supplemental instruction in Rhode Island

2025We view our holding in State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894 (R.I. 2003), as more akin to the facts and circumstances presented in this case. 5 “An Allen charge is a supplemental jury instruction given by the court to encourage a deadlocked jury, after prolonged deliberations, to reach a verdict.” State v. Gordon, 30 A.3d 636 , 640 n.9 (R.I. 2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Vargas, 21 A.3d 347 , 351 n.8 (R.I. 2011)). - 20 - It is well settled that when this Court is tasked with assessing whether a trial justice’s Allen charge was permissible, we review the supplemental instruction “in its

2005On review, we “consider the propriety of the trial justice’s supplemental instruction ‘in its context and under all the circumstances.’ ” State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 899-900 (R.I.2003) (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 , 85 S.Ct. 1059 , 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965) (per curiam)).

2025We view our holding in State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894 (R.I. 2003), as more akin to the facts and circumstances presented in this case. 5 “An Allen charge is a supplemental jury instruction given by the court to encourage a deadlocked jury, after prolonged deliberations, to reach a verdict.” State v. Gordon, 30 A.3d 636 , 640 n.9 (R.I. 2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Vargas, 21 A.3d 347 , 351 n.8 (R.I. 2011)). - 20 - It is well settled that when this Court is tasked with assessing whether a trial justice’s Allen charge was permissible, we review the supplemental instruction “in its

2005The trial justice was attempting to balance the “conflicting policies of encouraging verdict finality and safeguarding a defendant’s right to be judged solely on evidence presented at trial.” State v. Hartley, 656 A.2d 954, 962 (R.I.1995); see State v. Souza, 425 A.2d 893, 900 (R.I.1981) (“Obviously, supplemental charges, like original charges, must be scrupulously fair to the defendant and to the state and must not infringe upon the factfinding province of the jury by coercion or improper suggestion.”).

2025We view our holding in State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894 (R.I. 2003), as more akin to the facts and circumstances presented in this case. 5 “An Allen charge is a supplemental jury instruction given by the court to encourage a deadlocked jury, after prolonged deliberations, to reach a verdict.” State v. Gordon, 30 A.3d 636 , 640 n.9 (R.I. 2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Vargas, 21 A.3d 347 , 351 n.8 (R.I. 2011)). - 20 - It is well settled that when this Court is tasked with assessing whether a trial justice’s Allen charge was permissible, we review the supplemental instruction “in its

2025We view our holding in State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894 (R.I. 2003), as more akin to the facts and circumstances presented in this case. 5 “An Allen charge is a supplemental jury instruction given by the court to encourage a deadlocked jury, after prolonged deliberations, to reach a verdict.” State v. Gordon, 30 A.3d 636 , 640 n.9 (R.I. 2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Vargas, 21 A.3d 347 , 351 n.8 (R.I. 2011)). - 20 - It is well settled that when this Court is tasked with assessing whether a trial justice’s Allen charge was permissible, we review the supplemental instruction “in its

2015Finally, we note that we consider the alternative instruction later proposed by defendant to act as a further objection to the supplemental instruction, see Perry v. Alessi, 890 A.2d 463, 470 (R.I.2006) ("He then objected to the trial justice’s failure to give eleven of his proposed instructions * * *.”); Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 348 (R.I.2002), and it is this latter objection that we address more fully in our analysis of defendant’s arguments on appeal. 20 .

2015The state responds that the trial justice did not err in this regard because a jury is presumed to understand instructions as given; the state further contends that, in view of the fact that the jury did not seek further clarification after having heard the trial justice’s supplemental instruction, the jury should be presumed to have understood. , For the reasons set forth below, we hold that defendant has waived any argument which she may have had relative to the trial justice’s declining to give the alternative instruction because that argument was not raised in a timely *242 manner before t

2015The state responds that the trial justice did not err in this regard because a jury is presumed to understand instructions as given; the state further contends that, in view of the fact that the jury did not seek further clarification after having heard the trial justice’s supplemental instruction, the jury should be presumed to have understood. , For the reasons set forth below, we hold that defendant has waived any argument which she may have had relative to the trial justice’s declining to give the alternative instruction because that argument was not raised in a timely *242 manner before t

2015Finally, we note that we consider the alternative instruction later proposed by defendant to act as a further objection to the supplemental instruction, see Perry v. Alessi, 890 A.2d 463, 470 (R.I.2006) ("He then objected to the trial justice’s failure to give eleven of his proposed instructions * * *.”); Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 348 (R.I.2002), and it is this latter objection that we address more fully in our analysis of defendant’s arguments on appeal. 20 .

2015The state responds that the trial justice did not err in this regard because a jury is presumed to understand instructions as given; the state further contends that, in view of the fact that the jury did not seek further clarification after having heard the trial justice’s supplemental instruction, the jury should be presumed to have understood. , For the reasons set forth below, we hold that defendant has waived any argument which she may have had relative to the trial justice’s declining to give the alternative instruction because that argument was not raised in a timely *242 manner before t

2015That principle, commonly referred to as the raise or waive rule, 20 is a *243 “well-established maxim,” Thornley v. Community College of Rhode Island, 107 A.3d 296 , 302 (R.I.2014), and it “imposes upon litigants a duty to raise all their claims for relief in the trial court and properly articulate them to a judge for a ruling.” D’Alessio v. State, 101 A.3d 1270, 1278 (R.I.2014) (emphasis added).

2012The cases cited by defendant fail to support his argument that the trial justice rejected Rhode Island law because, while reiterating the elements of robbery, no case has expressly defined the terms “wholly” or “permanently.” See State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726 , 729 n. 2 (R.I. 1999) (noting the word “felonious” required the intent “to deprive the victim wholly and permanently”); State v. Edwards, 478 A.2d 972, 976 (R.I.1984) (explaining that an essential element of the crime of robbery requires “[t]he specific intention to deprive another wholly and permanently of his property”); State v. Ro

2012A. Jury Instructions The defendant first contends that the trial justice erred when he provided a supplemental instruction to the jurors at their request, clarifying the meaning of “intent to permanently deprive.” The thrust of defendant’s argument is that criminal intent is satisfied only if there is a whole and permanent deprivation of a person’s property and that the trial justice “expressly rejected Rhode Island law” when he provided jury instructions that did not specifically utilize the words “wholly and permanently.” The state correctly points out that throughout this state’s long juris

2012A. Jury Instructions The defendant first contends that the trial justice erred when he provided a supplemental instruction to the jurors at their request, clarifying the meaning of “intent to permanently deprive.” The thrust of defendant’s argument is that criminal intent is satisfied only if there is a whole and permanent deprivation of a person’s property and that the trial justice “expressly rejected Rhode Island law” when he provided jury instructions that did not specifically utilize the words “wholly and permanently.” The state correctly points out that throughout this state’s long juris

2012The cases cited by defendant fail to support his argument that the trial justice rejected Rhode Island law because, while reiterating the elements of robbery, no case has expressly defined the terms “wholly” or “permanently.” See State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726 , 729 n. 2 (R.I. 1999) (noting the word “felonious” required the intent “to deprive the victim wholly and permanently”); State v. Edwards, 478 A.2d 972, 976 (R.I.1984) (explaining that an essential element of the crime of robbery requires “[t]he specific intention to deprive another wholly and permanently of his property”); State v. Ro

2006“Statements are voluntary when they are ‘the product of [a] free and rational choice.’ ” State v. Leuthavone, 640 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I.1994) (quoting State v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1062 (R.I.1981)).

2006“Statements are voluntary when they are ‘the product of [a] free and rational choice.’ ” State v. Leuthavone, 640 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I.1994) (quoting State v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1062 (R.I.1981)).

2006Furthermore, when issuing a supplemental instruction, “there [is] no necessity for the trial justice to repeat that portion of the principal charge * * *; his [or her] only responsibility in response to the requirements of due process [is] to answer the *939 jury’s specific questions.” State v. Giordano, 413 A.2d 93, 94 (R.I.1980).

2005The trial justice was attempting to balance the “conflicting policies of encouraging verdict finality and safeguarding a defendant’s right to be judged solely on evidence presented at trial.” State v. Hartley, 656 A.2d 954, 962 (R.I.1995); see State v. Souza, 425 A.2d 893, 900 (R.I.1981) (“Obviously, supplemental charges, like original charges, must be scrupulously fair to the defendant and to the state and must not infringe upon the factfinding province of the jury by coercion or improper suggestion.”).

2003United States v. Hemandez-Albino, 177 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir.1999). 7 .

2003Allen, 164 U.S. at 501 , 17 S.Ct. at 157 , 41 L.Ed. at 531 ; see also Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 , 123 S.Ct. 362, 364 , 154 L.Ed.2d 263, 269 (2002); Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237 , 108 S.Ct. at 550 , 98 L.Ed.2d at 577 .

2003Allen, 164 U.S. at 501 , 17 S.Ct. at 157 , 41 L.Ed. at 531 ; see also Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 , 123 S.Ct. 362, 364 , 154 L.Ed.2d 263, 269 (2002); Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237 , 108 S.Ct. at 550 , 98 L.Ed.2d at 577 .

2003We consider the propriety of the trial justice’s supplemental instruction “in *900 its context and under all the circumstances.” Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 , 85 S.Ct. 1059, 1060 , 13 L.Ed.2d 957, 958 (1965) (per curiam); see also Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237 , 108 S.Ct. 546, 550 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568, 577 (1988).

2003We consider the propriety of the trial justice’s supplemental instruction “in *900 its context and under all the circumstances.” Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 , 85 S.Ct. 1059, 1060 , 13 L.Ed.2d 957, 958 (1965) (per curiam); see also Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237 , 108 S.Ct. 546, 550 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568, 577 (1988).

1994See State v. Bassett, 447 A.2d 371, 375 (R.I.1982).

1983See State v. Souza, R.I., 425 A.2d 893, 899-901 (1981) and State v. Rogers, R.I., 420 A.2d 1363, 1366-68 (1980).

1983See State v. Souza, R.I., 425 A.2d 893, 899-901 (1981) and State v. Rogers, R.I., 420 A.2d 1363, 1366-68 (1980).