supplemental instruction in Iowa

2019P. 1.925 (“While the jury is deliberating, the court may in its discretion further instruct the jury, in the presence of or after notice to counsel.”); State v. Watkins, 463 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1990) (noting that “the decision to give a supplemental instruction, or to refrain from doing so, rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice” (quoting State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 184 (R.I. 10 1983))); McConnell v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 367 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Iowa 1985) (“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McConnells’ objection to the form of its responses to the jurors

2019P. 1.925 ("While the jury is deliberating, the court may in its discretion further instruct the jury, in the presence of or after notice to counsel."); State v. Watkins , 463 N.W.2d 15 , 18 (Iowa 1990) (noting that "the decision to give a supplemental instruction, or to refrain from doing so, rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice" (quoting State v. Pignolet , 465 A.2d 176 , 184 (R.I. 1983) )); McConnell v. Aluminum Co. of Am. , 367 N.W.2d 245 , 250 (Iowa 1985) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McConnells' objection to the form of its responses to the ju

2019P. 1.925 (“While the jury is deliberating, the court may in its discretion further instruct the jury, in the presence of or after notice to counsel.”); State v. Watkins, 463 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1990) (noting that “the decision to give a supplemental instruction, or to refrain from doing so, rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice” (quoting State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 184 (R.I. 10 1983))); McConnell v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 367 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Iowa 1985) (“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McConnells’ objection to the form of its responses to the jurors

2019P. 1.925 ("While the jury is deliberating, the court may in its discretion further instruct the jury, in the presence of or after notice to counsel."); State v. Watkins , 463 N.W.2d 15 , 18 (Iowa 1990) (noting that "the decision to give a supplemental instruction, or to refrain from doing so, rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice" (quoting State v. Pignolet , 465 A.2d 176 , 184 (R.I. 1983) )); McConnell v. Aluminum Co. of Am. , 367 N.W.2d 245 , 250 (Iowa 1985) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McConnells' objection to the form of its responses to the ju

2019P. 1.925 (“While the jury is deliberating, the court may in its discretion further instruct the jury, in the presence of or after notice to counsel.”); State v. Watkins, 463 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1990) (noting that “the decision to give a supplemental instruction, or to refrain from doing so, rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice” (quoting State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 184 (R.I. 10 1983))); McConnell v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 367 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Iowa 1985) (“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McConnells’ objection to the form of its responses to the jurors

2019P. 1.925 ("While the jury is deliberating, the court may in its discretion further instruct the jury, in the presence of or after notice to counsel."); State v. Watkins , 463 N.W.2d 15 , 18 (Iowa 1990) (noting that "the decision to give a supplemental instruction, or to refrain from doing so, rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice" (quoting State v. Pignolet , 465 A.2d 176 , 184 (R.I. 1983) )); McConnell v. Aluminum Co. of Am. , 367 N.W.2d 245 , 250 (Iowa 1985) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McConnells' objection to the form of its responses to the ju

2019P. 1.925 (“While the jury is deliberating, the court may in its discretion further instruct the jury, in the presence of or after notice to counsel.”); State v. Watkins, 463 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1990) (noting that “the decision to give a supplemental instruction, or to refrain from doing so, rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice” (quoting State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 184 (R.I. 10 1983))); McConnell v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 367 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Iowa 1985) (“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McConnells’ objection to the form of its responses to the jurors

2019P. 1.925 ("While the jury is deliberating, the court may in its discretion further instruct the jury, in the presence of or after notice to counsel."); State v. Watkins , 463 N.W.2d 15 , 18 (Iowa 1990) (noting that "the decision to give a supplemental instruction, or to refrain from doing so, rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice" (quoting State v. Pignolet , 465 A.2d 176 , 184 (R.I. 1983) )); McConnell v. Aluminum Co. of Am. , 367 N.W.2d 245 , 250 (Iowa 1985) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McConnells' objection to the form of its responses to the ju

2017Factors that may evidence whether the jury’s verdict was coerced include: “an inquiry into the jury’s numerical division, a speedy verdict after receiving the supplemental instruction, and language instructing the jury it must make a decision.” Id. at 912 .

2009Factors that might suggest a coercive effect include “an inquiry into the jury’s numerical division, a speedy verdict after receiving the supplemental instruction, and language instructing the jury it must make a decision.” Id. at 912 .

2015See State v. Wright, 772 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).

2014Wright, 772 N.W.2d at 778 .

2023See Hooks, 606 F.3d at 749 (explaining that an Allen charge separate from and later than other instructions risks jurors giving disproportionate weight to the new charge).

2021He appeals from his conviction, arguing (1) the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts and the court should overrule State v. Pearson, 514 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa 1994), which provides that finding contact constitutes a “sex act” requires that the contact be “sexual in nature” but not that the act was done with the intent of sexual gratification; (2) the court erred in refusing to give a supplemental instruction after the jury asked for clarification on a jury instruction; (3) the court abused its discretion in excluding evidence under the rape-shield law; (4) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct b

2019See State v. Rankin, 181 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Iowa 1970) (finding “the trial court did not err in failing to require the state to elect a date certain”).

2017See 812 N.W.2d at 850 .

2017See Olson,728 N.W.2d at 848–49; see also State v. Wilson, No. 08-1040, 2009 WL 1913695, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 2, 2009).

2017See Olson,728 N.W.2d at 848–49; see also State v. Wilson, No. 08-1040, 2009 WL 1913695, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 2, 2009).

2016See State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996) (“Generally understood words of ordinary usage need not be defined.”).

2015Despite conflicting testimony, the court, in effect, set the value of the phones as a matter of law. “‘Generally, the decision to give a supplemental instruction, or to refrain from doing so, rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice . . . .’” State v. Watkins, 463 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1990) (quoting State v. Pignolet, 415 A2d 176, 184 (R.I. 1983)).

2015See Brown, 400 N.W.2d at 76-77 (“The date fixed in the indictment or information for the commission of a crime is not material, and a conviction can be returned upon any date within the statute of limitations, absent a fatal variance between the allegations and proof.”).

2011While the repetition of the second element of attempted murder in Instruction No. 14 may have emphasized the State’s less rigorous burden to prove specific intent, it also correctly provided the context of Hunt’s expectations for the jury’s consideration and so “was no more than was required for a clear presentation of the issues.” Estate of Smith v. Lemer, 387 N.W.2d 576, 582 (Iowa 1986).

2011See id. at 186 n. 3 (“When applicable the district court should use a separate instruction to explain that, even if the defendant proves the defendant’s act could not have caused the death of any person, this element is established if the defendant intended to cause the death of some person by so acting.”); see also Smith v. Koslow, 757 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Iowa 2008) (stating “a supplemental instruction that properly assists the jury in the correct application of the law to the facts is not error”).

2003E.g., Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 , 108 S.Ct. at 552 , 98 L.Ed.2d at 579 ; United States v. Cook, 663 F.2d 808, 811, n. 4 (8th Cir.1981); Kociemba v. G.D.

2003Id. at 239-40 , 108 S.Ct. at 551-52 , 98 L.Ed.2d at 578-79 ; accord State v. Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15, 20 (Iowa 1978) (noting five-hour period between supplemental instruction and verdict indicated jury was not coerced into rendering a decision).