enumerated factors in New Mexico

2024See Sims, 2010-NMSC-027, ¶ 3 (recognizing that the Legislature did not intend “to forbid intoxicated individuals from merely entering their vehicles as passive occupants or using their vehicles for temporary shelter”). {7} Ultimately, it is the role of the fact-finder to weigh the enumerated factors and determine, under the totality of the circumstances, whether Defendant exercised actual physical control over the vehicle with the intent to drive.

2017Under the TCA, “the rule is immunity; waiver is the exception.” 2 Upton, 2006-NMSC-040, ¶ 29 (Minzner, J., dissenting). 3 {44} Where TCA immunity is waived by an enumerated exception to the general 4 rule of immunity, liability is to be determined “based upon the traditional tort 5 concepts of duty and the reasonably prudent person’s standard of care in the 6 performance of that duty[,]” provided that “[d]etermination of the standard of care 7 required in any particular instance should be made with the knowledge that each 8 governmental entity has financial limitations within which it must exe

2016We therefore conclude that there was sufficient 12 evidence to support the conviction, including with regard to Child’s intent. 13 {6} With regard to Child’s argument regarding the district court’s dispositional 14 judgment, as Child concedes and as we explained in our notice of proposed 15 disposition, findings on the enumerated factors in NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-19 16 (2009) are not required. [MIO 3; CN 5–6] Morever, as also indicated in our notice of 17 proposed disposition, there is no evidence that the district court did not consider the 18 factors identified in the statute. [See CN 6; s

2016We therefore conclude that there was sufficient 12 evidence to support the conviction, including with regard to Child’s intent. 13 {6} With regard to Child’s argument regarding the district court’s dispositional 14 judgment, as Child concedes and as we explained in our notice of proposed 15 disposition, findings on the enumerated factors in NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-19 16 (2009) are not required. [MIO 3; CN 5–6] Morever, as also indicated in our notice of 17 proposed disposition, there is no evidence that the district court did not consider the 18 factors identified in the statute. [See CN 6; s

2009We have 9 previously explained that, in contrast to children under the age of fifteen, “a child over 10 age fifteen is unlikely to make an involuntary statement . . . after receiving Miranda 11 warnings.” State v. Jonathan M., 109 N.M. 789, 791 , 791 P.2d 64, 66 (1990).

2009We have 9 previously explained that, in contrast to children under the age of fifteen, “a child over 10 age fifteen is unlikely to make an involuntary statement . . . after receiving Miranda 11 warnings.” State v. Jonathan M., 109 N.M. 789, 791 , 791 P.2d 64, 66 (1990).

2000See Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 18 , 127 N.M. 207 , 979 P.2d 718 . {12} To be sure, each of the enumerated factors of Subsection E is relevant to the children’s court’s determination of admissibility under Subsection F. In the case on appeal, the children’s court addressed certain of these factors but gave particular weight to the facts that the child had only recently turned thirteen and was no more mature or intelligent than average.

2000See Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 18 , 127 N.M. 207 , 979 P.2d 718 . {12} To be sure, each of the enumerated factors of Subsection E is relevant to the children’s court’s determination of admissibility under Subsection F. In the case on appeal, the children’s court addressed certain of these factors but gave particular weight to the facts that the child had only recently turned thirteen and was no more mature or intelligent than average.

1986Accord Couzens v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).