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10 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Wright, 512 So.2d at 681 (the problem normally associated with supplemental jury instructions was adequately addressed by additional language instructing the jury to consider the supplemental instruction along with their other instructions). ¶ 48. 2006See Wright, 512 So. 2d at 681 (the problem normally associated with supplemental jury instructions was adequately addressed by additional language instructing the jury to consider the supplemental instruction along with their other instructions). ¶48. | 2 | 4 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2017See also Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (providing that the following criteria must be met by a preponderance of the evidence to establish ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) counsel's performance was defective; and (2) the defect was so prejudicial that it prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial). 2017See also Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (providing that the following criteria must be met by a preponderance of the evidence to establish ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) counsel's performance was defective; and (2) the defect was so prejudicial that it prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial). | 1 | 1 |
Stoop v. Stategreen1 sentence2016It should not have been suggested to the jury that they must find Willie guilty of murder if they found him “guilty” of possessing the gun, because—at the least—such an instruction contradicted the correct instruction informing the jury it must find him guilty of the elements of deliberate design murder. ‘When a jury is given instructions which are in hopeless conflict this Court is compelled to reverse because it cannot be said that the jury verdict was founded on correct principles of law.” Scott v. State, 446 So.2d 580, 588 (Miss. 1984) (citing Pittman v. State, 297 So.2d 888 (Miss. 1974)); | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Like the Berry Court before us, we hold the trial judge’s supplemental instruction to the jury, in response to the jury’s note, was “confusing and misleading, and therefore requires reversal.” Berry, 728 So. 2d at 571 (¶ 9). 2016Like the Berry Court before us, we hold the trial judge’s supplemental instruction to the jury, in response to the jury’s note, was “confusing and misleading, and therefore requires reversal.” Berry, 728 So.2d at 571 (¶ 9). | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Stategreen1 sentence2016It should not have been suggested to the jury that they must find Willie guilty of murder if they found him “guilty” of possessing the gun, because—at the least—such an instruction contradicted the correct instruction informing the jury it must find him guilty of the elements of deliberate design murder. ‘When a jury is given instructions which are in hopeless conflict this Court is compelled to reverse because it cannot be said that the jury verdict was founded on correct principles of law.” Scott v. State, 446 So.2d 580, 588 (Miss. 1984) (citing Pittman v. State, 297 So.2d 888 (Miss. 1974)); | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2005We observe, however, that had defense counsel given a more detailed argument, similar to the argument he raises on appeal, the trial judge would have been given an opportunity to include more extensive prefatory and concluding language in the supplemental instruction. [3] See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 606 So.2d 598, 599 (Miss.1992); Jackson v. State, 452 So.2d 438, 440 (Miss.1984); Davis v. State, 406 So.2d 795, 801 (Miss.1981). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen1 sentence2005We observe, however, that had defense counsel given a more detailed argument, similar to the argument he raises on appeal, the trial judge would have been given an opportunity to include more extensive prefatory and concluding language in the supplemental instruction. [3] See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 606 So.2d 598, 599 (Miss.1992); Jackson v. State, 452 So.2d 438, 440 (Miss.1984); Davis v. State, 406 So.2d 795, 801 (Miss.1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Forbesgreen1 sentence2005In State v. Forbes , the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that a trial court has authority to respond to jury questions with supplemental instructions, and added "[w]hile the better procedure is to admonish the jury not to place undue emphasis on the supplemental instruction and to consider it in conjunction with the entire charge, it is not necessarily reversible error to fail to do so." State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 451-52 (Tenn. Crim.App.1995) (citing State v. Chance, 778 S.W.2d 457, 461-62 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1989)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chancegreen1 sentence2005In State v. Forbes , the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that a trial court has authority to respond to jury questions with supplemental instructions, and added "[w]hile the better procedure is to admonish the jury not to place undue emphasis on the supplemental instruction and to consider it in conjunction with the entire charge, it is not necessarily reversible error to fail to do so." State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 451-52 (Tenn. Crim.App.1995) (citing State v. Chance, 778 S.W.2d 457, 461-62 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1989)). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence2005We observe, however, that had defense counsel given a more detailed argument, similar to the argument he raises on appeal, the trial judge would have been given an opportunity to include more extensive prefatory and concluding language in the supplemental instruction. [3] See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 606 So.2d 598, 599 (Miss.1992); Jackson v. State, 452 So.2d 438, 440 (Miss.1984); Davis v. State, 406 So.2d 795, 801 (Miss.1981). | 1 | 1 |
Bailey v. Stategreen1 sentence2003The additional or supplemental instruction on intoxication given by the trial court was taken from Bailey v. State, 760 So.2d 781, 783 (¶ 6) (Miss.2000) and reads as follows: The Court instructs the jury that if a defendant when sober is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and the defendant voluntarily deprived himself of the ability to distinguish between right and wrong by reason of becoming intoxicated and commits an offense while in that condition, he is criminally responsible for such acts. ¶ 34. | 1 | 1 |
Nicolaou v. Stategreen1 sentence1995As to the second allegation, Sago relies on Nicolaou v. State, 534 So. 2d 168, 174 (Miss. 1988), where the supreme court reversed a conviction based upon the giving of a supplemental instruction defining "malice aforethought." The alleged error is procedurally barred. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Haynes v. State
green
2 sentences2008Haynes, 451 So.2d at 231 . 2006Id. at 229-30 . 15 Additionally, the supplemental instruction in Haynes likely had accentuated an already erroneous instruction. | 2 | 2006–2008 |
Shaw v. State
green
2 sentences2005Shaw, 540 So.2d at 30 . 1994The Mississippi Supreme Court also addressed this issue in Shaw v. State, 540 So. 2d 26 (Miss. 1989), where a supplemental instruction was given on the distinction between murder and manslaughter. | 2 | 1994–2005 |
Hughes v. State
green
1 sentence2017Hughes v. State , 983 So.2d 270 , 280 (¶ 41) (Miss. 2008). ¶ 18. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Pittman v. State
green
1 sentence2016It should not have been suggested to the jury that they must find Willie guilty of murder if they found him “guilty” of possessing the gun, because—at the least—such an instruction contradicted the correct instruction informing the jury it must find him guilty of the elements of deliberate design murder. ‘When a jury is given instructions which are in hopeless conflict this Court is compelled to reverse because it cannot be said that the jury verdict was founded on correct principles of law.” Scott v. State, 446 So.2d 580, 588 (Miss. 1984) (citing Pittman v. State, 297 So.2d 888 (Miss. 1974)); | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Caldwell v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1970Caldwell v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 248 Miss. 767 , 160 So.2d 209 (1964). 1970Caldwell v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 248 Miss. 767 , 160 So.2d 209 (1964). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.