8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Christopher K. v. Markaa S.green1 sentence2019Father counters that these statutes did not apply because Mother’s allegations “have all gone unsubstantiated.” ¶23 When considering the child’s best interests, the superior court “must consider all relevant factors, including those enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-403(A).” Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 301, ¶ 18 (App. 2013). | 1 | 1 |
Volk v. Bramegreen1 sentence2019See Volk, 235 Ariz. at 469, ¶ 22 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boltongreen1 sentence2018State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309 (1995). ¶32 Although the instruction may reflect a correct statement of law, the italicized comments in the State’s rebuttal argument reflect that the State, contrary to Mullet’s argument, did not seek a conviction merely based on Mullet’s manipulation of the invoices. | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Andy Daniel Almeidagreen2 sentences2016See Almeida, 238 Ariz. 77, ¶ 17 , 356 P.3d at 826 . 2016See Almeida, 238 Ariz. 77, ¶ 17 , 356 P.3d at 826 . | 1 | 1 |
Rollins v. Stategreen1 sentence2014This often occurs “where the supplemental instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to address effectively in summation the offense on which he is ultimately convicted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459-60 (9th Cir.1988); Rollins v. State, 757 P.2d 601, 602 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988); Garza, 55 S.W.3d at 77-78 ; People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (2000); People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (1979); Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d 655, ¶¶ 24-25 ; but see Cheely v. State, 850 P.2d 653, 663 (Alaska Ct.App.1993) (n | 1 | 1 |
People v. Millsapgreen2 sentences2014This often occurs “where the supplemental instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to address effectively in summation the offense on which he is ultimately convicted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459-60 (9th Cir.1988); Rollins v. State, 757 P.2d 601, 602 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988); Garza, 55 S.W.3d at 77-78 ; People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (2000); People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (1979); Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d 655, ¶¶ 24-25 ; but see Cheely v. State, 850 P.2d 653, 663 (Alaska Ct.App.1993) (n 2014This often occurs “where the supplemental instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to address effectively in summation the offense on which he is ultimately convicted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459-60 (9th Cir.1988); Rollins v. State, 757 P.2d 601, 602 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988); Garza, 55 S.W.3d at 77-78 ; People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (2000); People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (1979); Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d 655, ¶¶ 24-25 ; but see Cheely v. State, 850 P.2d 653, 663 (Alaska Ct.App.1993) (n | 1 | 1 |
People v. Richardsgreen1 sentence2014This often occurs “where the supplemental instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to address effectively in summation the offense on which he is ultimately convicted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459-60 (9th Cir.1988); Rollins v. State, 757 P.2d 601, 602 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988); Garza, 55 S.W.3d at 77-78 ; People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (2000); People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (1979); Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d 655, ¶¶ 24-25 ; but see Cheely v. State, 850 P.2d 653, 663 (Alaska Ct.App.1993) (n | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jeffrey Gaskins, AKA Jeffery Gaskingreen1 sentence2014This often occurs “where the supplemental instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to address effectively in summation the offense on which he is ultimately convicted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459-60 (9th Cir.1988); Rollins v. State, 757 P.2d 601, 602 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988); Garza, 55 S.W.3d at 77-78 ; People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (2000); People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (1979); Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d 655, ¶¶ 24-25 ; but see Cheely v. State, 850 P.2d 653, 663 (Alaska Ct.App.1993) (n | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2004Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens' concurrence in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 587 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)). ¶ 25 The above supplemental test is similar to the test the United States Supreme Court used in analyzing a defendant's right to a public trial under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 , 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). 2004Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens' concurrence in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 587 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)). ¶ 25 The above supplemental test is similar to the test the United States Supreme Court used in analyzing a defendant's right to a public trial under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 , 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garcia-Contrerasgreen2 sentences2004See State v. Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144, 148-49, ¶¶ 17-22 , 953 P.2d 536, 540-41 (1998) (absence of defendant in selecting jury is structural error); Dann, 205 Ariz. at 575, ¶ 72 , 74 P.3d at 249 (emphasizing importance of having defendant present in matters dealing with the jury). 2004See State v. Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144, 148-49, ¶¶ 17-22 , 953 P.2d 536, 540-41 (1998) (absence of defendant in selecting jury is structural error); Dann, 205 Ariz. at 575, ¶ 72 , 74 P.3d at 249 (emphasizing importance of having defendant present in matters dealing with the jury). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Danngreen2 sentences2004It also meets the underlying concerns stated in Summerlin, Justice White's dissent in Fulminante and most of the concerns of the more restrictive tests used for structural error. ¶ 26 Applying this test to the important issue of the defendant being present before the jury, Dann, 205 Ariz. at 575, ¶ 72 , 74 P.3d at 249 , I conclude the return of the verdict in absentia here was structural error. 2004It also meets the underlying concerns stated in Summerlin, Justice White's dissent in Fulminante and most of the concerns of the more restrictive tests used for structural error. ¶ 26 Applying this test to the important issue of the defendant being present before the jury, Dann, 205 Ariz. at 575, ¶ 72 , 74 P.3d at 249 , I conclude the return of the verdict in absentia here was structural error. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Levatogreen2 sentences2004Levato, 186 Ariz. at 444 n. 2, 924 P.2d at 448 (holding that issue need not be addressed). 2004Levato, 186 Ariz. at 444 n. 2, 924 P.2d at 448 (holding that issue need not be addressed). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stella Maudine Nickellgreen1 sentence1996United States v. Nickell, 883 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir.1989). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cheely v. Stategreen1 sentence2014This often occurs “where the supplemental instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to address effectively in summation the offense on which he is ultimately convicted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459-60 (9th Cir.1988); Rollins v. State, 757 P.2d 601, 602 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988); Garza, 55 S.W.3d at 77-78 ; People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (2000); People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (1979); Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d 655, ¶¶ 24-25 ; but see Cheely v. State, 850 P.2d 653, 663 (Alaska Ct.App.1993) (n | 1 | 1 |
Garza v. Stategreen2 sentences2014This often occurs “where the supplemental instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to address effectively in summation the offense on which he is ultimately convicted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459-60 (9th Cir.1988); Rollins v. State, 757 P.2d 601, 602 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988); Garza, 55 S.W.3d at 77-78 ; People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (2000); People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (1979); Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d 655, ¶¶ 24-25 ; but see Cheely v. State, 850 P.2d 653, 663 (Alaska Ct.App.1993) (n 2014This often occurs “where the supplemental instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to address effectively in summation the offense on which he is ultimately convicted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459-60 (9th Cir.1988); Rollins v. State, 757 P.2d 601, 602 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988); Garza, 55 S.W.3d at 77-78 ; People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (2000); People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (1979); Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d 655, ¶¶ 24-25 ; but see Cheely v. State, 850 P.2d 653, 663 (Alaska Ct.App.1993) (n | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stanley v. Illinois
green
1 sentence2019She contends the additional time was necessary to ensure she had a meaningful opportunity to be heard because she would have presented evidence making clear that the presumptions codified in A.R.S. §§ 25-403.03 and -403.04 barred Father from exercising legal decision-making.2 Father asserts the court afforded 2 Mother also suggests the lack of time violated her substantive due process rights, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
1 sentence2019She contends the additional time was necessary to ensure she had a meaningful opportunity to be heard because she would have presented evidence making clear that the presumptions codified in A.R.S. §§ 25-403.03 and -403.04 barred Father from exercising legal decision-making.2 Father asserts the court afforded 2 Mother also suggests the lack of time violated her substantive due process rights, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State of Arizona v. Dale Shawn Hausner
green
2 sentences2018State v. Hausner , 230 Ariz. 60 , 82 ¶ 99, 280 P.3d 604 (2012) (citing Tuilaepa v. California , 512 U.S. 967 , 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630 , 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994) ). 2018State v. Hausner , 230 Ariz. 60 , 82 ¶ 99, 280 P.3d 604 (2012) (citing Tuilaepa v. California , 512 U.S. 967 , 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630 , 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Tuilaepa v. California
green
2 sentences2018State v. Hausner , 230 Ariz. 60 , 82 ¶ 99, 280 P.3d 604 (2012) (citing Tuilaepa v. California , 512 U.S. 967 , 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630 , 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994) ). 2018State v. Hausner , 230 Ariz. 60 , 82 ¶ 99, 280 P.3d 604 (2012) (citing Tuilaepa v. California , 512 U.S. 967 , 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630 , 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Co.
green
1 sentence2014This often occurs “where the supplemental instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to address effectively in summation the offense on which he is ultimately convicted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459-60 (9th Cir.1988); Rollins v. State, 757 P.2d 601, 602 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988); Garza, 55 S.W.3d at 77-78 ; People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (2000); People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (1979); Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d 655, ¶¶ 24-25 ; but see Cheely v. State, 850 P.2d 653, 663 (Alaska Ct.App.1993) (n | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Thurmond
green
1 sentence2014This often occurs “where the supplemental instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to address effectively in summation the offense on which he is ultimately convicted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459-60 (9th Cir.1988); Rollins v. State, 757 P.2d 601, 602 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988); Garza, 55 S.W.3d at 77-78 ; People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155 , 244 Ill.Dec. 54 , 724 N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (2000); People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (1979); Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d 655, ¶¶ 24-25 ; but see Cheely v. State, 850 P.2d 653, 663 (Alaska Ct.App.1993) (n | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Waller v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2004Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens' concurrence in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 587 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)). ¶ 25 The above supplemental test is similar to the test the United States Supreme Court used in analyzing a defendant's right to a public trial under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 , 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). 2004Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens' concurrence in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 587 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)). ¶ 25 The above supplemental test is similar to the test the United States Supreme Court used in analyzing a defendant's right to a public trial under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 , 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2004Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens' concurrence in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 587 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)). ¶ 25 The above supplemental test is similar to the test the United States Supreme Court used in analyzing a defendant's right to a public trial under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 , 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). 2004Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens' concurrence in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 587 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)). ¶ 25 The above supplemental test is similar to the test the United States Supreme Court used in analyzing a defendant's right to a public trial under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 , 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Neder v. United States
green
2 sentences2004Neder, 527 U.S. at 9 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 . ¶ 43 The only two elements which some of the more stringent tests include and which could be considered omitted from the supplemental test are that the error pervade the entire trial and that it affect the truth-finding function of the jury. 2004Neder, 527 U.S. at 9 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 . ¶ 43 The only two elements which some of the more stringent tests include and which could be considered omitted from the supplemental test are that the error pervade the entire trial and that it affect the truth-finding function of the jury. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Berry v. McLeod
green
2 sentences2002That the jury returned appropriately consistent verdicts after a supplemental instruction confirms that the jury neither disregarded its instructions nor was hopelessly confused. ¶ 47 Defendants rely on Berry v. McLeod, 124 Ariz. 346 , 604 P.2d 610 (1979), but that case does not show that the inconsistency here was incurable. 2002That the jury returned appropriately consistent verdicts after a supplemental instruction confirms that the jury neither disregarded its instructions nor was hopelessly confused. ¶ 47 Defendants rely on Berry v. McLeod, 124 Ariz. 346 , 604 P.2d 610 (1979), but that case does not show that the inconsistency here was incurable. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.