supplemental instruction in California

2025(Id. at pp. 886, 889.) The appellate court agreed that the supplemental instruction erroneously shifted the burden of proof on attempted voluntary manslaughter to the defendant. ( Franklin, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 889-890.) Nonetheless, it concluded that reversal was not required because, in light of the jury’s other findings based on other instructions, the defendant “fail[ed] to establish prejudice flowing” from the instructional error beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard articulated in Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .

2023Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information.” (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 97 .) We apply “the abuse of discretion standard of review to any decision by a trial court to instruct, or not to instruct, in its exercise of its supervision over a deliberating jury.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690 , 745–746.) “If a supplemental instruction is given, however, its correctness presents a question of law that we

2025(Gainer, at p. 852; People v. Whaley (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 968, 984 (Whaley) [concluding that an instruction containing the statement that jurors should arrive at a verdict only if they could do so without violence to their individual judgment was not an impermissible Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492 charge].) Because the jury continued to deliberate for about another day and continued to be deadlocked on three counts after receiving the supplemental instruction, the record does not support the claim that the supplemental instruction coerced the jury to reach a verdict.

2025And it did not instruct any juror to surrender to the views of other jurors. 9 As in Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th 718 , Whaley, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 968 , and Moore, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1105 , considering the entire charge to the jury, we conclude the trial court did not err in giving the supplemental instruction.

2021(Lua, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016 .) As Franklin explained, however, the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies only to “the decision to provide [or not provide] further instructions in response to an inquiry.” (People v. Franklin, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 887, fn. 4 .) “If a supplemental instruction is given, . . . its correctness presents a question of law that we review de novo.” (Ibid.; see People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) In determining whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury, “the question is whether there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the j

2018(See People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193 , 218, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 551 , 82 P.3d 755 ["The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly state the law"].) Relying on section 1138 cases where defense attorneys explicitly agreed to courts' proposed responses, the People argue that Franklin waived any claim of error on appeal through his trial counsel's assent to the response.

2022(People v. Ardoin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 102, 129 (Ardoin), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 214 , citing U.S. v. Fontenot (9th Cir. 1994) 14 F.3d 1364 , 1368 & People v. Bishop (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 220, 231-235 (Bishop).) However, additional argument is not required when a supplemental instruction clarifies an existing theory.

2022(Cf. Fontenot, at p. 1368; Bishop, at pp. 231-235.) We review the decision to issue a supplemental instruction for abuse of discretion. (§§ 1093.5, 1094; Ardoin, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 127 ; People v. Smith (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 7, 16 .) Defendant claims that by waiting until just before the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument to rule on the request to instruct the jury on CALCRIM No. 207, the trial court violated section 1093.5, deprived him a meaningful opportunity to defend himself in light of the instruction, and violated due process.

2013(See People v. Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1251-1252; Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 485 .) Defendants further argue the trial court compounded its error by giving the supplemental instruction.

2013(See People v. Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1251-1252; Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 485 .) Defendants further argue the trial court compounded its error by giving the supplemental instruction.

1971Without this instruction the trial court deprives defendant of his ‘constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence.’ (People v. Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 730 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 382 P.2d 33 ].) “If upon retrial the evidence indicates that defendant was unconscious at the time of the offense due to voluntary intoxication, the trial judge should give this supplemental instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

1971Without this instruction the trial court deprives defendant of his ‘constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence.’ (People v. Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 730 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 382 P.2d 33 ].) “If upon retrial the evidence indicates that defendant was unconscious at the time of the offense due to voluntary intoxication, the trial judge should give this supplemental instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

2022(People v. Ardoin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 102, 129 (Ardoin), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 214 , citing U.S. v. Fontenot (9th Cir. 1994) 14 F.3d 1364 , 1368 & People v. Bishop (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 220, 231-235 (Bishop).) However, additional argument is not required when a supplemental instruction clarifies an existing theory.

2022(Bishop, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 235 [“defense counsel did not seek leave to reopen arguments to address” the 19 instructional change]; cf. People v. Young (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1171 [defendant’s failure to object to having case reopened to present additional closing argument to jury forfeited the issue on appeal].) Moreover, even if defendant’s challenge was not forfeited, and even if we were to find error, defendant fails to show the error prejudiced his defense because the supplemental instruction only clarified the prosecutor’s existing theory, and was a correct statement of the

2010The instruction considered in its totality properly stated the role of sympathy in the deliberations (see People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 601 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131 , 199 P.3d 535 ]), and it also properly stated the requirement that the jury weigh all the evidence in reaching the verdict, assigning whatever weight it deemed appropriate to each factor.

2010The instruction considered in its totality properly stated the role of sympathy in the deliberations (see People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 601 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131 , 199 P.3d 535 ]), and it also properly stated the requirement that the jury weigh all the evidence in reaching the verdict, assigning whatever weight it deemed appropriate to each factor.

1982The same general holding is found in Steed v. City of Long Beach (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 488, 491-492 [ 315 P.2d 101 ], where it was held that a supplemental claim filed after the 90-day statutory period had expired could not relate back to the filing of the original claim.

1982The same general holding is found in Steed v. City of Long Beach (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 488, 491-492 [ 315 P.2d 101 ], where it was held that a supplemental claim filed after the 90-day statutory period had expired could not relate back to the filing of the original claim.

1969Without this instruction the trial court deprives defendant of his "constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence." ( People v. Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 730 .) If upon retrial the evidence indicates that defendant was unconscious at the time of the offense due to voluntary intoxication, the trial judge should give this supplemental instruction on involuntary manslaughter. ( People v. Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d 303, 316-317 ; People v. Baker (1954) 42 Cal.2d 550, 575 [ 268 P.2d 705 ].) In addition, if upon retrial the evidence indicates that

1969Without this instruction the trial court deprives defendant of his "constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence." ( People v. Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 730 .) If upon retrial the evidence indicates that defendant was unconscious at the time of the offense due to voluntary intoxication, the trial judge should give this supplemental instruction on involuntary manslaughter. ( People v. Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d 303, 316-317 ; People v. Baker (1954) 42 Cal.2d 550, 575 [ 268 P.2d 705 ].) In addition, if upon retrial the evidence indicates that

2025And it did not instruct any juror to surrender to the views of other jurors. 9 As in Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th 718 , Whaley, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 968 , and Moore, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1105 , considering the entire charge to the jury, we conclude the trial court did not err in giving the supplemental instruction.

2025And it did not instruct any juror to surrender to the views of other jurors. 9 As in Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th 718 , Whaley, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 968 , and Moore, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1105 , considering the entire charge to the jury, we conclude the trial court did not err in giving the supplemental instruction.

2021(See People v. Whaley, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 983 [concluding trial court’s instruction to the deadlocked jury was not coercive in part because “we observe that the United States Supreme Court has stated that where, as here, defense counsel does not object to a supplemental instruction, ‘such an omission indicates that the potential for coercion argued now was not apparent to one on the spot’”], quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 240 .) Finally, that the jury remained deadlocked on one of the two counts charged confirms the jurors did not view the court’s remarks as an app

2013However, it does support our conclusion that the instruction as a whole was not coercive: “[W]here, as here, defense counsel does not object to a supplemental instruction, ‘such an omission indicates that the potential for coercion argued now was not apparent to one on the spot.’ ” (People v. Whaley (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 968, 983 , quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 240 .) In a related point, defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because “at a crucial moment in the jury’s deliberations--the announcement of an impasse after a lengthy deliberation

2025Although “ ‘[w]e review de novo the legal accuracy of any supplemental instructions provided’ ” (People v. Fleming (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 754, 765-766 ), it has long been recognized that the decision whether to give a supplemental instruction in the first instance is a matter of discretion ( Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 745-746).

2023Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information.” (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 97 .) We apply “the abuse of discretion standard of review to any decision by a trial court to instruct, or not to instruct, in its exercise of its supervision over a deliberating jury.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690 , 745–746.) “If a supplemental instruction is given, however, its correctness presents a question of law that we

2023(People v. Lua, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016 .) The abuse-of-discretion standard only applies to “the decision to provide [or not provide] further instructions in response to an inquiry.” (People v. Franklin (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 881, 887, fn. 4 .) “If a supplemental instruction is given, … its correctness presents a question of law that we review de novo.” (Ibid.) Section 12022.7, subdivision (a), applies to any person who (1) personally inflicts, (2) great bodily injury, (3) on any person other than an accomplice, (4) in the commission of a felony or attempted felony. (§ 12022.7, subd. (

2022(People v. Lua, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016 .) The abuse-of-discretion standard only applies to “the decision to provide [or not provide] further instructions in response to an inquiry.” (Franklin, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 887, fn. 4 .) “If a supplemental instruction is given, … its correctness presents a question of law that we review de novo.” (Ibid.) In reviewing a claim that the court’s instructions were incorrect or misleading, we must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions as asserted by the defendant.

1971(People v. Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d 303, 315-316 ; People v. Castillo, 70 Cal.2d 264, 269-270 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 449 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, 323 .) But under cases antedating Mosher , a defendant asserting the defense of diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication was entitled to a supplemental instruction on involuntary manslaughter only where there was evidence that he was intoxicated to the degree of unconsciousness.

1969Without this instruction the trial court deprives defendant of his "constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence." ( People v. Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 730 .) If upon retrial the evidence indicates that defendant was unconscious at the time of the offense due to voluntary intoxication, the trial judge should give this supplemental instruction on involuntary manslaughter. ( People v. Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d 303, 316-317 ; People v. Baker (1954) 42 Cal.2d 550, 575 [ 268 P.2d 705 ].) In addition, if upon retrial the evidence indicates that

2022DISCUSSION Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for a supplemental hearing to collect and preserve mitigating evidence tied to his youth at the time he committed his offenses for an eventual parole hearing because its ruling shows the court misunderstood the scope and nature of its discretion to order a supplemental sentencing proceeding pursuant to section 1203.01 and Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th 439 . 5 Section 1203.01 “provides that, postjudgment, the trial court may generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant and the crime to the Department of 4 Corre

2022DISCUSSION Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for a supplemental hearing to collect and preserve mitigating evidence tied to his youth at the time he committed his offenses for an eventual parole hearing because its ruling shows the court misunderstood the scope and nature of its discretion to order a supplemental sentencing proceeding pursuant to section 1203.01 and Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th 439 . 5 Section 1203.01 “provides that, postjudgment, the trial court may generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant and the crime to the Department of 4 Corre

2014Next, the court found the district court’s allowance of supplemental arguments “intruded upon the jury’s fact-finding role in two ways and through two conduits: (1) the judge’s questioning as to the reasons for the deadlock required that the jury divulge the state of its unfinished deliberations, thereby violating the jury’s deliberative secrecy, [citations]; and (2) the parties’ supplemental arguments, coupled with the judge’s insistence on “1An Allen charge, the original concept of which was approved by the Supreme Court in Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492, 501-502 , is ‘a suppleme

2014Next, the court found the district court’s allowance of supplemental arguments “intruded upon the jury’s fact-finding role in two ways and through two conduits: (1) the judge’s questioning as to the reasons for the deadlock required that the jury divulge the state of its unfinished deliberations, thereby violating the jury’s deliberative secrecy, [citations]; and (2) the parties’ supplemental arguments, coupled with the judge’s insistence on “1An Allen charge, the original concept of which was approved by the Supreme Court in Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492, 501-502 , is ‘a suppleme