Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lowry v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Laychur, 315 S.C. at 369 ; see also McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33, 48 , 661 S.E.2d 354, 362 (2008) (because bad charge was in a supplemental instruction, it "likely attained special significance in the minds of jurors"); Lowry, 376 S.C. 499 ; State v. Blassingame, 271 S.C. 44 , 46–47, 244 S.E.2d 528 , 529–30 (1978). 2022Accepting the premise that the original instruction was erroneous, I am firmly convinced the trial court's clear supplemental instruction—the State had to disprove self-defense as to the charges involving Green—refuted and removed the error in the original charge, even absent the court failing to "formally" withdraw the original instruction. 8 Cf. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946) ("Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word."); McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33 , 48-49, 661 S.E.2d 354, 362 (2008) (explaining that supplemental instru | 3 | 4 |
Bollenbach v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023When, as here, a supplemental instruction dilutes and distorts a previous charge on the same point of law, then "the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word." Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946). 2022Accepting the premise that the original instruction was erroneous, I am firmly convinced the trial court's clear supplemental instruction—the State had to disprove self-defense as to the charges involving Green—refuted and removed the error in the original charge, even absent the court failing to "formally" withdraw the original instruction. 8 Cf. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946) ("Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word."); McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33 , 48-49, 661 S.E.2d 354, 362 (2008) (explaining that supplemental instru | 3 | 3 |
McKnight v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Laychur, 315 S.C. at 369 ; see also McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33, 48 , 661 S.E.2d 354, 362 (2008) (because bad charge was in a supplemental instruction, it "likely attained special significance in the minds of jurors"); Lowry, 376 S.C. 499 ; State v. Blassingame, 271 S.C. 44 , 46–47, 244 S.E.2d 528 , 529–30 (1978). 2023Laychur, 315 S.C. at 369 ; see also McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33, 48 , 661 S.E.2d 354, 362 (2008) (because bad charge was in a supplemental instruction, it "likely attained special significance in the minds of jurors"); Lowry, 376 S.C. 499 ; State v. Blassingame, 271 S.C. 44 , 46–47, 244 S.E.2d 528 , 529–30 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Grovensteingreen2 sentences2022See State v. Washington, 431 S.C. 394 , 410, 848 S.E.2d 779 , 788 (2020) ("[J]urors are presumed to follow the law as instructed to them." (quoting State v. Grovenstein, 335 S.C. 347, 353 , 517 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1999))). 2022See State v. Washington, 431 S.C. 394 , 410, 848 S.E.2d 779 , 788 (2020) ("[J]urors are presumed to follow the law as instructed to them." (quoting State v. Grovenstein, 335 S.C. 347, 353 , 517 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1999))). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2022See State v. Washington, 431 S.C. 394 , 410, 848 S.E.2d 779 , 788 (2020) ("[J]urors are presumed to follow the law as instructed to them." (quoting State v. Grovenstein, 335 S.C. 347, 353 , 517 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1999))). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jeffrey Gaskins, AKA Jeffery Gaskingreen1 sentence2016In People v. Ardoin, 196 Cal.App.4th 102 , 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 24 (2011), the court stated, “To prevent unfair prejudice, if a supplemental instruction introduces new matter for consideration by the jury, the parties should be given an opportunity to argue the theory.” Further, the court held, “If supplemental or curative instructions are given by the trial court without granting defense counsel an opportunity to object, and if necessary, offer additional legal argument to respond to the substance of the new instructions, the spirit of [a state statute] and the defendant’s right to a fair trial | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Willie Hortongreen1 sentence2016In People v. Ardoin, 196 Cal.App.4th 102 , 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 24 (2011), the court stated, “To prevent unfair prejudice, if a supplemental instruction introduces new matter for consideration by the jury, the parties should be given an opportunity to argue the theory.” Further, the court held, “If supplemental or curative instructions are given by the trial court without granting defense counsel an opportunity to object, and if necessary, offer additional legal argument to respond to the substance of the new instructions, the spirit of [a state statute] and the defendant’s right to a fair trial | 1 | 1 |
In re Oconee County Juvenile Drug Court Programgreen1 sentence2016Cf. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 ("We are mindful that the jury returned with its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction, and that this suggests the possibility of coercion."); Workman, 412 S.C. at 132 , 771 S.E.2d at 639 (concluding the fact that the jury returned a verdict two hours after receiving the Allen charge tended to prove the charge was coercive); Tucker, 346 S.C. at 494 , 552 S.E.2d at 718 (finding the fact that the jury returned a verdict approximately an hour and a half after receiving the Allen charge tended to prove the charge was coercive). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Melvingreen1 sentence2016See State v. Bircher, 446 Md. 458 , 132 A.3d 292, 302, 304-06 (2016) (holding the trial court did not err in determining a supplemental instruction on transferred intent was proper and “offering additional closing time” for the parties to give additional closing arguments); Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 50 (Pa. Super. | 1 | 1 |
Tucker v. Catoegreen2 sentences2016Cf. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 ("We are mindful that the jury returned with its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction, and that this suggests the possibility of coercion."); Workman, 412 S.C. at 132 , 771 S.E.2d at 639 (concluding the fact that the jury returned a verdict two hours after receiving the Allen charge tended to prove the charge was coercive); Tucker, 346 S.C. at 494 , 552 S.E.2d at 718 (finding the fact that the jury returned a verdict approximately an hour and a half after receiving the Allen charge tended to prove the charge was coercive). 2016Cf. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 ("We are mindful that the jury returned with its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction, and that this suggests the possibility of coercion."); Workman, 412 S.C. at 132 , 771 S.E.2d at 639 (concluding the fact that the jury returned a verdict two hours after receiving the Allen charge tended to prove the charge was coercive); Tucker, 346 S.C. at 494 , 552 S.E.2d at 718 (finding the fact that the jury returned a verdict approximately an hour and a half after receiving the Allen charge tended to prove the charge was coercive). | 1 | 1 |
Lowenfield v. Phelpsgreen1 sentence2016Cf. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 ("We are mindful that the jury returned with its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction, and that this suggests the possibility of coercion."); Workman, 412 S.C. at 132 , 771 S.E.2d at 639 (concluding the fact that the jury returned a verdict two hours after receiving the Allen charge tended to prove the charge was coercive); Tucker, 346 S.C. at 494 , 552 S.E.2d at 718 (finding the fact that the jury returned a verdict approximately an hour and a half after receiving the Allen charge tended to prove the charge was coercive). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Roger Welbeckgreen1 sentence2016Ct. 2014) (noting the appellant “arguably waived this claim by failing to request the opportunity to offer additional argument to the jury to address the supplemental charge after being informed that it would be given”); State v. Calvin, 176 Wash.App. 1 , 316 P.3d 496, 507 (2013) (finding no prejudice when “[d]efense counsel was given the opportunity to reargue the case but declined”), review granted in part, cause remanded, 183 Wash.2d 1013 , 353 P.3d 640 (2015); see also United States v. Welbeck, 145 F.3d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The initiative for the supplemental instruction came from the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ardoingreen2 sentences2016In People v. Ardoin, 196 Cal.App.4th 102 , 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 24 (2011), the court stated, “To prevent unfair prejudice, if a supplemental instruction introduces new matter for consideration by the jury, the parties should be given an opportunity to argue the theory.” Further, the court held, “If supplemental or curative instructions are given by the trial court without granting defense counsel an opportunity to object, and if necessary, offer additional legal argument to respond to the substance of the new instructions, the spirit of [a state statute] and the defendant’s right to a fair trial 2016In People v. Ardoin, 196 Cal.App.4th 102 , 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 24 (2011), the court stated, “To prevent unfair prejudice, if a supplemental instruction introduces new matter for consideration by the jury, the parties should be given an opportunity to argue the theory.” Further, the court held, “If supplemental or curative instructions are given by the trial court without granting defense counsel an opportunity to object, and if necessary, offer additional legal argument to respond to the substance of the new instructions, the spirit of [a state statute] and the defendant’s right to a fair trial | 1 | 1 |
State v. Birchergreen2 sentences2016See State v. Bircher, 446 Md. 458 , 132 A.3d 292, 302, 304-06 (2016) (holding the trial court did not err in determining a supplemental instruction on transferred intent was proper and “offering additional closing time” for the parties to give additional closing arguments); Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 50 (Pa. Super. 2016See State v. Bircher, 446 Md. 458 , 132 A.3d 292, 302, 304-06 (2016) (holding the trial court did not err in determining a supplemental instruction on transferred intent was proper and “offering additional closing time” for the parties to give additional closing arguments); Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 50 (Pa. Super. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Calvingreen2 sentences2016Ct. 2014) (noting the appellant “arguably waived this claim by failing to request the opportunity to offer additional argument to the jury to address the supplemental charge after being informed that it would be given”); State v. Calvin, 176 Wash.App. 1 , 316 P.3d 496, 507 (2013) (finding no prejudice when “[d]efense counsel was given the opportunity to reargue the case but declined”), review granted in part, cause remanded, 183 Wash.2d 1013 , 353 P.3d 640 (2015); see also United States v. Welbeck, 145 F.3d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The initiative for the supplemental instruction came from the 2016Ct. 2014) (noting the appellant “arguably waived this claim by failing to request the opportunity to offer additional argument to the jury to address the supplemental charge after being informed that it would be given”); State v. Calvin, 176 Wash.App. 1 , 316 P.3d 496, 507 (2013) (finding no prejudice when “[d]efense counsel was given the opportunity to reargue the case but declined”), review granted in part, cause remanded, 183 Wash.2d 1013 , 353 P.3d 640 (2015); see also United States v. Welbeck, 145 F.3d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The initiative for the supplemental instruction came from the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pedro Arroyo v. Everett Jones, Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, and Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York
green
2 sentences2022Accepting the premise that the original instruction was erroneous, I am firmly convinced the trial court's clear supplemental instruction—the State had to disprove self-defense as to the charges involving Green—refuted and removed the error in the original charge, even absent the court failing to "formally" withdraw the original instruction. 8 Cf. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946) ("Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word."); McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33 , 48-49, 661 S.E.2d 354, 362 (2008) (explaining that supplemental instru 2008That the trial court prefaced the supplemental charge with the admonition that it was “not to be given any other weight or highlighted in any way” does not alter the fact that the improper charge on felony murder was the last thing the jurors heard before beginning deliberations and that its brevity was likely received by the jurors with “heightened alertness rather than the normal attentiveness which may well flag from time to time during the lengthy initial charge.” Arroyo v. Jones, 685 F.2d 35 (2d. | 2 | 2008–2022 |
State v. Norris
red
2 sentences2000State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86 , 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985), overruled on other grounds State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). [12] In keeping with Norris, the trial judge's supplemental instruction properly told the jury not to consider parole eligibility or ineligibility. 2000State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86 , 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985), overruled on other grounds State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). [12] In keeping with Norris, the trial judge's supplemental instruction properly told the jury not to consider parole eligibility or ineligibility. | 2 | 1989–2000 |
Allen v. United States
green
2 sentences1983We therefore hold this charge to be reversible error and remind the bench that they are limited to the factually neutral charge approved in Allen v. U.S. , 164 U.S. 492, 501-502 , 17 S.Ct. 154, 157-158 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). 1983We therefore hold this charge to be reversible error and remind the bench that they are limited to the factually neutral charge approved in Allen v. U.S. , 164 U.S. 492, 501-502 , 17 S.Ct. 154, 157-158 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). | 2 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Blassingame
green
2 sentences2023Laychur, 315 S.C. at 369 ; see also McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33, 48 , 661 S.E.2d 354, 362 (2008) (because bad charge was in a supplemental instruction, it "likely attained special significance in the minds of jurors"); Lowry, 376 S.C. 499 ; State v. Blassingame, 271 S.C. 44 , 46–47, 244 S.E.2d 528 , 529–30 (1978). 2023Laychur, 315 S.C. at 369 ; see also McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33, 48 , 661 S.E.2d 354, 362 (2008) (because bad charge was in a supplemental instruction, it "likely attained special significance in the minds of jurors"); Lowry, 376 S.C. 499 ; State v. Blassingame, 271 S.C. 44 , 46–47, 244 S.E.2d 528 , 529–30 (1978). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Horry County v. Laychur
green
1 sentence2023Laychur, 315 S.C. at 369 ; see also McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33, 48 , 661 S.E.2d 354, 362 (2008) (because bad charge was in a supplemental instruction, it "likely attained special significance in the minds of jurors"); Lowry, 376 S.C. 499 ; State v. Blassingame, 271 S.C. 44 , 46–47, 244 S.E.2d 528 , 529–30 (1978). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Workman v. State
green
1 sentence2016Cf. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 ("We are mindful that the jury returned with its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction, and that this suggests the possibility of coercion."); Workman, 412 S.C. at 132 , 771 S.E.2d at 639 (concluding the fact that the jury returned a verdict two hours after receiving the Allen charge tended to prove the charge was coercive); Tucker, 346 S.C. at 494 , 552 S.E.2d at 718 (finding the fact that the jury returned a verdict approximately an hour and a half after receiving the Allen charge tended to prove the charge was coercive). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Linda Mc Co., Inc. v. Shore
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 549-50 , 703 S.E.2d at 502 . 2016Id. at 549-50 , 703 S.E.2d at 502 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Calvin
neutral
2 sentences2016Ct. 2014) (noting the appellant “arguably waived this claim by failing to request the opportunity to offer additional argument to the jury to address the supplemental charge after being informed that it would be given”); State v. Calvin, 176 Wash.App. 1 , 316 P.3d 496, 507 (2013) (finding no prejudice when “[d]efense counsel was given the opportunity to reargue the case but declined”), review granted in part, cause remanded, 183 Wash.2d 1013 , 353 P.3d 640 (2015); see also United States v. Welbeck, 145 F.3d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The initiative for the supplemental instruction came from the 2016Ct. 2014) (noting the appellant “arguably waived this claim by failing to request the opportunity to offer additional argument to the jury to address the supplemental charge after being informed that it would be given”); State v. Calvin, 176 Wash.App. 1 , 316 P.3d 496, 507 (2013) (finding no prejudice when “[d]efense counsel was given the opportunity to reargue the case but declined”), review granted in part, cause remanded, 183 Wash.2d 1013 , 353 P.3d 640 (2015); see also United States v. Welbeck, 145 F.3d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The initiative for the supplemental instruction came from the | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2012After a thorough review of the record and counsel's brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss the appeal and grant counsel's motion to be relieved.[1] APPEAL DISMISSED. 2012After a thorough review of the record and counsel's brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss the appeal and grant counsel's motion to be relieved.[1] APPEAL DISMISSED. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Anders v. California
green
1 sentence2012After a thorough review of the record and counsel's brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss the appeal and grant counsel's motion to be relieved.[1] APPEAL DISMISSED. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Torrence
green
2 sentences2000State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86 , 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985), overruled on other grounds State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). [12] In keeping with Norris, the trial judge's supplemental instruction properly told the jury not to consider parole eligibility or ineligibility. 2000State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86 , 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985), overruled on other grounds State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). [12] In keeping with Norris, the trial judge's supplemental instruction properly told the jury not to consider parole eligibility or ineligibility. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2000State v. Bailey, 253 S.C. 304 , 170 S.E.2d 376 (1969) (general objection leaves nothing for Court to review). 2000State v. Bailey, 253 S.C. 304 , 170 S.E.2d 376 (1969) (general objection leaves nothing for Court to review). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Jones v. United States
green
2 sentences2000Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381-83 , 119 S.Ct. 2090, 2099 , 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (a death sentence is not arbitrary within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment “if the jury is not given any bit of information that might possibly influence the individual juror’s voting behavior.”). a Appellant argues the trial judge’s supplemental instruction was erroneous. 2000Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381-83 , 119 S.Ct. 2090, 2099 , 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (a death sentence is not arbitrary within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment “if the jury is not given any bit of information that might possibly influence the individual juror’s voting behavior.”). a Appellant argues the trial judge’s supplemental instruction was erroneous. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.