supplemental instruction in Maryland

2019Although the Court reached different conclusions based on the facts of each case, both opinions stand for the principle that "a supplemental instruction should not be given if the accused was unfairly prevented from arguing his or her defense to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating and presenting arguments." Bircher , 446 Md. at 472 , 132 A.3d 292 ( citing Cruz , 407 Md. at 202 , 963 A.2d 1184 ) (cleaned up)). "[A] defendant must have an adequate opportunity to argue his innocence under the [trial] court's instructions in order to be assured a fair trial." Cruz , 407 Md. at 214

2019Although the Court reached different conclusions based on the facts of each case, both opinions stand for the principle that "a supplemental instruction should not be given if the accused was unfairly prevented from arguing his or her defense to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating and presenting arguments." Bircher , 446 Md. at 472 , 132 A.3d 292 ( citing Cruz , 407 Md. at 202 , 963 A.2d 1184 ) (cleaned up)). "[A] defendant must have an adequate opportunity to argue his innocence under the [trial] court's instructions in order to be assured a fair trial." Cruz , 407 Md. at 214

2019Although the Court reached different conclusions based on the facts of each case, both opinions stand for the principle that “a supplemental instruction should not be given if the accused was unfairly prevented from arguing his or her defense 12 to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating and presenting arguments.” Bircher, 446 Md. at 472 (citing Cruz, 407 Md. at 202 ) (cleaned up)). “[A] defendant must have an adequate opportunity to argue his innocence under the [trial] court’s instructions in order to be assured a fair trial.” Cruz, 407 Md. at 214 (quoting Horton, 921 F.2d at 541

2019Although the Court reached different conclusions based on the facts of each case, both opinions stand for the principle that “a supplemental instruction should not be given if the accused was unfairly prevented from arguing his or her defense 12 to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating and presenting arguments.” Bircher, 446 Md. at 472 (citing Cruz, 407 Md. at 202 ) (cleaned up)). “[A] defendant must have an adequate opportunity to argue his innocence under the [trial] court’s instructions in order to be assured a fair trial.” Cruz, 407 Md. at 214 (quoting Horton, 921 F.2d at 541

2016We concluded that, “a trial court must respond to a question from a deliberating jury in a way that clarifies the confusion evidenced by the query when the question involves an issue central to the case.” Id. at 263 , 946 A.2d at 488 citing Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 657-60 , 702 A.2d 261, 278-79 (1997) (holding that a trial court has a duty to instruct “in response to a jury’s question concerning a matter that the jury is required to consider.”); see also Perez v. State, 201 Md.App. 276, 284 , 29 A.3d 656, 661 (2011) (“the court was required to provide a supplemental instruction to resolve

2016We concluded that, “a trial court must respond to a question from a deliberating jury in a way that clarifies the confusion evidenced by the query when the question involves an issue central to the case.” Id. at 263 , 946 A.2d at 488 citing Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 657-60 , 702 A.2d 261, 278-79 (1997) (holding that a trial court has a duty to instruct “in response to a jury’s question concerning a matter that the jury is required to consider.”); see also Perez v. State, 201 Md.App. 276, 284 , 29 A.3d 656, 661 (2011) (“the court was required to provide a supplemental instruction to resolve

2016In United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 1988), one of the cases cited in Cruz , the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a district court’s supplemental instruction to the jury on aiding and abetting was prejudicial.

2016The takeaways from Cruz and the cases upon which it relied are that a supplemental instruction should not be given if the accused “was unfairly prevented from arguing his or her defense to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating and presenting arguments.” Gaskins, 849 F.2d at 458 .

2016Over Brogden’s objection, the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction, which in part stated that, “ ‘It’s the burden of the Defendant to prove the existence of the license, if one exists, not the State.’ ” Id. at 639 , 866 A.2d at 133 .

2016Over Brogden’s objection, the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction, which in part stated that, “ ‘It’s the burden of the Defendant to prove the existence of the license, if one exists, not the State.’ ” Id. at 639 , 866 A.2d at 133 .

2016Faced with the trial court’s refusal to give a supplemental instruction, we reversed Baby’s conviction, stating that the trial judge failed to “address either of the jury’s questions as the definition makes no reference to the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of consent which was central to the jury’s questions.” Id. at 263-64 , 946 A.2d at 489 .

2016Faced with the trial court’s refusal to give a supplemental instruction, we reversed Baby’s conviction, stating that the trial judge failed to “address either of the jury’s questions as the definition makes no reference to the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of consent which was central to the jury’s questions.” Id. at 263-64 , 946 A.2d at 489 .

2019Unless the trial court provides a supplemental opportunity to respond, as in Bircher, 446 Md. at 458 , a supplemental instruction that presents a new theory of liability goes unaddressed and, in the jury’s mind, unchallenged.

2019Although the Court reached different conclusions based on the facts of each case, both opinions stand for the principle that “a supplemental instruction should not be given if the accused was unfairly prevented from arguing his or her defense 12 to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating and presenting arguments.” Bircher, 446 Md. at 472 (citing Cruz, 407 Md. at 202 ) (cleaned up)). “[A] defendant must have an adequate opportunity to argue his innocence under the [trial] court’s instructions in order to be assured a fair trial.” Cruz, 407 Md. at 214 (quoting Horton, 921 F.2d at 541

2019See Lowenfield v. Phelps , 484 U.S. 231 , 232, 108 S.Ct. 546 , 548, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)"[C]oercion is suggested by the fact that the jury returned its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction[.]"). "[V]erdict-urging on the part of the court tends to undermine the proper function of the common law jury system ...." Burroughs v. United States , 365 F.2d 431 , 434 (10th Cir. 1966).

2019See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 232 , 108 S. Ct. 546, 548 (1988) “[C]oercion is suggested by the fact that the jury returned its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction[.]”). “[V]erdict-urging on the part of the court tends to undermine the proper function of the common law jury system . . . .” Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431, 434 (10th Cir. 1966).

2019See Lowenfield v. Phelps , 484 U.S. 231 , 232, 108 S.Ct. 546 , 548, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)"[C]oercion is suggested by the fact that the jury returned its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction[.]"). "[V]erdict-urging on the part of the court tends to undermine the proper function of the common law jury system ...." Burroughs v. United States , 365 F.2d 431 , 434 (10th Cir. 1966).

2019See Lowenfield v. Phelps , 484 U.S. 231 , 232, 108 S.Ct. 546 , 548, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)"[C]oercion is suggested by the fact that the jury returned its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction[.]"). "[V]erdict-urging on the part of the court tends to undermine the proper function of the common law jury system ...." Burroughs v. United States , 365 F.2d 431 , 434 (10th Cir. 1966).

2016It was clearly within the province of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the law, and we find no error in either the form or substance of the instruction objected to.”); Higginbotham v. State, 104 Md.App. 145, 157 , 655 A.2d 1282, 1287 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Allen, 387 Md. 389, 400 , 875 A.2d 724, 730 (2005) (a supplemental instruction cannot be given where it is not supported by the evidence and “once the court chose to give supplemental instructions, it was required to state the law correctly”).

2016It was clearly within the province of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the law, and we find no error in either the form or substance of the instruction objected to.”); Higginbotham v. State, 104 Md.App. 145, 157 , 655 A.2d 1282, 1287 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Allen, 387 Md. 389, 400 , 875 A.2d 724, 730 (2005) (a supplemental instruction cannot be given where it is not supported by the evidence and “once the court chose to give supplemental instructions, it was required to state the law correctly”).

2016Factors considered in determining prejudice include: “when the change in the instructions is substantial, when the judge’s instructions repudiate counsel’s argument, or when the judge’s instructions impair the effectiveness of the attorney’s argument.” Clark, 556 N.W.2d at 828 ; see also United States v. White, 27 F.3d 1531, 1538 (11th Cir.1994).

2016Factors considered in determining prejudice include: “when the change in the instructions is substantial, when the judge's instructions repudiate counsel's argument, or when the judge's instructions impair the effectiveness of the attorney's argument.” Clark, 556 N.W.2d at 828 ; see also United States v. White, 27 F.3d 1531, 1538 (11th Cir. 1994).

2016For example, in Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 685 , 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (1980), Battle was charged with first degree rape and assault with intent to rape, among other violations.

2016For example, in Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 685 , 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (1980), Battle was charged with first degree rape and assault with intent to rape, among other violations.

2016It was clearly within the province of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the law, and we find no error in either the form or substance of the instruction objected to.”); Higginbotham v. State, 104 Md.App. 145, 157 , 655 A.2d 1282, 1287 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Allen, 387 Md. 389, 400 , 875 A.2d 724, 730 (2005) (a supplemental instruction cannot be given where it is not supported by the evidence and “once the court chose to give supplemental instructions, it was required to state the law correctly”).

2016It was clearly within the province of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the law, and we find no error in either the form or substance of the instruction objected to.”); Higginbotham v. State, 104 Md.App. 145, 157 , 655 A.2d 1282, 1287 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Allen, 387 Md. 389, 400 , 875 A.2d 724, 730 (2005) (a supplemental instruction cannot be given where it is not supported by the evidence and “once the court chose to give supplemental instructions, it was required to state the law correctly”).

2016We concluded that, “a trial court must respond to a question from a deliberating jury in a way that clarifies the confusion evidenced by the query when the question involves an issue central to the case.” Id. at 263 , 946 A.2d at 488 citing Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 657-60 , 702 A.2d 261, 278-79 (1997) (holding that a trial court has a duty to instruct “in response to a jury’s question concerning a matter that the jury is required to consider.”); see also Perez v. State, 201 Md.App. 276, 284 , 29 A.3d 656, 661 (2011) (“the court was required to provide a supplemental instruction to resolve

2016We concluded that, “a trial court must respond to a question from a deliberating jury in a way that clarifies the confusion evidenced by the query when the question involves an issue central to the case.” Id. at 263 , 946 A.2d at 488 citing Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 657-60 , 702 A.2d 261, 278-79 (1997) (holding that a trial court has a duty to instruct “in response to a jury’s question concerning a matter that the jury is required to consider.”); see also Perez v. State, 201 Md.App. 276, 284 , 29 A.3d 656, 661 (2011) (“the court was required to provide a supplemental instruction to resolve

2011In Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134 , 355 A.2d 455 (1976), we stated that the “decisions of this Court dealing with trial judges’ comments to juries regarding evidence clearly support the principle that the judge should not reveal to the jury his opinion.” Dempsey, 277 Md. at 148-49 , 355 A.2d at 463 ; see also Gore, 309 Md. at 214 , 522 A.2d at 1343 (1987) (holding that the judge’s instruction regarding sufficiency of the evidence was “an indirect comment on the general weight of the evidence as to each count and outside the permissible scope of argument”).

2011In Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134 , 355 A.2d 455 (1976), we stated that the “decisions of this Court dealing with trial judges’ comments to juries regarding evidence clearly support the principle that the judge should not reveal to the jury his opinion.” Dempsey, 277 Md. at 148-49 , 355 A.2d at 463 ; see also Gore, 309 Md. at 214 , 522 A.2d at 1343 (1987) (holding that the judge’s instruction regarding sufficiency of the evidence was “an indirect comment on the general weight of the evidence as to each count and outside the permissible scope of argument”).

2005Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-252(h)(2)(B), “[i]f the court denies a motion to suppress evidence, the ruling is binding at the trial unless the court, on the motion of a defendant and in the exercise of its discretion, grants a supplemental hearing or a hearing de novo and rules otherwise.” See also Logue v. State, 282 Md. 625, 628 , 386 A.2d 780 (1978) (“When such a motion has been fully heard and considered and there is not new evidence which was unavailable at the first hearing, the trial court may exercise his discretion and bind himself by the prior ruling whether the proceeding is in the o

2005Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-252(h)(2)(B), “[i]f the court denies a motion to suppress evidence, the ruling is binding at the trial unless the court, on the motion of a defendant and in the exercise of its discretion, grants a supplemental hearing or a hearing de novo and rules otherwise.” See also Logue v. State, 282 Md. 625, 628 , 386 A.2d 780 (1978) (“When such a motion has been fully heard and considered and there is not new evidence which was unavailable at the first hearing, the trial court may exercise his discretion and bind himself by the prior ruling whether the proceeding is in the o

2019Although the Court reached different conclusions based on the facts of each case, both opinions stand for the principle that “a supplemental instruction should not be given if the accused was unfairly prevented from arguing his or her defense 12 to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating and presenting arguments.” Bircher, 446 Md. at 472 (citing Cruz, 407 Md. at 202 ) (cleaned up)). “[A] defendant must have an adequate opportunity to argue his innocence under the [trial] court’s instructions in order to be assured a fair trial.” Cruz, 407 Md. at 214 (quoting Horton, 921 F.2d at 541

2019Although the Court reached different conclusions based on the facts of each case, both opinions stand for the principle that "a supplemental instruction should not be given if the accused was unfairly prevented from arguing his or her defense to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating and presenting arguments." Bircher , 446 Md. at 472 , 132 A.3d 292 ( citing Cruz , 407 Md. at 202 , 963 A.2d 1184 ) (cleaned up)). "[A] defendant must have an adequate opportunity to argue his innocence under the [trial] court's instructions in order to be assured a fair trial." Cruz , 407 Md. at 214

2021See id. at 51 , 63 A.3d at 604 .

2021See id. at 51 , 63 A.3d at 604 .

2019There is no aiding and abetting statute in Maryland, but the common law recognizes that a person “who did not actually commit the crime in question may nevertheless be guilty to the same degree as the person who did.” Kohler v. State, 203 Md.

2019There is no aiding and abetting statute in Maryland, but the common law recognizes that a person "who did not actually commit the crime in question may nevertheless be guilty to the same degree as the person who did." Kohler v. State , 203 Md.

2005It is in this regard that we turn to the supplemental rule of appellate review, as explained by Morris v. State, 153 Md.App. at 489-90 , 837 A.2d 248 : How then does the appellate court ... fill those fact-finding gaps, partial,or total?

2005It is in this regard that we turn to the supplemental rule of appellate review, as explained by Morris v. State, 153 Md.App. at 489-90 , 837 A.2d 248 : How then does the appellate court ... fill those fact-finding gaps, partial,or total?