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62 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1898–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Prestongreen2 sentences2023In announcing that rule, the Cowan court quoted 24 from Preston, which stated, “ ‘it is primarily the function of the trial court to determine, on the basis of such factors as the length of time already spent in deliberation and the complexity of the issues before the jury, when the giving of the supplemental instruction becomes appropriate.’ ” Id. (quoting Preston, 76 Ill. 2d at 283-84 ). ¶ 56 Here, the jury was actively engaged in reviewing the evidence until it was retired, as exemplified by its submission of five notes during that time. 2023See Preston, 76 Ill. 2d at 283-84 (stating that the trial court is tasked with deciding when to give a supplemental instruction “on the basis of such factors as the length of time already spent in deliberation and the complexity of the issues before the jury”). 25 ¶ 58 Moreover, case law barred the court from further defining the meaning of “reasonable doubt” and the related concept of the State’s burden of proof, the points of contention recited in the jury’s fifth note. | 5 | 9 |
People v. Leegreen2 sentences2005In that regard the court held that the trial court had discretion to decline to answer inquiries from the jury when the instructions are readily understandable and sufficiently explain the relevant law; when further instructions would serve no useful purpose or would potentially mislead the jury; when the jury's inquiry involves a question of fact; or when the giving of an answer would cause the court to express an opinion that would likely direct a verdict one way or another. *** When the jury communicates to the court its inability to reach a unanimous verdict, the court may, in its discreti 2005In that regard the court held that the trial court had discretion to decline to answer inquiries from the jury when the instructions are readily understandable and sufficiently explain the relevant law; when further instructions would serve no useful purpose or would potentially mislead the jury; when the jury’s inquiry involves a question of fact; or when the giving of an answer would cause the court to express an opinion that would likely direct a verdict one way or another. *** When the jury communicates to the court its inability to reach a unanimous verdict, the court may, in its discreti | 4 | 4 |
People v. Cowangreen2 sentences2023People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985) (stating that “[t]he time when a supplemental instruction should be given is for the court to decide”). 2023In announcing that rule, the Cowan court quoted 24 from Preston, which stated, “ ‘it is primarily the function of the trial court to determine, on the basis of such factors as the length of time already spent in deliberation and the complexity of the issues before the jury, when the giving of the supplemental instruction becomes appropriate.’ ” Id. (quoting Preston, 76 Ill. 2d at 283-84 ). ¶ 56 Here, the jury was actively engaged in reviewing the evidence until it was retired, as exemplified by its submission of five notes during that time. | 3 | 6 |
People v. Millsapgreen2 sentences2011See id. at 165 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942 . ¶ 19 Accordingly, the dispositive question in this case is whether the trial court's supplemental instruction introduced *653 a new theory of liability. 2011See id. at 165 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942 . ¶ 19 Accordingly, the dispositive question in this case is whether the trial court's supplemental instruction introduced *653 a new theory of liability. | 2 | 2 |
Palanti v. Dillon Enterprises, Ltd.green2 sentences2001However, although the length of time it took a jury to return its verdict after a supplemental instruction was given is a factor to be considered (Palanti v. Dillon Enterprises, Ltd., 303 Ill. 2001However, although the length of time it took a jury to return its verdict after a supplemental instruction was given is a factor to be considered ( Palanti v. Dillon Enterprises, Ltd. , 303 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Primgreen2 sentences2026Alternatively, defendant asks this court to review the error as ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to properly preserve the issues. ¶ 90 In Prim, the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged “the possible coercive dangers inherent in a supplemental instruction given to a deadlocked jury” but believed the jury should not “be left 32 to grope in such circumstances without some guidance from the court.” Id. at 74 . 2009The prosecutor asked the court to give the supplemental instruction set forth in People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 74-75 , 289 N.E.2d 601, 608-09 (1972). | 1 | 13 |
People v. Branchgreen2 sentences2020App. 3d 799 ; People v. Branch, 123 Ill. 1999People v. Branch, 123 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
The People v. Malmenatogreen1 sentence2023“Illinois law is clear that neither the court nor counsel should attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard for the jury (People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 374 (1992); People v. Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d 52, 61 (1958)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Speightgreen1 sentence2023“Illinois law is clear that neither the court nor counsel should attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard for the jury (People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 374 (1992); People v. Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d 52, 61 (1958)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2020See People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985) (“The time when a supplemental instruction should be given is for the court to decide.”); People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 222 (2000) (“It is up to the trial court’s discretion whether to give such an instruction and, if so, when to give the instruction.”); People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 121 (2005) (“Matters relating to jury selection and management are generally within the discretion of the trial court) (citing Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 222 ); People v. Kimble, 2019 IL 122830, ¶ 46 (it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine i 2020See People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985) (“The time when a supplemental instruction should be given is for the court to decide.”); People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 222 (2000) (“It is up to the trial court’s discretion whether to give such an instruction and, if so, when to give the instruction.”); People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 121 (2005) (“Matters relating to jury selection and management are generally within the discretion of the trial court) (citing Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 222 ); People v. Kimble, 2019 IL 122830, ¶ 46 (it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine i | 1 | 1 |
People v. Terrygreen1 sentence2020“To sustain the charge of first degree murder ***, the State must prove the following propositions: First proposition: That the defendant or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible performed the acts which caused the death *** and Second proposition: That when the defendant or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible did so, he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm ***.” Id. ¶ 76 In clarifying these instructions to the jury, the trial court also provided a supplemental instruction, based on People v. Terry, 99 Ill. 2d 508, 514 (1984), in e | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chapmangreen2 sentences2020See People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985) (“The time when a supplemental instruction should be given is for the court to decide.”); People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 222 (2000) (“It is up to the trial court’s discretion whether to give such an instruction and, if so, when to give the instruction.”); People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 121 (2005) (“Matters relating to jury selection and management are generally within the discretion of the trial court) (citing Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 222 ); People v. Kimble, 2019 IL 122830, ¶ 46 (it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine i 2020See People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985) (“The time when a supplemental instruction should be given is for the court to decide.”); People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 222 (2000) (“It is up to the trial court’s discretion whether to give such an instruction and, if so, when to give the instruction.”); People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 121 (2005) (“Matters relating to jury selection and management are generally within the discretion of the trial court) (citing Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 222 ); People v. Kimble, 2019 IL 122830, ¶ 46 (it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine i | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kimblegreen2 sentences2020See People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985) (“The time when a supplemental instruction should be given is for the court to decide.”); People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 222 (2000) (“It is up to the trial court’s discretion whether to give such an instruction and, if so, when to give the instruction.”); People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 121 (2005) (“Matters relating to jury selection and management are generally within the discretion of the trial court) (citing Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 222 ); People v. Kimble, 2019 IL 122830, ¶ 46 (it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine i 2020See People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985) (“The time when a supplemental instruction should be given is for the court to decide.”); People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 222 (2000) (“It is up to the trial court’s discretion whether to give such an instruction and, if so, when to give the instruction.”); People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 121 (2005) (“Matters relating to jury selection and management are generally within the discretion of the trial court) (citing Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 222 ); People v. Kimble, 2019 IL 122830, ¶ 46 (it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine i | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Curtisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Canalegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
U. S. Collins v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2005Consequently, the circuit court has jurisdiction under the Act to review an award of attorney fees and, for purposes of such review, attorneys are “parties to the supplemental hearing at which their fees were determined.” Collins, 12 Ill. 2d at 203 . 2005Consequently, the circuit court has jurisdiction under the Act to review an award of attorney fees and, for purposes of such review, attorneys are "parties to the supplemental hearing at which their fees were determined." Collins, 12 Ill.2d at 203 , 145 N.E.2d 622 . [2] In their briefs, Goldstein and the Commission also argued that Alvarado was equitably estopped from claiming that Goldstein's fee petition was barred. | 3 | 1979–2005 |
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin
green
2 sentences1988Ed. 2d 144 , 93 S. Ct. 2731 , does not mandate a finding of error. 1985Ed. 2d 144 , 93 S. Ct. 2731 : “The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. | 3 | 1981–1988 |
Brumbaugh v. United States
green
2 sentences1988(People v. Cowan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 , 473 N.E.2d 1307, 1309 .) Moreover, the fact that the court did not give the supplemental instruction from People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 62, 75-76 , 289 N.E.2d 601, 609 , cert. denied (1973), 412 U.S. 918 , 37 L. 1985The prosecutor requested that the jury be given the supplemental instruction set out in People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 62, 75-76 , cert. denied (1973), 412 U.S. 918 , 37 L. | 3 | 1981–1988 |
Howard v. Hemphill
green
2 sentences1988(People v. Cowan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 , 473 N.E.2d 1307, 1309 .) Moreover, the fact that the court did not give the supplemental instruction from People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 62, 75-76 , 289 N.E.2d 601, 609 , cert. denied (1973), 412 U.S. 918 , 37 L. 1985The prosecutor requested that the jury be given the supplemental instruction set out in People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 62, 75-76 , cert. denied (1973), 412 U.S. 918 , 37 L. | 3 | 1981–1988 |
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.
green
2 sentences2025Section 20 stated that “ ‘[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court against an offending party.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting 740 ILCS 14/20 (West 2016)). 2025It further provided the following: “ ‘[a] prevailing party may recover for each violation: (1) against a private entity that negligently violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; (2) against a private entity that intentionally or recklessly violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; - 13 - (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert witness fees and other litigation expenses; and (4) other relief, including an injunction, as the State or federal court may de | 2 | 2022–2025 |
Doe v. Chand
green
2 sentences2019In terms that parallel the AIDS Confidentiality Act, it provides simply that "[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court against an offending party." Id. *662 *1205 ¶ 28 Admittedly, this parallel, while instructive ( Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer , 2013 IL 115130 , ¶ 25, 376 Ill.Dec. 294 , 998 N.E.2d 1227 ), is not dispositive. 2019In terms that parallel the AIDS Confidentiality Act, it provides simply that “[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court against an offending party.” Id. ¶ 28 Admittedly, this parallel, while instructive (Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer, 2013 IL 115130, ¶ 25 ), is not dispositive. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Hartney Fuel Oil Company v. Board of Trustees of the Village of Forest View, etc.
green
2 sentences2019In terms that parallel the AIDS Confidentiality Act, it provides simply that "[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court against an offending party." Id. *662 *1205 ¶ 28 Admittedly, this parallel, while instructive ( Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer , 2013 IL 115130 , ¶ 25, 376 Ill.Dec. 294 , 998 N.E.2d 1227 ), is not dispositive. 2019In terms that parallel the AIDS Confidentiality Act, it provides simply that “[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court against an offending party.” Id. ¶ 28 Admittedly, this parallel, while instructive (Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer, 2013 IL 115130, ¶ 25 ), is not dispositive. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Kinkead
green
2 sentences1998Kinkead I, 168 Ill.2d at 417 , 214 Ill.Dec. 145 , 660 N.E.2d 852 . 1998Kinkead I, 168 Ill. 2d at 417 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Burgess
green
2 sentences1997The court concluded that the evidence presented at the supplemental hearing "compels the conclusion that the defendant was suffering no impairment as a result of his ingestion of psychotropic drugs during the time of his trial and sentencing hearing." Burgess , 176 Ill. 2d at 304 . 1997The court concluded that the evidence presented at the supplemental hearing "compels the conclusion that the defendant was suffering no impairment as a result of his ingestion of psychotropic drugs during the time of his trial and sentencing hearing.” Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d at 304 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Herbert G. Jennings
green
2 sentences1997Farella relied upon a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States v. Jennings , 471 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1973). 1997Farella relied upon a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States v. Jennings, 471 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1973). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Farella
green
2 sentences1997App. 3d at 445 , 398 N.E.2d at 619 ), it does not follow that the supplemental instruction issued by the trial court in this case was demonstrably coercive and thus requires reversal. 1997App. 3d at 445 , 398 N.E.2d at 619 ), it does not follow that the supplemental instruction issued by the trial court in this case was demonstrably coercive and thus requires reversal. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences1985People v. Harris (1981), 96 Ill. 1984See also People v. Canale (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 107 , 285 N.E.2d 133 (supplemental instruction after seven hours of deliberations and foreman’s statement that a verdict could be reached in a reasonable period of time); People v. Preston (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 274 , 391 N.E.2d 359 (Prim instruction after 6V2 hours of deliberations and foreman’s statement that the jury had not completely reached a verdict); People v. Harris (1981), 96 Ill. | 2 | 1984–1985 |
Schilling v. Quincy Physicians & Surgeons Clinic, S.C.
green
1 sentence2026“The supplemental instruction provided in IPI Civil No. 1.05 was derived from the Prim case.” Schilling v. Quincy Physicians and Surgeons Clinic, S.C., 2026 IL 131411, ¶ 42 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In re Estate of Schlenker
green
1 sentence2025It further provided the following: “ ‘[a] prevailing party may recover for each violation: (1) against a private entity that negligently violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; (2) against a private entity that intentionally or recklessly violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; - 13 - (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert witness fees and other litigation expenses; and (4) other relief, including an injunction, as the State or federal court may de | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Manning
green
1 sentence2022Manning, 241 Ill. 2d at 327 . ¶ 141 The majority summarily concludes that “counsel’s error [in not tendering a definition] resulted in the jury being improperly instructed on how to apply the legal terms to the facts and prevented them from analyzing the evidence to determine defendant’s guilt.” (Emphasis added.) Supra ¶ 70. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Mora v. J&M Plating, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Section 20 further provides that “[a] prevailing party may recover for each violation: (1) against a private entity that negligently violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; (2) against a private entity that intentionally or recklessly violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; -4- 2022 IL App (2d) 210692 (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert witness fees and other litigation expenses; and (4) other relief, including an injunction, as the State or fed 2022Section 20 further provides that “[a] prevailing party may recover for each violation: (1) against a private entity that negligently violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; (2) against a private entity that intentionally or recklessly violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; -4- 2022 IL App (2d) 210692 (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert witness fees and other litigation expenses; and (4) other relief, including an injunction, as the State or fed | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.
neutral
1 sentence2017The Act also requires “using the reasonable standard of -2 2017 IL App (2d) 170317 care within the private entity’s industry” to store and protect the information. 740 ILCS 14/15(e) (West 2016). ¶5 Of relevance to this appeal is section 20, titled “Right of action,” which provides that “[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court against an offending party.” 740 ILCS 14/20 (West 2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| The People v. Golub. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Stevenson green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Reimolds green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Garrett green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Taylor v. Beasley green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Craddock green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Katalinich neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Ross green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Lady v. Montgomery Ward & Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Smith v. Bishop green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Blakes neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Thompson green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Robinson neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Iverson green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| The People v. Defrates green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| The PEOPLE v. Mays green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Hazelton v. Zoning Board of Appeals green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Allen v. United States green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| United States v. John Fioravanti, Nicholas Panaccione, and Angelo Pepe, Nicholas Panaccione green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| People v. Richards neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| McDonald v. Rosengarten green | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.