ohio App.3d 142 (6th Dist.1996).

2002In re Shanequa H . (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 142 , 671 N.E.2d 1113 ; In re Higby (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 466 , 611 N.E.2d 403 .

2008The court disagreed, writing: "Whether the acceptance of a particular job with lower earnings amounts to voluntary limitation should be determined based on the enumerated factors [physical impairment, age, industrial history, training and education, motivation, work experience, work record, diligence and availability of jobs] and not based simply on a requirement for continued diligent search by claimant after completion of his normal daily work schedule." Id. at 401 .

2005The court disagreed, writing: "Whether the acceptance of a particular job with lower earnings amounts to voluntary limitation should be determined based on the enumerated factors [physical impairment, age, industrial history, training and education, motivation, work experience, work record, diligence and availability of jobs] and not based simply on a requirement for continued diligent search by claimant after completion of his normal daily work schedule." Id. at 401 .

2008In re Higby (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 466 , 469 . {¶ 5} Ms. Lamtman challenges the trial court's finding under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(2) that her chronic mental retardation was so severe that it prevented her from providing an adequate permanent home for J.E.

2002In re Shanequa H . (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 142 , 671 N.E.2d 1113 ; In re Higby (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 466 , 611 N.E.2d 403 .

2008"Rigid rules generally have no place in this determination, as courts should apply the enumerated factors and consider the relevance, application, and persuasiveness of individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis." State v. McKinniss , 153 Ohio App.3d 654 , 2003-Ohio-4239 , 795 N.E.2d 160 , ¶ 7, citing State v. Robertson , 147 Ohio App.3d 94 , 2002-Ohio-494 , 768 N.E.2d 1207 , ¶ 20. {¶ 11} The trial court must determine whether the offender is a sexual predator by clear and convincing evidence.

2008"Rigid rules generally have no place in this determination, as courts should apply the enumerated factors and consider the relevance, application, and persuasiveness of individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis." State v. McKinniss , 153 Ohio App.3d 654 , 2003-Ohio-4239 , 795 N.E.2d 160 , ¶ 7, citing State v. Robertson , 147 Ohio App.3d 94 , 2002-Ohio-494 , 768 N.E.2d 1207 , ¶ 20. {¶ 11} The trial court must determine whether the offender is a sexual predator by clear and convincing evidence.

2012Id. {¶ 68} Neither R.C. 2945.59 nor Evid.R. 404(B) requires that the other act be similar to the crime charged, as long as the prior act tends to show one of the enumerated factors.

2006Broom, supra, 40 Ohio St.3d at 282 , 533 N.E.2d at 690 ; State v. Flonnory (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 124 , 126 , 60 O.O.2d 95, 96-97 , 285 N.E.2d 726 , 729." Shedrick at 337 . {¶ 80} The exceptions in Evid.R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59 are to be strictly construed against the State and conservatively applied by a trial court.

2007State v. Eppinger (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 158 , 166 . *Page 4 {¶ 8} Here, in adjudicating the defendant a sexual predator, the trial court systematically addressed the enumerated factors in R.C. 2950.09 (B)(2) and made the following findings: {¶ 9} a) The defendant was 38 years of age at the time of trial; {¶ 10} b) The defendant has a prior criminal record; {¶ 11} c) The victim of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence was imposed was between the ages of 7 to 16, over a nine-year period, at the time of the crimes; {¶ 12} d) The sexually oriented offense for which the sentence was impo

2006State v. Eppinger (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 158 , 166 . {¶ 8} Here, in adjudicating the defendant a sexual predator, the trial court systematically addresses the enumerated factors in R.C. 2950.09 (B)(2) and made the following findings: {¶ 9} The defendant was 47 years of age at the time of trial; {¶ 10} The defendant has no prior criminal record; {¶ 11} The victim of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence was imposed was between the ages of 7 to 12, over a five-year period, at the time of the crimes; {¶ 12} The sexually oriented offense for which the sentence was imposed did not involve

2023Lucas No. L-22-1016, 2022-Ohio-1978, ¶ 42 . {¶ 79} To terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a public services agency under R.C. 2151.414, the juvenile court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, both of the following: (1) one of the enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply, and (2) permanent custody is in the best interests of the child.

2023Lucas No. L-22- 1016, 2022-Ohio-1978, ¶ 42 . {¶ 69} In order to terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a public services agency under R.C. 2151.414, the juvenile court must find two things by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that one of the enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply, and (2) that permanent custody is in the best interests of the child.

2017Fayette No. CA2006-12-045, 2008-Ohio-95 , 2008 WL 115012 , ¶ 26, quoting State v. Crotts , 104 Ohio St.3d 432 , 2004-Ohio-6550 , 820 N.E.2d 302 , ¶ 19.

2013Fayette No. CA2006-12-045, 2008-Ohio-95, ¶ 25 . {¶ 19} Neither R.C. 2945.59 nor Evid.R. 404(B) "requires that the other act be 'like' or 'similar' to the crime charged, as long as the prior act tends to show one of the enumerated factors." Id. at ¶ 26.

2011But neither R.C. 2945.59 nor Evid.R. 404(B) “ ‘requires that the other act be “like” or “similar” to the crime charged, as long as the prior act tends to show one of the enumerated factors.’ ” State v. Crotts, 104 Ohio St.3d 432, 435 , 2004-Ohio-6550 , 820 N.E.2d 302 , quoting State v. Shedrick (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 331, 337 , 574 N.E.2d 1065 . {¶ 37} Courts have long recognized the danger of admitting other-acts evidence.

2011But neither R.C. 2945.59 nor Evid.R. 404(B) “ ‘requires that the other act be “like” or “similar” to the crime charged, as long as the prior act tends to show one of the enumerated factors.’ ” State v. Crotts, 104 Ohio St.3d 432, 435 , 2004-Ohio-6550 , 820 N.E.2d 302 , quoting State v. Shedrick (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 331, 337 , 574 N.E.2d 1065 . {¶ 37} Courts have long recognized the danger of admitting other-acts evidence.

2008In re Moore (Aug. 31, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76942, citing In re Shaeffer Children (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 683 ; see, also, In re M.Z. , Cuyahoga App. No. 80799, 2002-Ohio-6634 . {¶ 29} The record demonstrates that the trial court considered all the applicable factors and that its award of permanent custody to CCDCFS was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

2006"Under the statute, even in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of one of the enumerated factors, a trial court could still properly determine that granting permanent custody to a state agency is in a child's best interest." In re Shaeffer Children , supra, 85 Ohio App.3d at 692 . {¶ 19} Under R.C. 2151. 414(D)(1), the court is to consider: "the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, foster care givers, and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may affect the child." {¶ 20} The parents have no relationship with the child.

2006Broom, supra, 40 Ohio St.3d at 282 , 533 N.E.2d at 690 ; State v. Flonnory (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 124 , 126 , 60 O.O.2d 95, 96-97 , 285 N.E.2d 726 , 729." Shedrick at 337 . {¶ 80} The exceptions in Evid.R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59 are to be strictly construed against the State and conservatively applied by a trial court.

2006Broom, supra, 40 Ohio St.3d at 282 , 533 N.E.2d at 690 ; State v. Flonnory (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 124 , 126 , 60 O.O.2d 95, 96-97 , 285 N.E.2d 726 , 729." Shedrick at 337 . {¶ 80} The exceptions in Evid.R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59 are to be strictly construed against the State and conservatively applied by a trial court.

2024Lucas No. L-23-1043, 2023-Ohio-2310 , ¶ 58, quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, fn. 3 , 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). {¶ 61} Before terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody to LCCS under R.C. 2151.414, the juvenile court must first find, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) one of the enumerated factors under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply and (2) that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.

2024Lucas No. L-23-1043, 2023-Ohio-2310 , ¶ 58, quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, fn. 3 , 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). {¶ 61} Before terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody to LCCS under R.C. 2151.414, the juvenile court must first find, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) one of the enumerated factors under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply and (2) that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.

2024Id.

2022Hamilton No. C-200043, 2020-Ohio-3273, ¶ 23 .

2023Cuyahoga No. 110541, 2021-Ohio-4126, ¶ 43 , quoting In re Glenn, 139 Ohio App.3d at 113, 742 N.E.2d 1210 .

2022Cuyahoga No. 110541, 2021-Ohio-4126, ¶ 43 , quoting In re Glenn, 139 Ohio App.3d 105, 113 , 742 N.E.2d 1210 (8th Dist.2000).

2023The court explained that “a reviewing court must be able to discern from the magistrate’s or juvenile court’s decision and the court’s judgment entry that the court satisfied the statutory requirement that it consider the enumerated factors,” but it declined to require “that the court include in its decision a written discussion of or express findings regarding each of the best-interest factors.” Id.

2002In re Stacey S . (1999), 136 Ohio App.3d 503 , 520 .

2023Cuyahoga Nos. 82258 and 82852, 2003-Ohio-6854, ¶ 58 , citing In re Glenn, 139 Ohio App.3d 105, 113 , 742 N.E.2d 1210 (8th Dist.2000) (“Once a court determines, by clear and convincing evidence one of the enumerated factors exists, the court must enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time.”).

2008In re C.H. , Cuyahoga App. Nos. 82258 and 82852, 2003-Ohio-6854 , at ¶ 34. *Page 14 {¶ 32} The record demonstrates that the trial court considered all the applicable factors and properly concluded that an award of permanent custody to the Agency was in P.C.'s best interest.

2017Id., citing Braatz at 45 .1 "While it is always preferable for the trial court to mention R.C. 3109.051 and its factors, the court need not specifically refer to the statute." Id., citing Kager v. Kager, 5th Dist.

2017Id., citing Braatz at 45 .1 "While it is always preferable for the trial court to mention R.C. 3109.051 and its factors, the court need not specifically refer to the statute." Id., citing Kager v. Kager, 5th Dist.

2015Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). {¶ 26} The court cited the “extraordinary costs” associated with Father’s parenting time, which is one of the enumerated factors that a court may consider in granting a deviation from the child support guidelines.

2015Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). {¶ 26} The court cited the “extraordinary costs” associated with Father’s parenting time, which is one of the enumerated factors that a court may consider in granting a deviation from the child support guidelines.