supplemental instruction in New Jersey

2026When addressing a supplemental instruction, "the question is whether the supplemental instruction . . . improperly influenced the dissenting jurors to change their votes." State v. Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219, 238 (2007).

2024A-1489-22 14 The principle that a jury verdict "must not be the product of coercion" is paramount and, thus, "appellate review of a trial court's supplemental instruction is 'guided by a concern for the weighty role that the judge plays in the dynamics of the courtroom.'" Id. at 144 (quoting Figueroa, 190 N.J. at 238 ).

2019For that reason, we reverse defendant's conviction and remand this case for a new trial. "[A]ppropriate and proper charges are essential for a fair trial." State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 158-59 (2016) (quoting State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 , 613 A-2225-17T1 7 (2004)).

2017State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 159 (2016). 1 Defendant represented himself at trial with the assistance of standby counsel. 3 A-5080-14T4 We likewise find no merit in defendant's claim that a scheduled sixteen-day break in the midst of the jury's deliberations deprived him of his right to a fair trial.

2018We consider two concerns when evaluating a judge's response to a jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict: "(1) whether the supplemental instruction has the capacity to improperly influence the dissenting jurors to change their votes; and (2) whether 'the weighty role that the judge plays in the dynamics of the courtroom' improperly coerced the jury into returning a verdict." State v. Dorsainvil, 435 N.J.

2016Id. at 237-38. [State v. Dorsainvil, 435 N.J.

2017"The trial judge's discretion must be exercised in a manner that ensures 'a jury verdict free from untoward interference from any source, including the court.'" Id. at 145 (quoting State v. Shomo, 129 N.J. 248, 257 (1992)).

2014The trial judge’s discretion must be exercised in a manner that ensures “‘a jury verdict free from untoward interference from any source, including the court.’” State v. Shomo, 129 N.J. 248, 257 (1992) (quoting State v. Collier, 90 N.J. 117, 122 (1982)); see also State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 346 (1987) (cautioning that “the deliberative process . . . must be 2 In a January 2013 reorganization of the Model Criminal Jury Charges, the Czachor charge was “removed from the Criminal Final Charge and made into a separate Non 2C charge.” Notice to the Bar, Updates to Model Criminal Jury Charges, 21

2014The trial judge’s discretion must be exercised in a manner that ensures “‘a jury verdict free from untoward interference from any source, including the court.’” State v. Shomo, 129 N.J. 248, 257 (1992) (quoting State v. Collier, 90 N.J. 117, 122 (1982)); see also State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 346 (1987) (cautioning that “the deliberative process . . . must be 2 In a January 2013 reorganization of the Model Criminal Jury Charges, the Czachor charge was “removed from the Criminal Final Charge and made into a separate Non 2C charge.” Notice to the Bar, Updates to Model Criminal Jury Charges, 21

2014The trial judge’s discretion must be exercised in a manner that ensures “ ‘a jury verdict free from untoward interference from any source, including the court.’ ” State v. Shomo, 129 N.J. 248, 257 , 609 A.2d 394 (1992) (quoting State v. Collier, 90 N.J. 117, 122 , 447 A.2d 168 (1982)); see also State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 346 , 526 A.2d 1046 (1987) (cautioning that “the deliberative process ... must be insulated from influences that could warp or undermine the jury’s deliberations and its ultimate determination”).

2014Consistent with the principle that a jury verdict must not be the product of coercion, appellate review of a trial court’s supplemental instruction is “guided by a concern for the weighty role that the judge plays in the dynamics of the courtroom.” State v. Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219, 238 (2007) (citing State v. Tyler, 176 N.J. 171, 181 (2003)).

2014Consistent with the principle that a jury verdict must not be the product of coercion, appellate review of a trial court’s supplemental instruction is “guided by a concern for the weighty role that the judge plays in the dynamics of the courtroom.” State v. Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219, 238 (2007) (citing State v. Tyler, 176 N.J. 171, 181 (2003)).

2026A-0564-24 20 In State v. Czachor, our Supreme Court prohibited the use of jury instructions that coerce a jury to return a verdict because doing so is "inconsistent with jury freedom and responsibility" and "does not permit jurors to deliberate objectively, freely, and with an untrammeled mind." 82 N.J. 392, 402 (1980).

2017"Consistent with the principle that a jury verdict must not be the product of coercion, appellate review of a trial court's supplemental instruction is 'guided by a concern for the weighty role that the judge plays in the dynamics of the courtroom.'" Ibid. (quoting Figueroa, supra, 190 N.J. at 238).

2017Ibid. (citing State v. Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219 , 237- 38 (2007)).

2014The trial judge’s discretion must be exercised in a manner that ensures “‘a jury verdict free from untoward interference from any source, including the court.’” State v. Shomo, 129 N.J. 248, 257 (1992) (quoting State v. Collier, 90 N.J. 117, 122 (1982)); see also State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 346 (1987) (cautioning that “the deliberative process . . . must be 2 In a January 2013 reorganization of the Model Criminal Jury Charges, the Czachor charge was “removed from the Criminal Final Charge and made into a separate Non 2C charge.” Notice to the Bar, Updates to Model Criminal Jury Charges, 21

1980The Supreme Court found no error in this supplemental instruction, stating that [i]t certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments, and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. [ Ibid. ] In State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471 (1963), cert. den. 374 U.S. 855 , 83 S.Ct. 1924 , 10 L.Ed. 2d 1075 (1963), this Court upheld the use of an Allen charge in a criminal case.

1980The Supreme Court found no error in this supplemental instruction, stating that [i]t certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference ' to the arguments, and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. [Ibid.] In State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471 (1963), cert. den. 374 U.S. 855 , 83 S.Ct. 1924 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1075 (1963), this Court upheld the use of an Allen charge in a criminal case.

2026We reach this conclusion because the judge previously made credibility findings, and thus, it is "appropriate that the matter be assigned to a different trial court." R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 306 (2009).

2025Corp. v. Hyman Beck & Co., 432 N.J.

2025See In re Est. of Branigan, 129 N.J. 324, 331-33 (1992).

2021See State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007) (holding that under Rules 1:7-2 and 2:10-2, "the failure to object to a jury instruction requires review under the plain error standard"); see also State v. 17 A-5128-18 Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017); State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012) (holding where a defendant does not object to the jury charge, "there is a presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case").

2021See State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007) (holding that under Rules 1:7-2 and 2:10-2, "the failure to object to a jury instruction requires review under the plain error standard"); see also State v. 17 A-5128-18 Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017); State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012) (holding where a defendant does not object to the jury charge, "there is a presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case").

2021See State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007) (holding that under Rules 1:7-2 and 2:10-2, "the failure to object to a jury instruction requires review under the plain error standard"); see also State v. 17 A-5128-18 Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017); State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012) (holding where a defendant does not object to the jury charge, "there is a presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case").

2007Rather than viewing the supplemental instruction in isolation, we noted at the outset that the trial court’s failure in the supplemental charge was to specifically "remind the jury of the brief references in its main charge to the possibility and consequences of a non-unaninious verdict." Id. at 305, 524 A.2d 188 .

2007Rather than viewing the supplemental instruction in isolation, we noted at the outset that the trial court's failure in the supplemental charge was to specifically "remind the jury of the brief references in its main charge to the possibility and consequences of a non-unanimous verdict." Id. at 305, 524 A. 2d 188 .

2007See State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 351-52 , 801 A.2d 1142 (2002) (citing Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 313 , 524 A.2d 188 ); cf. State v. Spruill, 28 N.J.Super. 381, 391 , 100 A.2d 766 (App.Div. 1953) (“Coercion of a jury is not permissible in any degree.”).

2007See State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 351-52 , 801 A.2d 1142 (2002) (citing Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 313 , 524 A.2d 188 ); cf. State v. Spruill, 28 N.J.Super. 381, 391 , 100 A.2d 766 (App.Div. 1953) (“Coercion of a jury is not permissible in any degree.”).

2007See State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 351-52 , 801 A.2d 1142 (2002) (citing Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 313 , 524 A.2d 188 ); cf. State v. Spruill, 28 N.J.Super. 381, 391 , 100 A.2d 766 (App.Div. 1953) (“Coercion of a jury is not permissible in any degree.”).

2007See State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 351-52 , 801 A.2d 1142 (2002) (citing Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 313 , 524 A.2d 188 ); cf. State v. Spruill, 28 N.J.Super. 381, 391 , 100 A.2d 766 (App.Div. 1953) (“Coercion of a jury is not permissible in any degree.”).