supplemental instruction in Texas

2011See Daniell , 848 S.W.2d at 147 (noting that under article 36.16, an additional charge may be given after arguments at the request of the jury); Guajardo , 176 S.W.3d at 406 (“A trial court is allowed to give a supplemental instruction if requested by the jury.”); Garza v. State , 55 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref’d) (stating that if prerequisites of article 36.16 are met, a supplemental charge may be given).

2011See Daniell, 848 S.W.2d at 147 (noting that under article 36.16, an additional charge may be given after arguments at the request of the jury); Guajardo, 176 S.W.3d at 406 (―A trial court is allowed to give a supplemental instruction if requested by the jury.‖); Garza v. State, 55 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref‘d) (stating that if prerequisites of article 36.16 are met, a supplemental charge may be given). 9 Appellant cites to—Herrera v. State, 848 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no pet.)—is not dispositive.

2020“A trial court’s substantive answer to a jury question during deliberations is considered an additional or supplemental instruction to the jury that is governed by the requirements of article 36.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” Hernandez v. State, 340 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (citing Daniell v. State, 848 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. Crim.

2011See Daniell , 848 S.W.2d at 147 (noting that under article 36.16, an additional charge may be given after arguments at the request of the jury); Guajardo , 176 S.W.3d at 406 (“A trial court is allowed to give a supplemental instruction if requested by the jury.”); Garza v. State , 55 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref’d) (stating that if prerequisites of article 36.16 are met, a supplemental charge may be given).

2011See Daniell , 848 S.W.2d at 147 (noting that under article 36.16, an additional charge may be given after arguments at the request of the jury); Guajardo , 176 S.W.3d at 406 (“A trial court is allowed to give a supplemental instruction if requested by the jury.”); Garza v. State , 55 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref’d) (stating that if prerequisites of article 36.16 are met, a supplemental charge may be given).

2011See Daniell, 848 S.W.2d at 147 (noting that under article 36.16, an additional charge may be given after arguments at the request of the jury); Guajardo, 176 S.W.3d at 406 (―A trial court is allowed to give a supplemental instruction if requested by the jury.‖); Garza v. State, 55 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref‘d) (stating that if prerequisites of article 36.16 are met, a supplemental charge may be given). 9 Appellant cites to—Herrera v. State, 848 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no pet.)—is not dispositive.

2022See Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tex. Crim.

2005Id. (quoting Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tex. Crim.

2012As the Court explained in Penry , the instruction considered there “placed law-abiding jurors in an impossible situation” because “answering the special issues in the mode prescribed by the supplemental instruction [which allowed the jury to consider mitigating evidence to mitigate punishment even if it answered “yes” to all three special issues] necessarily meant ignoring the verdict form instructions [which required the jury to answer “yes” or “no” *393 to three special issues solely based on the evidence and gave no other avenue to mitigate punishment].” Penry, 532 U.S. at 799-800 , 121 S.C

2012As the Court explained in Penry , the instruction considered there “placed law-abiding jurors in an impossible situation” because “answering the special issues in the mode prescribed by the supplemental instruction [which allowed the jury to consider mitigating evidence to mitigate punishment even if it answered “yes” to all three special issues] necessarily meant ignoring the verdict form instructions [which required the jury to answer “yes” or “no” *393 to three special issues solely based on the evidence and gave no other avenue to mitigate punishment].” Penry, 532 U.S. at 799-800 , 121 S.C

2025He also cites authority indicating that, when a jury returns its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction, this “suggests the possibility of coercion.” Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 (jury reached unanimous verdict thirty minutes after Allen charge was issued).

1998See id., 484 U.S. at 241 , 108 S.Ct. at 552 , 98 L.Ed.2d at 579 .

2022Gamblin v. State, 476 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim.

2022Gamblin, 476 S.W.2d at 20 ; Wade, 164 S.W.3d at 795 .

2014The reviewing court found reversible error because the supplemental instruction was equivalent to the trial court’s “answering defense counsel’s oral argument with a written rebuttal.” Id. at 811 , quoting Moore v. State, 848 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d).

2013The reviewing court found reversible error because the supplemental instruction was equivalent to the trial court’s “answering defense counsel’s oral argument with a written rebuttal.” Id. at 811 (quoting Moore v. State, 848 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 15 Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d)).

2011We do not read article 36.16 as requiring a trial court to submit a supplemental instruction in every instance that a jury requests additional information. [9] See Mauricio v. State , 293 S.W.3d 756, 759 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (declining to accept appellant’s argument that trial court was required under article 36.16 to submit a supplemental instruction containing a “reasonable doubt” definition simply because the jury requested it).

2011We do not read article 36.16 as requiring a trial court to submit a supplemental instruction in every instance that a jury requests additional information. 9 See Mauricio v. State, 293 S.W.3d 756, 759 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (declining to accept appellant‘s argument that trial court was required under article 36.16 to submit a supplemental instruction containing a ―reasonable doubt‖ definition simply because the jury requested it).

2006See Ex parte Smith, 132 S.W.3d at 416 (declining to impose procedural bar and addressing merits of Smith's claim); see also Maj. op. supra at 462 & n. 10 ("We rejected [Smith's direct appeal] claim and held that... the trial judge's supplemental instruction provided a sufficient vehicle for the jury to fully consider all of that evidence"); see Applicant's Reply Brief at 2 n.* (noting that the State has taken mutually exclusive positions throughout the case regarding error preservation).

2006See Ex parte Smith, 132 S.W.3d at 416 (declining to impose procedural bar and addressing merits of Smith’s claim); see also Maj. op. supra at 462 & n. 10 (“We rejected [Smith’s direct appeal] claim and held that ... the trial judge’s supplemental instruction provided a sufficient vehicle for the jury to fully consider all of that evidence”); see Applicant’s Reply Brief at 2 n.* (noting that the State has taken mutually exclusive positions throughout the case regarding error preservation).

2005See id.

2005See id.

1997See Martinez v. State, 833 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). *872 Although rule 286 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does allow for additional argument following a supplemental instruction, permitting such argument is expressly committed to the trial court’s discretion.

1997See Martinez v. State, 833 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). *872 Although rule 286 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does allow for additional argument following a supplemental instruction, permitting such argument is expressly committed to the trial court’s discretion.

2021If, u[p]on the other hand, the majority were for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority. 164 U.S. at 501 , 17 S. Ct. at 157 . 9 To the extent the State argues that the supplemental instruction here was not a true Allen charge and therefore subject to a different analysis than that put forth in Stevens, we disagree.

2021If, u[p]on the other hand, the majority were for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority. 164 U.S. at 501 , 17 S. Ct. at 157 . 9 To the extent the State argues that the supplemental instruction here was not a true Allen charge and therefore subject to a different analysis than that put forth in Stevens, we disagree.

2014The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Murray was constructively denied a right to counsel by the supplemental instruction which was substantially different than the charge which defense counsel had originally made and which had the effect “tantamount to denying jury argument . . . .” Id. at 810-12 .

2014The reviewing court found reversible error because the supplemental instruction was equivalent to the trial court’s “answering defense counsel’s oral argument with a written rebuttal.” Id. at 811 , quoting Moore v. State, 848 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d).

2024Lucio, 353 S.W.3d at 875 .

2024Id.

2023Earnhart v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444 , 449–50 (Tex. Crim.

2014See Earnhart, 582 S.W.2d at 450 .

2025Finally, Sanchez observes that “[i]f a trial judge inquires into the numerical division of the jury and then gives an Allen charge, the charge is per se coercive and requires reversal.” United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892 , 893–94 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926) (finding that a trial court may not “inquir[e] of a jury, unable to agree, the extent of its numerical division”)).

2025P. 38.1(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (k); see also In re Hammond, No. 04-17-00371-CV, 2018 WL 843062 , at *1–3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 14, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellant’s brief violated Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure where it did not “include a clear and concise argument for the contentions made”); Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 896 (“[S]tatements of fact must be supported by direct references to the record that are precise in locating 1 On September 15, 2025, Rojas filed a document titled, “Supplemental brief,” which also does not comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Proc